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ABSTRACT 
Investigating vaccine preventable diseases and outbreaks in 
Australia 
Alexis Pillsbury BA (International Relations); MIPH; MPP 
Despite having a well-established and successful National Immunisation Program 
{NIP), vaccine preventable diseases continue to affect communities and result in 
large outbreaks in Australia . Because of the dynamic nature of vaccine preventable 
diseases, surveillance and monitoring of epidemiological trend s are necessary for 
informing appropriate policy development and vaccine delivery. In this thesis, I 
present selected works under the theme of the epidemiology of vaccine 
preventable diseases which I conducted while placed at the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) from March 2012-2014 as a 
Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Scholar. The works presented 
comprise my MAE requirements, of which a core component is to investigate an 
outbreak. My first outbreak investigation was a fo?dborne outbreak of 
staphylococcal gastroenteritis at an elite athletic event, where fried rice and chicken 
were suspected as the cause. The remainder of my MAE work related to vaccine 
preventable diseases and I participated in the public health response to a state-
wide outbreak of measles, including a specific investigation to determine the source 
of infection for a cluster of four cases infected in a paediatric hospital Emergency 
Department (ED). I developed an algorithm for this contact tracing investigation, 
although the source of infection was never identified. Measles was also the subject 
of my applied epidemiological project, where I considered characteristics of measles 
in the post-elimination era with an emphasis on the role of healthcare setting 
transmissions in perpetuating outbreaks . In the 2012 outbreak, 16 individuals 
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infected with measles tran sm itted the illness to 36 others in EDs and General 
Practice (GP) clinics. In addition, I examined the vaccine effectiveness of the 
measles vaccine that may al low outbreaks to persist in a setting of high vaccine 
coverage. I analysed pertussis trends in Australia from 2006-2012, which revealed 
that the average annual notification rate was more than 2.8 times that of the 
previous decade with a significant change in the pattern of age-specific incidence. 
The steepest increases in notification rates were among children less than 10 years, 
especially those 2-4 years and 6-9 years of age. Reasons for this shift include 
increased diagnostic testing and more rapid waning of effectiveness post 
vaccination with acellular vaccines compared to whole cell vaccines used in 
previous decades. The shift was exacerbated by cessation of the 18 month dose in 
the National Immunisation Program (NIP) from 2003 . Lastly, I evaluated Australia's 
post-marketing surveillance for intussuscept ion (IS) following the introduction of 
the rotavirus vaccines in 2007. The evaluation found that despite not having 
planned surveillance, Australian systems evo lved to include several surveillance 
components that were more effective than the nation's passive adverse event 
following immunisation (AEFI) survei ll ance system at detecting cases and assessing 
causality. The work in this thesis contributed to the work of NCIRS and improves our 
understanding of the epidemiology of vaccine preventable diseases in Australia. 
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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY APPLIED 
EPIDEMIOLOGY (MAE) FIELD PLACEMENT 
Introduction 
I became aware of the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program at the time 
the program was undergoing evaluation and being re-designed. Having completed 
postgraduate studies in public policy, and then international public health, I was 
slowly but surely narrowing in on my area of interest . The Master of International 
Public Health (MIPH) had piqued my curiosity in epidemiology and Australia's Field 
Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) was exactly the type of hands on education I 
was after. I was both excited and grateful to be accepted as part of the first cohort 
in the restructured Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology in 2012. 
My field placement commenced in March 2012 at the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) located in New South Wales (NSW) 
at the Kids Research Institute within the Children's Hospital at Westmead (CHW). It 
was an ideal placement. My previous studies were social science and policy 
focussed; NCIRS, while incorporating aspects of these areas, relies heavily on 
quantitative research, at the time an area of relative inexperfence for me. I had long 
wished to participate in the meshing of epidemiological research and policy; 
placement at NCIRS offered me that opportunity. 
My primary field supervisor was Dr Helen Quinn, an epidemiologist and Research 
Fellow within the NCIRS Surveillance Unit. Dr Quinn, a 2005 graduate of the MAE 
program, holds a conjoint academic appointment as Lecturer in the Discipline of 
Paediatrics and Child Health and the School of Public Health, University of Sydney. 
During my time at NCIRS, Director Peter McIntyre also provided supervision . 
About NCIRS 
Stemming from the 1993 National Immunisation Strategy, the Australian 
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Govern ment Department of Hea lth and Ageing*(DOHA) established th e Immunise 
Australia Progra m in 1997 with its Seven Point Plan st ress ing the need for education 
and research. The Pl an specifically ca lled for the establishment of NCIRS to 
'coordinate and conduct research and analysis of epidemiological and sociological 
aspect s of immunisation and vaccin e preventable diseases (VPDs) and provide 
policy information and advice to inform future direction s for the national childhood 
immunisation program'. 1 
NCIRS was establish ed at th e CHW where it now remain s as a component of th e 
CHW's Kids Research Institute infectious disease and immunology research stream. 
NCIRS also has academic affiliation with the University of Sydney's Department of 
Paed iatrics and Child Health and School of Public Health , and simultaneously 
maintains an array of government and academic collaborations at state, national 
an d international leve ls. Operationally, NCIRS is currently divided into two sections: 
Clinical Resea rch; and Policy and Surveillance. The latter is funded primarily by 
NCIRS's main partners : the Department of Health (DOH); the NSW Min istry of 
Health ; and th e CHW. Clinical Research, howeve r, is supported by a mixture of 
competitive grants and industry supplied funding; detail s of all clinical research 
funding received are publicly available. Both an Advisory Board and a Scientific 
Advisory Committee exist to govern and oversee NCIRS activities and operations. 
*Note: Some work conducted or referred to in t his t hesis occurred prior to the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing becoming the Department of Health . 
Consequently, "Department of Health and Ageing" and "DOHA" are used when referencing 
past work. 
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Within the main operational sections, ten project groups function : 
• Evidence Based Practice and Policy Support 
• Clinical Research (including trials) 
• Surveillance (including the Australian Childhood Immunisation Registe r) 
• Adverse Events 
• Indigenous/Migrant Health 
• Communications and Education 
• Social Research 
• Serosurveillance 
• Dataset/Technology Management 
• Library and Information Management Committee2 
Broadly, NCIRS conducts research targeted at reducing the incidence of vaccine 
preventable diseases and increasing the uptake of vaccinations recommended by 
the National Immunisation Program (NIP). NCIRS also advises on vaccination s and 
VPDs, including providing information for the Australian Immunisation Handbook, 
the source of Australia's immunisation clinical guidelines. 3 NCIRS informs and offers 
recommendations to government immunisation policy in _ conjunction with the 
Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) . Moreover, NCIRS 
contributes to surveillance planning and policy, and also trains and supervises a 
range of postgraduate students. 4 
Understandably, the responsibilities, roles and staff numbers at NCIRS have 
expanded and evolved in line with the increased number of vaccinations and 
targeted age groups recommended by the NIP. In the early 1990s the NIP's 
recommended childhood vaccination schedule included diphtheria, tetanus, 
pertu·ssis, polio, measles, mumps and rubella. It has since expanded to incorporate 
hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), pneumococcal, rotavirus, 
meningococcal C, varicella, human papillomavirus (HPV) and influenza .5 
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SUMMARY: EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT 
My MAE experience kicked off with a bang. After completing my first MAE 
residential course block, I began my field placement at NCIRS. But immediately 
before even having time to learn my NCIRS's colleagues' names, Western Sydney 
Public Health Unit's (PHU) Parramatta office offered me the opportunity to become 
involved with the public health response to what was to become NSW's largest 
measles outbreak since 1998. It was fortuitous, for my subsequent involvement 
.provided the foundation for the majority of my MAE learning. 
The outbreak's index case had infected several others before being diagnosed; 
consequently the contact tracing effort was sizable. After receiving a crash course in 
measles epidemiology, I was immediately entrusted to trace and call contacts, and 
then to provide appropriate information and advice. As the outbreak grew, I later 
assisted in organising and executing multiple post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) clinics 
at the CHW for those exposed to subsequent measles cases. 
In addition to this initial assistance, I also participated in the ongoing monitoring of 
the outbreak via daily teleconferences led by Dr Vicky Sheppeard, then Manager of 
the Western Sydney Nepean and Blue Mountains PHU. It was a valuable experience, 
offering me insight into the 'real-time' monitoring and management of a disease 
outbreak. Additionally-as part of an investigation into the source of infection for a 
cluster of cases in the outbreak, a task I undertook jointly with my MAE and NCIRS 
colleague Ms May Chiew-1 accompanied Dr Sheppeard as she met staff from the 
Emergency Departments (EDs) where several cases had been exposed. Attempting 
to trace transmission lines and account for the source of infection for as many cases 
as possible is critical to stopping an outbreak and for Australia to remain on track 
for ratifying measles elimination status. 
The outbreak provided me with numerous other public health experiences . At the 
local level, I along with Ms Chiew and the public health registrar working at the 
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Western Sydney PHU at the time de livered a presentation to the NCIRS Journal Club 
and to the CHW Infectious Disease Meeting regarding the outbreak' s initial stages, 
its affected demographics, and its contributing factors. I also participated in the 
debrief convened by Dr Sheppeard with local public health officers, assessing the 
response effort's successes, challenges and limitation s. 
By September, the outbreak had spread beyond Western Sydney. The response 
effort was now being overseen by the NSW Ministry of Health, and I was requested 
by the Communicable Disease Branch to assist. It was a fine opportunity; I could 
now observe the response effort from a state-wide perspective. 
Of my roles with the Ministry, conducting ana lysis of measles exposure in 
healthcare settings-in particular, overlap times between primary and secondary 
cases-was key. Existing policy employed a two hour contact tracing rule; due to 
the abi lity of the measles virus to rema in airborne for up to two hours, PH Us were 
instructed to contact trace all potential contacts entering a location within two 
hours of an infected case departing it. My analysis, however, demonstrated a need 
to reassess th is po licy. Using data from both Western Sydney and Sydney South 
Western PHUs, I found that in this particular outbreak all known secondary ca ses 
who acqu ired measles in a healthcare setting had in fact overlapped in time and 
place wit h their source case. Consequently, I drafted a brief for the NSW Measles 
Expe rt Working Group summarising th ese findings. In this era when measles cases 
are rare, resou rces may be better spent contact tracing only those who we re known 
to have overlapped closely in time with a source case rather than adhering to the 
two hour rule. 
At the outbreak' s end, I subsequently performed more extensive analysis 
incorporating al l outbreak cases in fect ed in a healthcare setting. This work was 
conducted collabora ti vely with co lleagues from Western Sydney and Sydney South 
Western PHUs and NCIRS. In March 2013, I del ivered a presentation regarding this 
analysis at the joint Commun icable Disease Control (CDC) and Australasian Society 
for Infectious Diseases (ASID) Conference in Canberra. Th is also resulted in a draft 
manuscript to be submitted for publication. 
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My experience with the measles outbreak inspired me to conduct a vaccine 
effectiveness analysis for both the outbreak cohort and at the population level for 
notifications 2006-2012. Though the outbreak had clearly been fuelled by failure to 
vaccinate, and not vaccine failure, vaccine effectiveness analyses are nonetheless 
important components of evaluating the vaccination schedule and maintaining 
public and provider confidence in vaccines. Moreover, such analyses highlight the 
true culprit in an outbreak: vaccination coverage gaps and vulnerable 
demographics. This was the final project I conducted for my MAE. Given how much 
of my two year MAE experience was spent focused on measles, and given my field 
placement at NCIRS, this was an extremely appropriate culmination to my MAE. 
This work was provided to the NSW Ministry of Health as well as to the Measles 
Elimination Working Party and the Measles Verification Committee. 
Though measles occupied a significant proportion of my MAE time, other projects 
involved different diseases, primarily vaccine preventable . As NCIRS is required by 
its contract with the DOH to undertake periodic reviews of all vaccine preventable 
diseases, I was tasked with conducting an updated epidemiological review of 
pertussis trends in Australia for the period 2006-2012. The final report will be 
submitted to the DOH, the Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) and 
the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) and will be 
published in Communicable Diseases Intelligence (CDI). Parts of this report have also 
been used by the Pertussis Working Party in the Party's final advice to inform re-
instatement of the 18 month booster dose which was removed from the 
immunisation schedule in 2003. 
Additionally, I evaluated Australia's adverse event following immunisation (AEFI) 
surveillance of intussusception (IS) associated with the introduction of the rotavirus 
vaccines in the mid-2000s. This was not a typical disease surveillance system 
evaluation. IS surveillance was not planned or centrally managed. Efforts were 
somewhat organic in nature, relying on contributions from several existing 
surveillance systems. NCIRS-in line with the 2011 Horvath Review into the 
management of adverse events associated with Panvax and Fluvax, which 
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recommended a strengthening of Australian AEFI surveillance efforts6-views novel 
surveillance efforts, such as those compris ing of more than one survei llance 
mechanism, as key to future vaccine safety surveillance. However, no assessments 
of these 'ad hoc' surveillance efforts had yet been made. I hoped this first 
evaluat ion wou ld, idea lly, inform and assist future surveillance efforts that utilise 
multiple su rveillance mechanisms to achieve a singu lar surveillance goal. My 
preliminary results were presented at the 7th Training Programs in Epidemiology 
and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Bi-regional Scientific 
Conference in Danang, Vietnam, in November 2013. The evaluation report will be 
provided to the DOH, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) and the Advisory 
Committee on the Safety of Vaccines (ACSOV). 
Finally, as an exception to all my VPD work, I was invited to investigate a food borne 
gastroenteritis outbreak on behalf of the Western Sydney PHU in June 2012. This 
outbreak affected more than 20 individuals who had eaten dinner at a commercially 
catered buffet served at a large el ite sporting event. Though an exact food exposure 
could not be identified, laboratory tests of faecal samples were positive for 
Staphylococcal aureus. Despite being a significant contributor to fopdborne illness 
in Australia, little is published on Staphylococcal aureus or staphylococcal food 
poisoning (SFP). Consequently, I wrote a report about this investigation, co-
authored with Ms Chiew, Dr Sheppeard and Mr John Bates of Queensland Health 
Forensic and Scientific Services; the manuscript was published in June 2013 by CDI. 
Lastly, w ith NCIRS being favourably situated between the CHW and Westmead 
Hospital, I was able to attend many educational sessions at both . I also spent two 
days visiting the Institute for Clinical Pathology and Medical Research (ICPMR) at 
Westmead Hospital to learn about the services and research conducted there with a 
view to better understanding the relationship between laboratory testing and 
epidemio logy. 
I feel extremely fortunate to have been able to develop my analytical and 
quantitative skills at a wel l-respected and influential national research centre. The 
learning opportunities at NCIRS were second to none. My MAE experience was 
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greatly enhanced, however, by being offered several hands-on public health 
experiences by the Western Sydney PH U which services one of Austral ia's most 
diverse populations. The unique combination of opportunities I was afforded 
impressed upon me the va rious applications of field epidemiology. 
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SUMMARY: MAE CORE REQUIREMENTS 
Th e fo llowing list summarises the MAE core requ irement s and the specific projects 
contributing to the fulfilment of each requ irement. 
Outbreak investigation 
• An outbreak of st aphylococcal food poisoning in a com mercially ca tered 
buffet (Chapter 2) 
• Tracing lines of transmiss ion in a measles outbreak, Western Sydney, New 
South Wa les, 2012 (Chapter 3) 
Evaluation of a public health survei llance system 
• Austral ian post-licensure su rveillance for intussusception associated with 
receipt of rotavirus vaccines (Chapter 6) 
Analysis of public health data 
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• Austra lian vaccine preventable disease review series: pertussis 2006- 2012 
(Chapter 5) 
• An out break of staphylococca l food poison ing in a commercially ca t ered 
buffet (Chapter 2) 
• An assessment of measles vaccine effectiveness, Australia, 2006- 2012 
(Chapter 4) 
• Th e changing epidemiology of measles in an era of elimination: lessons from 
healthcare setting transmissions of measles during an outbreak in Austral ia, 
2012 (Chapter 4) 
Design and execution of an epidemiological study 
• An assessment of measles vaccine effectiveness, Australia, 2006-2012 
{Chapter 4) 
• The changing epidemiology of measles in an era of elimination : lessons from 
healthcare setting transmissions of measles during an outbreak in Australia, 
2012 (Chapter 4) 
• An outbreak of staphylococcal food poisoning in a commercially catered 
buffet (Chapter 2) 
• Tracing lines of transmission in a measles outbreak, Western Sydney, New 
South Wales, 2012 (Chapter 3) 
Teaching experience 
• Lessons from the Field session ('Money matters: a brief introduction to 
health economic evaluation and cost effectiveness assessments in publicly 
funding vaccines in Australia') designed and taught to four MAE colleagues 
(Chapter 7) 
• Epi lnfo'M 7 training session designed and taught with four MAE colleagues 
as part of the CDC Pre-Conference Workshop session (March 2013) 
(Chapter 7) 
• Assisted teaching sessions of the National Centre for Epidemiology and 
Population Health (NCEPH) Outbreak Investigation course to the 2013 MAE 
cohort 
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Submission of manuscript for publication in peer-reviewed 
journal 
• Pillsbury A, Chiew M, Bates J, Sheppea rd V. An outbreak of staphylococcal 
food poison ing at a commercially catered buffet. Communicable Diseases 
Intelligence. 2013; 37(2) : E144-148. (Chapter 2) 
• Pillsbury A, Quinn H, McIntyre P. Austra lian vaccine preventable disease 
review series: pertussis 2006-2012. (Submitted to CDI ; publication pending) 
(Chapter 5) 
• Th e changing epidemiology of measles in an era of elimination: lessons from 
healthcare setti ng t ransmissions of measles during an outbreak in Austra lia, 
2012 (late stage draft; to be submitted to Western Pacific Surveillance and 
Response) (Chapter 4) 
Oral conference presentation 
• 'The clinical setting is important for measles transmission: lessons from the 
2012 NSW outbreak', Joint CDC and ASID Conference, Canberra, March 2013 
(Chapter 4, Appendix) 
• 'Re-thinking traditional adverse event following immunisation (AEFI) 
surveillance: lessons from Au stralia 's successful experience with 
intussusception (15) surveillance following th e 2007 introduct ion of rotavirus 
vaccines', t h TEPHINET Bi-regional Scientific Conference, Danang, Vietnam, 
November 2013 (Chapter 6, Appendix) 
Drafting of public health communicat ion aimed at a non-
scientific audience 
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• Updating the 'Vaccines, allergy & asthma' factsheet which is one of a se ries 
of NCIRS factsheets available for immunisa tion providers and members of 
the public. This vers ion wil l ultimately replace the vers ion currently 
appearing on the NCIRS website. (Chapter 1, Appendix) 
Literature review 
• Extensive literature reviews were conducted for all project chapters 
{Chapters 2-6). 
Completion of MAE courses 
• I attended all MAE course blocks, presented all required Field Reports and 
participated in all Problems from the Field sessions. I successfully completed 
all required MAE academic courses: 
-Outbreak Investigation 
-Public Health Surveillance 
-Analysis of Public Health Data 
-Methods in Applied Epidemiological Research 
-Issues in Applied Epidemiology 
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Table 1.1. Summary of MAE core requirements included within the chapters of this thesis 
literature Data Outbreak Surveillance Epidemiological 
review analysis investigation system project 
evaluation 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
Chapter 2: 
Outbreak 
investi gation, ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
S. aureus 
Chapter 3 : 
Outbrea k 
investigation, ✓ ✓ ✓ 
measles 
Chapter 4 : 
Epidemiological ✓ ✓ ✓ 
project 
Chapter S: 
Data analysis 
✓ ✓ 
Chapter 6: 
Surveillance ✓ ✓ system 
evaluation 
Chapter 7: 
Teaching 
*Submitted or to be submitted for publication . 
Peer Oral Communication Teaching 
reviewed presentation for non- experience 
publication scientific 
audience 
✓ 
✓ 
✓* ✓ 
✓* 
✓ 
✓ 
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Appendix 1.A. Communication piece for a non-scientific 
audience 
ncirse 
NATIONAL CENTRE FOR IMMUNISATION 
RESEARCH & SURVEILLANCE 
Va ccine s, allergy & asthma 
• Asthma and allergic disease rates have increased in the past few decades 
though the cause of these increases remains unknown. 
• The 'hygiene hypothesis' has postulated that due to increased sanitation 
and hygiene children's immune systems are not primed in the way they 
used to be to fight pathogens. 
• While much research remains inconclusive, several large epidemiological 
studies have found that there is no increased risk of allergy with 
vaccination . 
Asthma and allergic disease rates have 
increased dramatically in the last few 
decades. The exact reasons for this 
remain unknown. It has been 
postulated, however, that vaccines 
may stimulate some type of change in 
the immune system which may affect 
the development of chronic allergic 
and autoimmune conditions. 
What is the proposed association 
between vaccines and allergy? 
Back in _the 1980s and 1990s, several 
researchers presented findings based 
on their observations that families 
with many children or children who 
attended day-care had lower rates of 
hay fever and eczema. 1 Another study 
demonstrated that children who first 
attend.ed day-care at an older age 
experienced an increased prevalence 
of allergy compared with children who 
first attended al a younger age.2 These 
studies were interpreted to mean that 
because children tend to pass 
infections around and therefore 
increased exposure to infectious 
pathogens- or unhygienic 
conditions-protected children from 
allergies. This became known as the 
' hygiene hypothesis ' .1 The hygiene 
hypothesis led to the suggestion that 
vaccines, because they prevent 
infections, may indirectly cause 
allergy.3 Consequently, supporters 
theorised, increasing use of 
vaccination and decreasing rates of 
disease have led to an increase in 
allergy rates. 
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ls the hygiene 
biologically plaus ible? 
hypothesis 
The idea is that childhood infections 
train the immune system to launch an 
effective defence against fore ign 
pathogens. With improved hygiene 
and sanitation, the hygiene hypothesis 
suggested that this train ing has been 
lost, allowing for an imbalanced 
immtme response. Consequently, 
when allergens are detected, the 
immune system overreacts triggering 
an allergic reaction. 
Those who have allergies have an 
exaggerated immune response which 
results in the increased production of 
allergen-specific immunoglobulin E 
(IgE). Allergens are inhaled, processed 
and presented to helper T cells. There 
are two types of helper T cells: one 
which fac ili tates the production of 
allergen-specific IgE (Th2) and one 
which decreases the production oflgE 
(Thl). Th2-type responses dominate at 
birth but earl y childhood infections 
trigger Th ! -type responses. Therefore 
the hygiene hypothesis postulates that 
a delay in childhood infections al lows 
Th2-type responses to dominate and 
persist and thus the risk of allergic 
diseases increases. Because vaccines 
prevent these infections, it is 
suggested that vaccines might 
similarl y result in increased risk of 
allergy. 4 
What does the ev idence suggest 
about the relationsh ips between 
vaccines and allergy? 
Firstly. the hygiene hypothesis 
argument has been controversial. 
Some studies seem to suppo1t it while 
others find it fla\,ved. 5•6·7 Reasons it 
may be fla wed include the fact that 
most common childhood infections are 
26 
not vaccine preventable. Moreover, 
childhood illnesses which are 
prevented by vaccination are typically 
those that are most infectious, like 
measles and pertussis. These are 
highly contagious and easily 
transm itted in settings irrespective of 
hygiene or environment. Also, Th2-
type responses are triggered by worm 
and helminth infections ~as opposed 
to Thl -type responses which are 
triggered by viruses and bacteria. 
Children with high wonn/helminth 
infection rates, however, have been 
observed to have lower incidence of 
allergies compared with other 
children.8 
Irrespective of the hygiene hypothesis, 
however, many large epidemiological 
studies have concluded that there is no 
evidence of an increased risk of 
allergic diseases associated with 
vaccination. Moreover, recent 
epidemiological studies do not suppo1t 
the idea that children who have not 
been vacci nated against infectious 
diseases have had less· allergy or 
asthma than those children who have 
received recommended vaccinations.9 
In terms of specific vaccines, the 
Bacillus Ca/me/le-Guerin or BCG 
vaccine (tuberculosis vaccine) has 
been the most studied of any vaccine 
in regards to risk of allergy; no studies 
have found an increased risk. 9 
Several early studies of the pertussis 
vaccine reported increased asthma 
diagnoses among those who had been 
vaccinated compared with those who 
had not received the vaccine. 10· 11 
These earlier studies were not as 
robust as later, larger and more 
controlled studies which have 
concluded no association between the 
pe1tussis vaccine and allergy. 12· 13•14 
Studies of the measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccine have found no link 
between vaccine and allergy. 12•13 
Similarly, no study has demonstrated 
an association between poliomyelitis 
vaccine and increased prevalence of 
allergic illness, Most studies have also 
concluded no increase associated with 
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) 
vaccine. Two Hib studies 
demonstrated a small but significant 
increase in preva lence of asthma 13•15 ; 
one of these studies, however, 
acknowledged thei r findings could 
have been infiuenced by 
methodological problems. 
Because research used to understand 
whether or not vaccination is 
associated with increased prevalence 
of allergy/asthma has been conducted 
using differing methodologies and 
study populations, and because there is 
still much that is not well understood 
regarding allergy and the immune 
system, it is difficult to confidently 
confirm or deny the connection 
between vaccines and allergy. To date, 
however, there is no evidence of 
increased risk of allergy or asthma 
associated with vaccination. 9 
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PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
Between January 2000 and March 2012, 14 staphylococcal food poisoning (SFP) 
outbreaks were recorded by OzFoodNet, affecting more than 400 individuals. Despite 
being a common cause of foodborne illness wor ldwide, little is published on SFP in 
Australia. 
On 2 June 2012, a SFP outbreak occurred at a commercially catered elite sporting 
event in Sydney. My Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology (MAE) and Nationa l 
Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) colleague Ms May Chiew 
and I were assigned to the Western Sydney Public Health Unit (PHU) to lead the 
epidemio logica l component of the outbreak investigation. 
This chapter details the ensuing epidemiological and microbiological investigations. 
Investigatory role 
The initial notification of the gastroenteritis outbreak was received by the Western 
Sydney PHU over the weekend of 2 June. PHU staff on call conducted several 
preliminary interviews with ill individuals and obtained a list of foods served by the 
caterers. Based on the timing and severity of symptoms, senior PHU members believed 
the infection likely occurred the same day as the outbreak, probably during the dinner 
service. Following this advice, Ms Chiew and I assumed responsibility for the outbreak 
investigation on Monday morning. We drafted a food exposure questionnaire based on 
the food list obtained by PHU staff and interviewed the 36 individuals who comprised 
the dining cohort of interest (Appendix 2.A). In order to inform the direction of our 
outbreak investigation and for the purposes of updating al l those with a vested 
interest, we liaised with members of the affected sporting organisation, New South 
Wales (NSW) Ambulance, NSW Food Authority, the hospitals where severely affected 
individuals had been transported, and Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific 
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Services where faecal samples had been sent. We conducted all analysis, followed up 
on the microbiological investigation and drafted the final outbreak report in 
collaboration with Dr Vicky Sheppeard of the Western Sydney PHU and Mr John Bates 
of Queensland Health Forensic and Scientific Services. 
All interviews, analysis, communication with the various parties involved, and drafting 
of the manuscript were conducted equally by Ms Chiew and me. As first author on the 
manuscript, I assumed responsibility for submitting th e publication, replying to 
reviewers' comments and finalising the manuscript. The manuscript was published in 
Communicable Diseases Intelligence (CDI) in June 2013 (Vol. 37, No. 2) and is included 
in this chapter. 
Lessons learned 
This outbreak investigation gave me the opportunity to apply the lessons learned 
during the MAE outbreak investigation course. Th e course had provided a solid 
foundation, arming me with a fram ework for approaching outbreak invest igation . 
Nonetheless, the practical application of the theory, of actua lly conducting an 
investigation on the ground and in ' real time', proved a much different experience. 
This was my first time collecting, organising and analysing my own data. It impressed 
upon me that having a thorough, cl ear questionnaire and clean data entry are critical 
to an investigation's efficiency. With respect to the analysis, I learned a useful lesson 
regarding what to do when presented with 'O cells' in the exposure-outcome two-by-
two table. In this outbreak, there were no ill people who did not eat either chicken stir-
fry or fried rice. Calculating risk ratios and strat ifying were both consequently 
impossible. Because we were unable to calcu late risk ratios for chicken stir-fry and 
fried rice, we could not simply state th at one of these two foods was the likely cause of 
the outbreak because we had a high risk ratio. We knew, however, that although the 
risk ratios for these two foods remained undefined, each yielded a significant p-value. 
No other food exposure yielded a high risk ratio; none was statisticall y significant. 
Moreover, we could calculate risk difference to demonstrate a strong associa t ion 
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between both chicken stir-fry and fried rice and illness. From our understanding of 
staphylococcal food poisoning, both chicken stir-fry and fried rice were plausible 
causes of illness. The fact that 20 out of 22 cases ate both chicken stir-fry and fried rice 
made it impossible to determine whether one exposure was singularly responsible for 
the outbreak. Cross-contamination was also a possibility. 
Leading the epidemiological component of this investigation exposed me to another 
challenge: working across the various sectors involved in a foodborne outbreak. Public 
health authorities and regulators may not always view investigation outcomes and 
response efforts in the same way. Negotiating across sectors was an eye-opening 
lesson in patience and diplomacy. 
Public health impact 
Heymann states that approximately 25% of healthy individuals are carriers of 
Staphylococcus aureus. 1 Because of this high carriage rate, strategies responding to 
and preventing 5. aureus outbreaks generally do not target carriage; instead 
transmission prevention is sought via appropriate food handling techniques . But while 
food handling guidelines exist, in practice the degree of their enforcement is 
unknowable. Outbreaks such as this, however, provide valu~ble opportunities to 
reinforce appropriate food handling. Moreover, investigating and reporting on 
outbreaks-especially those highlighted by media as this one was-are necessary 
public health responsibilities and confidence-building measures. 
Though 5. aureus is a common cause of foodborne illness, outbreaks are frequently 
underreported . For this reason, contributing investigation reports to the existing 
evidence base is important. Our investigation report was published in CDI and the 
results were presented by Dr Sheppeard to the CHW Infectious Disease Meeting. 
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AN OUTBREAK OF STAPHYLOCOCCAL FOOD 
PO ISONING IN A COMMERCIALLY CATERED BUFFET 
Alexis Pillsbury, May Chiew, John Ba tes, Vicky Sheppea rd 
Abstract 
Staphylococcal food poisoning is a common cause 
of foodborne illness. In Australia, since 2000, 
approximately 30% of foodbome Staphylococcus 
oureus outbreaks reported to O zFoodNet have 
been a ssociated with foods prepared by com-
mercial caterers. We conducted a retrospective 
cohort analysis of on outbreak of gastroinlestinal 
illness amo ng participants of an elite sporting 
event during which 22 individuals become ill 
after eating a commercially catered buffet dinner 
in June 2012. All recalled eating fried rice which 
had been intended fo r lunch service earlier that 
day and 20 of the 22 reported ealing chicken 
stir-fry. Though no food samples were available 
for a na lysis, laboratory analysis conducted on 
four faecal specimens resulted in S. aureus being 
cultured from one specimen and S. aureus entero-
toxin detected in another. The known epidemiol 
ogy of staphylococcal food poisoning suggests a 
food contaminated by a n infected food handler 
which was sub1ect to temperature abuse may have 
caused rhe outbreak. As S. aureus foodborne out-
breaks ore often underreported, this investigation 
1s a valuable contnbuhon lo the evidence-base 
and understanding of foodbo rne illness due to 
S. oureus a nd staphylococcal enterotoxin. 
Key-,vords: Staphyloco cc us a ureus, ente roioxins, 
outbreak , foodbo m e, rice, ch icke n 
Introduction 
Staphylococcal food poisoning (SFP) is a common 
cause offoodborne illness n ·orldwidc. 1•7 SFP occurs 
following lngestion of staphylornccal entc roroxins 
\\·hich are he:n res istant and arc produced in food 
fo!lo,\·ing contaml.flation by staphylococci. typi-
cally Sraph_rlococcw attrt'th. Foods rncluding sliced 
m eat. m eat products. salads. pastries. custards. 
r<nY milk and cheese products present a particular 
contamination risk.1 Such a large population of 
st3ph~,lococci is indicatiw of unhygienic food 
handling procedures and tempera cure abuse oYer a 
pe riod of time to allmY for bacterial gro\Ylh . .; 
In .-\ustralia, l.itt1e published infOrmation exists 
d escribing past SFP outbreaks. Oz Food-=" et. how-
eq:·r, collects information on all reported foodborn e 
illness outbreaks. Bcnn~enJanuan· 2000 and ..\!arch 
20 12, O zFood-="et recorded 14 S. ·aureus outbreaks 
;:iffecting --f 29 people {25 hospitalised: l d eath ). In 
just under a third of these outbreaks. m eals con-
taining chicken m:re implicated. T,.\·enty-nine per 
cent of these outbreaks \Yere associated with food 
prepared b~- a commercial caterer (OzFood~ et 
Outbreak Regis.ta. June 201 2. Unpublished data ). 
The ou tbreak 
O n 2 June 20 12, 22 indi..-iduals ,d10 had par-
ticipated in an ditc sporting eYcnt in Sydne~-
experi enced gastrointestinal symptoms after 
caring a buffe t dinner served by the commercial 
cater ing co m pan~· sen·icing the e,·enr. The day of 
the outbreak "·as the final day of the rn·o ,reek 
eYent and reportedly less busy at dinner time than 
pre,·ious m eals . The 22 indiYicluals ,,·e re part of a 
large r coh ort ofup to -fO p eople \,·ho queu ed for 
dinner sen·icc earlier than the other 500 attendees 
due to the timing of the ir responsibilities at the 
cn~nt. \Yithin hours of eating. all 22 fell ill ,,·ith 
symptoms including ,·omiting. diarrhoea and 
abdominal cramping. Six peop le "·e re transpo rted 
to hospital. The eYent organiser reported that o nly 
th e euly dining group "·as affected. 
This report summarises the epidemiological and 
microbiological inwsrigations into the cause of 
the outbreak. 
Methods 
Epidemiological investigation 
.-\s rbis epidemiological inYestigat io n ,Ya s conducted 
as part of the required pu blic h ealth respo n se to a 
reported outbreak. it \,·as not necessary to obtain 
ethical appron L 
In orde r to develop hypoth eses regarding rhe cau se 
of rh e outbreak. prel iminary inten·i e,n ,,,.e re co n-
ducted by telephone "-ith seYeral of the cases who 
attended the em ergency dep;:irtmcnt (E D) due to 
the sc \·e rity of their symptoms. \Ye drafted a food 
expo sure questionnaire based on information from 
these inten·iews and information from a copy of the 
m enu proYided by the caterers. The questionnai re 
sought basic demographic d etails. food exposures 
(lunch and dinner). symptom description and 
duration. and illness history. IndiYiduals were also 
41 
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asked \\· hether the,· \\·e re aw:ire of a1w one \\·ho had 
been ill ,,·ith gastr~ intest.in;d sym pto~11S prior to or 
fo llowing the outbrea k. 
. -\ case \\"as ddined ::ts am·o ne "·ho ate the ca tl"red 
buffet dinnl" r on 2 Tun ~ 2012 a t th e ea rh- time 
(16:00 to 17:30) and l"Xpenencl"d YOmiting ~nd/or 
diarrhol"a and abdominal cra mping commenci ng 
bet"\,·ee n 17:45 and 2 1:1 5. A confirmed case was 
someone meeting the case definition ,,·ith 5. (lffrt'lf.• 
or S. {l/fre11s toxin clerected in a stool speci m en . 
The names of the cases as \\·ell as oth c-rs who were 
thought ro ba,·e dined early \\ere prond ed by the 
en:·nt organi sers , Ambulance S('n·ice "'.'\"$\\ : and 
other intef\"i ewed :nrendees . Based on the knO\d-
edge g lean ed from these inten·ie,,·s . ,,·e conduct l" d 
a rl" crospcc ti,·e rnh ort inn~stiga ti on to id enti~-
risk factors fo r dewloping illness. Inten ·iew data 
\\·ere co lbred and arrac k races and risk ncios \Yl"r(' 
calcu lated for specific food expos u res .. -\.na lys ls w.; s 
conducted using S.--\Se softwarl" (n-rsion 9.3). 
Microbiological and environmental 
invest igatio ns 
~ o food sampll"s \\"e re .; ,·adabll" for tes ting. 
Faecal spl"cimens we re col lec ted from 5 of the 
indi...-idu als who «nended the ED. I niti a l testing 
for Clo,tridium difji"ci!c . Sn!111011el!a, 5higd!n and 
Cawp1•/obacra sp ec ies «nd norovirus was con-
ducud by the hospi tal labor«tory. 
Four speci m ens were. aYail ab le to be Sl"nt to 
Queensland H ea lth Foren sic and Sc ienti tic 
Sen·ices laborMorv \\"here they \\·ere n tl turl"d 
for ;i foll range o f entl"ric p:1t h
0
ogl" ns (includ ing 
So/monelln, Shi"gdla and Campvlobarter spec il"s) 
and ro.x in -m edi ated foodborne illness causing bac-
teria (5. 011re11., .; nd Bacill11J cere11.i ) . Samples \\"l"re 
cu Im red on Baird Parkl"r .-\g;u fo r two d:iys «t 37°C 
for 5. fllll"m.i «nd Phenol-Red Egg l.Olk Polymixin 
Agar fo r B. ce,-eu.,. T hree. faec:tl sample-s we rl" tl"sted 
fo r sm phylococca l em erotox in u si ng the Tec ra 
enzyml"-linkcd immunosorbc n1 assay (TECR.-\) .. -\ 
site inspection \\.ts conducted by KS\\· Food .--\urhoriry 
and is the su bject of:1 sqJa.r:ne interna l report. 
Resu lts 
Epidem io logical res ults 
.--\ 1otal of 36 persons ,Yho :i. te «n euly d inner 
sen·cd b,· the ca tere r ,\·ere inten·i c,Ycd, with th e 
m:i.jorie:·· imen·il"n·ecl 1 to 3 d ays after the inci-
dent. T he m edi .in age of people inten·iewed \\as 
➔ O years (range 12 to 72 years): 73cc "·ere female. 
.--\...mong the 36 pl"rsons in ten·ie"·ed. 22 (61 <"f) \\·ere 
1dl"ntiticd «s cases . including t"\,·o persons \,·ith 
laborato ry-confi rmed illnesses. 
Of the 22 cases. 18 (82!'c) \\·ere frmak, ranging 
from 12 to 69 ,·ea rs old {median 3 ➔ years). Of th ose 
"·h o did not t:;u ill. 10 (71<:"f) \\"e re temak. rnnging 
from 21 to 72 years o ld (medi an 46 years). 
Durner Lim es reported by cases ranged from 16: 00 to 
17:30. The l"p1demlc cun·e illustr::ites thl" time di stri-
bu tio n of .symprom onsets amo ng c«scs ranging O\"Cr 
a --l hour period on 2 June (Figu re I). lncub«t1on 
period s r:ingecl from I hour to 4.75 hours (axe rage 
2.5 hours). Illness typi ca lly began with the sudden 
on se t of ,·omiting. follo\\·ecl by a pe.riod of concur-
renr \"omiting- «nd di,urhoea, \,·ith a med i.in du ra-
ti on of ➔ hou;s {range 2 to 13 hours). Of th e 12 cases. 
ll experienced \"O miting (96Cf): 17 had diarrhoea 
(77%) and 10 reported «bclom.inal cr:imping (➔ 6~f). 
Six people (27t;f) were transporte:d to a loca l ED. Ko 
inten·iewecs \\"ere a\\"are of othen; w ith symptom 
onset of gastrointestin .11 il lness prior to or fo llowing 
the outbre.1k . 
Figure 1: Number of cases of gastrointest ina l 
il ln ess .tft.:r the caten~d d in n e r on 2 Ju ne." 20 12, 
by time of o n se t (n =22) 
~ 
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Time of onset 
:\ number of food items n ·e r{' sl"n-ed during lunch 
and dinner .. --\ selection ofbrl"ad. cold meats (h am. 
chi cke n , rurke,· a nd sih·e rsidc). sal«d «nd fri ed 
nee \\·ere aYa ilab ll" at lunc h . Green sa bd. cole-
slaw. m ea tballs . canne:lloni. boiled ricl" , fri ed rice, 
cl1icken stir-fry. bread rolls, jdly and yoghurt were 
sen·ed fo r din n er. Fr ied rice Intended for lunch 
ser\•ice on the da y of the ou tbrea k \,·as rl"po rtedly 
served to the e:1rh- dine rs becausl" the boi led rice fo r 
d inner sc-n· ice \\·~snot ready in Lime. 
.--\.II tnten·iewees h ad eaten dinner earh· at the 
cate red buffet w hi le on h- 1--l (391:-f) ate lun~ h th e re. 
:'.""mNy-onl" per cent ol ~ases ate bo1h chicken sti r-
fr,· ;i nc\ fri ed nee at dinner \\·i th attack rates «nd rate 
d;ffercnces of 7--l~ for chi cken stir- fn· and 71<( for 
fried rice (Tab le 1). T he risk ratios f~r bo th dishes 
\\"('re undef1nl"d. Similar!\: \\"C , \·ere u n abll" to con-
duct furth er an;i lysis using stratificatlon. Thl"refore 
it was n ot possibll" to iden tify an ;1ssociation \\·ith 
either chicken stir-fry or fried rice. 
Table l : Relative risks and attack rates for food items consumed by the cohort 
Salad 5 7 71 17 
Coleslaw 2 2 100 20 
Meatballs 15 24 63 7 
Cannelloni 14 25 56 8 
Fried rice 22 31 71 0 
Chicken stir-fry 20 · 27 74 0 
Yoghurt 5 8 63 17 
Jelly 8' 13 62 13 
Bread roll 11' 17 65 7 
2missing 
l m1ssmg 
5missing 
Microbiological and env ironmental res ults 
In.itial scrc-ening rt'.' sulrs for ;ill fa-c: spe-cime-ns \\·e-re 
negatin · for n oroYirut., C. ddficile, Salmonella, Sln"gella 
;ind Ca11ip_1•lohacrer spec ies. 
Queensland H ea lth Forensic and Scicntitic St'.'rYices 
laboratory culnired S. a1tre11s in one specimen. A.notber 
specimen tested positi,-c for S. a11rt'11_, enteroto:xin. 
Though no food samples rc-m.ainc-d for laboratory 
testing. the catering company confi rmed that food 
handling policie s ,,·c:re in pl::icc: to prc:Ye nt con-
taminatio n ,is wel l as tim e and tempe rature- abuse. 
Ko cxidence of time and tempc-rat ure abuse was 
obse r wd during die si te inspecrion. The cate ring 
comp::iny ::ilso reported that no staff members 
n·c-re knov,n to be suffe ring from gastrointestin;i l 
illnes.s during the sporting c,,ent. 
Discussion 
S. a11r('11,,; is one of the most common pathogens in 
humans. c-sti mat ec\ to co lonist ;ipproxim;;itcly 25% of 
hea lthy adults .1 fl foltiplt pathogenic strains prod11Ce 
emcroroxins \\·hich. when ingesEed, can cause ~stro-
cnter!tis.5 ln Australia. S. at11-e11.• i..ntoxication accounted 
for l % of all suspected and confirmed food borne 
outbreaks reported to OzFood:\"et bets\·een January 
2000 and i\farch 2012. Mea ls including chicken . beef 
seafood. and lamb, as well as pasta salad and rice dishes 
have all be-en implicated as source of infn tion in thc-se 
S. a111-e11.• enterotoxin outbreaks (OzFooclL"--ct Outbreak 
Register. June 2012. LTnpublished d<l.ta). 
Our findings suggested that chicken stir fry ancVor 
fried rice Wl':re the food n ~h.idc-s responsible for illness. 
?Jthough it\Yas not possible to determine risk ratios for 
fried rice: and d1ic.ken stir-fry, the attack rates and rate 
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12 
11 
5 
7 
28 
22 
14 
59 1.22 (0.70-2.13) 0.68 
59 1.70 (1.28-2.25) 0.51 
58 1.07 (0,61 -1.89) 1.00 
73 0,77 (0.47-1 .27) 0.47 
0 undefined 0.005 
0 undefined 0.0006 
61 1.03 (0. 56-1.90 ) 1.00 
59 1.04 (0.60-1.81) 1.00 
50 1.29 (0.69-2.43) 0.48 
diffrrcnces calrn!attcd support d1is conclusion. It was 
not possible to consider d1ese exposures indcpcndendy 
as all cases w ho "·ertc able to recollect reported eating 
both food i.ten1s. 
SFP outbrea ks res ult from contaminat.ion of food 
ffi rh S. Ollrf'W from food hand le rs <"i th er through 
skin infectio n on uncoYe red hands or arms, or ,·ia 
coughing o r sneezing o,·e r food rhat is n ot sub-
jectl'."d to further cooking. Current industry gu ide-
lines requ ire food h and lers to ensure thelr bodies. 
and anything from their bod ies or cloth ing, do 
not co n tamin;cste food or food preparation are;is .9 
For the b:icte ri;cs to gro-Y to sufficient numbers , the 
contaminated food must be kfr in temper.iturc 
conditio n s whe re tho:" bacteria a re able to pro li fer-
ate. S. atirew produces pre -formed toxins tha t have 
an emetic and di::irrhea l dTc:-ct.' 
In this inYestiga tion. the-re wa s no evidence oftc-m-
peratu re abuse an d we ,w.re un able to d etinitiYely 
iclc- ntifv a cat1se o f the o utbrea k. Th e en vironme n-
tal inY~st.igation re.wa led n o food saf"ety breaches. 
and th e absence o f food samples made it impos-
sible to identif)· th e- food -Yehicle responsib le for the 
outbrea k. The only appare nt diffc:rc-nc e in foods 
sen'ec\ to the ea rlv dine rs ,Yas th e fri ed ric e "-hich 
had been intl':nded for lunch servia. 
To pre\'e nt toxin-based outbre::iks . it is import,111t 
that commercial food pro;-iders adhere to strict 
tempe rature prorocols a nd e n su re good food 
h.indling practices. :\fanageme nt and staff n ec-d 
to be a lert to the prese nce of ;nfected skin le sions 
or disc h rtrges from nasal passages , ears or c:ycs in 
food hand le rs .. --\p propriate measures shou ld be 
taken to ensure that no ill indlYiduals can con-
tanllnate food or food contact surfaces. 10 
43 
44 
lmc-~tig:;111011 of toxin-mc-d1:ned foodbornt" ill -
ness is particularl~· problc:m:nic due to short onset 
rimes :ind durat ion of symptoms. Fu rthermore , as 
5. atl/t'(f,> 1s not a notifiable disease ou tbreaks often 
go undetected. This outb reak was only likely to 
have been reported clue to the nature of the sporting 
e\·ent and the large numba ofindi,·idu :ds affec ted . 
Lim ita t ions 
This 1nvestigat1on was limited 111 several ways. 
T hough intcrvie\\'s \\·ere conductr:-d as soon as 
poBibk following the outbre,1.k, a number o f 
indi,·iclu;c1 ls h:-id ditlic u lty remembering ;1.II food s 
consumed . .-\ high proporcion of indi\'iduals 
,d10 dined e;uly strong!:,· be-liewd rlut the fried 
r ice intend c-cl for lunch was the infrction source. 
i\[oreona:r, parric ipants had extensin~ly discussed 
the outbreak a nd theo ries on its cause. predomi-
nantly through soci,d med ia. po tentially introduc-
ing bias to the inYesriga tio n . 
T he microbiological inwstig:n.ion was a lso 
imp,1ctecl by limi tation s. F irstly. initial anal~·ses of 
facc~li specimens were restric ted ro in-house PCR 
assays and not ctdtu red as per the ::--:-s,\· H ea lth 
ot1tbre;:1k prorocol wh ich specifies th.it all faecal 
specimens related to potentia l ou tbrcab undergo 
rout ine enteric cu ltu re. :--:e\·errhckss, S. 011/'(IIS is 
unlikely to be grm\·n using rou t ine cu lni re. and 
t he de b y \\·hi ch ens u ed from th e need Lo tra n sp ort 
s:tmplcs to Queensland for toxin testing \\·ould 
haw dc.c.rc:tsc cl th e yield \\·hen app ropriately cul-
tured there. G i,·en t he rime delay between onset 
:tnd recei pt of the s;im p ks and the \":tria ble stor-
:i.gc tem perntu res of rh c s.impks during th.it time. 
it is unsu rpris ing rh:i.t only I pos iti\·e result \\·as 
returned. This u nde rl ines the im portance o f good 
communiotion ben\·een public health inwsrig.i~ 
Lors ;:in cl labora tories so that spec ime n s are tes ted 
acco rding co the clin ica l and epiclemio logic;:il p ic-
nire. Additionally. vo mitus spccimc: ns \\·ou ld haYe 
been prc-ferabk for ana lrsis as staphylococcal 
enterotoxin is cleared from the gut quite quickly. 
l:nfortuna tcly. no samples of \·om itu s \\·e re co l-
lcctecl as this is not a routine p rac ti ce in EDs and 
\·omiting had resolwd before the public health 
i11Yesr1gat io n commenced. 
Conclusion 
Information obt;:iined from case inten·iews and 
th e results of microbiological tes ting of human 
spec11ncns support a conclusion th:i.t enterotaxi-
genic S. n11rc'1t . .- bacteria \Ycrc respo n sib le fo r th is 
outbrea k. \Ye were unable to dctiniti\·eh- identifr 
a food \·chicl e in this outbreak. S. aure;u associ·-
ated ourbre:ik reports are ra rely published in 
Ausrrnlia desp ite being such a common c;iuse of 
foodborne ill nc-ss \,·orlchick. This irncstigat1on 
impro\·es our underst<1nding of the- cp1demiology 
of foodborne 5. aur(tr, ourbrc:iks in Aus tr:di:i. 
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Appendix 2.A. Food exposure questionnaire 
i,tk Health NsW Western Sydney 
GOVERNMENT Local Health District 
Foodborne Illness 
Participant 
Elite Sporting Event 
Saturday 3 June, 2012 
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SECTION 1 : CO NTACT DETAILS 
Surname: ____ _________ ______ _____ _ 
First name: _____ ___________________ _ 
Telephone: _ ____________ _______ _ 
INTERVIEWER SCRIPT: 
"Good m orn ing/afternoon. My name is ____ and I'm calling from the Parramatta 
public health unit in Sydney. I was hoping to speak with _______ (name of 
person/ guardian or parent). "1 
"Hi _ _ __ I'm ringing in regards to a number of people getting sick on Saturda y 2 
June at a Sydney sporting event. We are trying to investigate the source of the infection 
and were hoping that you would be able to answer questions regarding food consumed 
and health over the weekend. Your name was given to us by even t organisers. It should 
take approximately ten minutes to complete this questionnaire. All the information we 
collect is confiden tial and only authorised public health staff will have access to this 
information. Would you be willing to answer our questions?" 
* If case unava ilable, ask wha t is t he best ti me to ca ll back ________ _ 
Verbal consen t given fo r interview: 
Yes D 
No □ 
1 If participant was 15 years or under, consent was requested from parents/guardian. If consent 
was granted, the telephone interview was conducted in the presence of the parent/guardian . 
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SECTION 2: PERSONAL DETAILS 
Age: [D 
Address: _________________________ _ 
Accommodation during championships: _____________ _ 
Role at championships: _ __________________ _ 
SECTION 3: HEALTH INFORMATION 
"Did you become ill with a gastrointestinal illness on the evening/night of 2June?" 
□ 
Yes continue 
□ 
No skip remainder of the health information questions 
"What symptoms did you experience?" 
"What time did your symptoms first start?" 
"How long did your symptoms last?" 
51 
"Did you visit o hospital emergency department or general practitioner because of your 
illness?" 
□ 
Yes 
□ 
No 
"If yes, which hospital?" 
"Did the doctor at the hospital/ general practice take a specimen from you?" 
□ 
Yes 
□ No 
"Were you aware of anyone who was ill with a similar illness prior to your getting 
sick?" 
□ Yes 
□ No 
52 
"Following your illness, were you aware of anyone close to you who subsequently 
became ill?" 
□ 
Yes 
□ No 
SECTION 4: FOOD HISTORY 
"Did you consume the following food during lunch service at the event?" 
Food item Response 
Sandwiches Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Cold meat (ham, chicken, silverside, Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
turkey) 
"If yes, which meats?" 
Fried rice Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Bread rolls Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Wraps Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Gluten free bread Yes D No □ Unsu re □ 
53 
"What time did you eat dinner?" 
"Did you consume the following food during dinner service at the event?" 
Food item Response 
Sa lad Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Coleslaw Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Meatballs Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Cannelloni Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Fried rice Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Boiled rice Yes D No □ Unsure □ 
Chicken stir-fry 
Yes D □ □ No Unsure 
Jelly 
Yes D □ □ No Unsure 
54 
Yoghurt 
Yes D □ □ No Unsure 
Bread roll 
Yes D □ □ No Unsure 
"Were other food items consumed during and between lunch and dinner?" 
□ Yes 
□ No 
"If yes, what food items?" 
''That concludes the interview. Thank you for your time and co-operation .Do you have 
any questions or comments regarding the interview?" 
"If you have any questions please do not hesitate to call any one from the infectious 
disease team at Parramatta public health unit on 9840 3603. 
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PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
In 2012, New South Wales (NSW) experienced its largest measles outbreak since 1998 
and the country's largest since 1997. The outbreak initiated in Western Sydney in April 
2012. Following the initial measles notification, I was requested by the Western 
Sydney Public Health Unit (PHU) to assist with the public health response. 
In early May, a cluster of infections occurred at the Emergency Department (ED) of the 
Children's Hospital at Westmead (CHW) . The PHU invited me and my Master of 
Philosophy Applied Epidemiology (MAE) and National Centre for Immunisation 
Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) colleague Ms May Chiew to investigate the source 
of infection. 
This chapter describes the NSW 2012 measles outbreak and the ensuing public health 
response effort, including the investigation into the CHW infection source. 
Investigatory role 
Contributing to the Western Sydney outbreak response effort, I assisted with contact 
tracing, conducting rapid risk assessment of exposed individuals to provide them with 
appropriate advice regarding risk potential, signs of infection, and post-exposure 
preventative measures when appropriate. I also aided with the planning and execution 
of several post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) clinics convened to distribute measles-
mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine or normal human immunoglobulin (NHIG) injections to 
those for whom such preventative measures were deemed appropriate. 
Investigating the infected cluster's source involved several key elements . Firstly, 
liaising with ED personnel to understand the ED layout (Appendix 3.B), likely patient 
movements, and case notes. Secondly, reviewing patient records and designing and 
implementing an algorithm to methodically narrow down a list of potential source 
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cases. Finally, drafting a questionnaire and interviewing the parents/guardians of 
potential sources of infection (Appendix 3.A). Th ese elements of the investigation were 
conducted equa lly by myself and Ms Chiew. Additionally, we co-wrote elements of the 
'Methods' and 'Results' sections of the report which follows. Also with Ms Ch iew, an d 
with Dr Shopna Bag, I co-wrot e and delivered a presentation to the NCIRS Journal Club 
and the CHW Infectious Disease Meeting detai li ng the outbreak and response effort, as 
we ll as aspects of measles epidemiology responsible for the propagation of the recent 
out break (Append ix 3.C). 
Lessons learned 
First and foremost, part icipating in the outbreak response effort at the local level 
required a crash course in measles virology, clinical features and epidemiology. This 
included attending to a measles case presenting to one of our PEP clinics with full-
blown maculopapular rash. It was a rare opportunity. In this post-elim ination era 
where cases are few, even clinicians seldom witness such cases firsthand, let alone 
epidemiology trainees. 
Participating in t he response effort was fantastic exposure to hands-on public health 
work. I have now experienced first-hand the time and energy required for outbreak 
response at this level, and learned that contact tracing and follow-up can be a massive, 
exhausting and sometimes seemingly thankless job. Moreover, the response effort 
made apparent th e importance of skilfully communicating health information to the 
public in an instructive, confident and calm manner. 
Conducting the investigation into the source of infections at the CHW ED further 
enhanced my ability to design and implement a field investigation. Having toured 
several hospital EDs as part of th is investigation, I better appreciate the reasons EDs 
persist as common transmission locations during outbreaks, and the challenges 
inherent in rectifying this. These will be elaborated upon in more detail both in this 
chapter and the next. 
Finally, investigating this piece of the wider NSW 2012 measles outbreak reinforced 
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the challenges in conclusively 'tying up' every known measles exposure during an 
outbreak and therefore how difficult achieving and maintaining elimination status may 
be. Furthermore, it stressed to me the distinct value of genotyping to proving 
epidemiological links and thereby assisting in achieving measles elimination. 
Public health impact 
Local public health responses are an important source of community protection 
against infectious diseases like measles. Skilled, effective and timely responses to 
outbreaks at the local level are also vital for achieving ratification of measles 
elimination status as defined by the World Health Organization (WH0). 1 Elimination 
status requires not only the cessation of endemic measles transmission but also 
ensuring sustained transmission following the importation of a measles case is limited. 
Consequently, ascertaining the origins of infection of each notified measles case, along 
with tracing all possible lines of transmission, is imperative. In this way, our 
investigation into the CHW ED source of infection constituted an important 
contribution to the Australian public health response effort in this era of measles 
elimination. 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
In April 2012, an imported measles case notified to th e Western Sydney Loca l Health 
District (LHD) began what would become the nation's largest outbreak since 1997. This 
report describes the beginning of this outbreak and the local level response effort and 
details the specific investigation into the source of t ransm ission that resulted in a smal l 
cluster of cases infected in a paediatric ED. 
Methods 
All notified measles cases, including th e cluster exposed in the paediatric ED, were 
followed up according to national guidelines. To investigate the infective source of the 
cluster, an investigatory algorithm was designed and implemented which methodically 
narrowed down potential sources of infection. This included a review of ED layout and 
the movements and timelines of secondary cases within the ED. The records of 
potential source cases were reviewed to exclude those with incompatible symptoms or 
timelines. Th e parents/gu ardians of potential sou rce cases were interviewed using a 
questionnaire designed for this invest igation. 
Results 
For the cluster of cases, 270 contacts required follow-up. Of the 162 children who 
presented to th e ED on 11 May 2012, we excluded 92 as potential sources of infection 
based on the timing of their presentation s. Additionally, we excluded 17 children who 
presented with conditions incompatible with measles. Following other preliminary 
exclusions, medical charts we re reviewed for the rema ining 40 patients, excluding 26 
for symptoms/diagnoses incompatible with measles and nine who we re fully 
immunised. Five potential cases were proxy interviewed; however, none was assessed 
as having had measles or measles-like illness at th e time of presentation to the ED. 
Conclusion 
Despite failing to identify the source of infection for the cluster infected in the 
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paed iatric ED on the same day, this report describes important components of the 
outbreak and response effort, emphasises the potential for transmiss ion to occur in 
EDs, and high lights characterist ics of EDs and ED work wh ich may facilitate 
transmission. Moreove r, investigations such as this which attempt to trace chain s of 
transmission are critical for measles elim ination efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Measles is an extremely infectious illness caused by the Paramyxovirus, genus 
Morbillivirus. Transmission is airborne, spread by respiratory secretions .2 Measles 
infection and resulting complications can be severe . Because of its severity, measles is 
a notifiable disease in Australia and a confirmed case requires laboratory definitive 
evidence of measles infection, or clinical and epidemiological evid ence.3 
Measles vaccination has been recommended in Australia since the mid-1970s, with a 
formal control campaign established in 1998 to prepare the country for measles 
elimination. The National Measles Surveillance Strategy (NMSS) has successfully 
reduced the incidence of measles in Australia by striving to maintain 95% vaccination 
coverage throughout each new birth cohort .4 Improvements to surveillance and 
vaccination policy-including targeted school-based catch-up campaigns-have greatly 
assisted the country with its goal of WHO-certified elimination . While evidence 
suggests that the disease has been eliminated from Australia since the end of the 
1990s,5 this status has not been formally ratified . 
Despite decreased incidence, outbreaks initiated by imported cases continue to 
persist,4 highlighting weaknesses in vaccination coverage, vulnerable demographics 
and infection control failures (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2) . 
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Transm issions in recent outb reaks ha ve com monly occurred in healthcare settings, 
pa rticul arly hospital EDs.8• 9 EDs tend to be crowded, busy environments where those 
susceptible (eg, th e immunocompromised and under-vaccinat ed) can potentially be 
exposed to individuals presenting with t he virus.8 In developed countries like Austra lia, 
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the relatively low incidence of measles means clinicians often misdiagnose what is for 
many of them an unfamiliar disease. This often results in delayed implementation of 
control strategies, providing time for outbreaks to persist. 
On 16 April 2012, the Western Sydney LHD was notified of a confirmed measles case . 
The case was a 25 year old Australian born male who had contracted measles on 
holiday in Thailand. He had returned to Australia on 30 March; symptoms began on 7 
April with a sore throat and cough. He attended a General Practice (GP) clinic on 9 and 
12 April but was not diagnosed with measles. On 13 April, a rash appeared and he 
presented to a local ED where he was triaged and admitted. He was not isolated and 
remained in the ED from 8:00 until 17:00. At the time of ED attendance, he had a fever 
of 39.5°(, conjunctivitis, cough, coryza and a maculopapular rash. The patient was 
eventually confirmed lgM (immunoglobulin M) positive and lgG negative . 
Following diagnosis, the patient was questioned by public health staff regarding his 
immunisation status and potential contacts. The patient professed to be fully 
immunised. It is possible, however, that due to his age (born in 1986), he missed out 
on the school-based catch-up immunisation campaign. He infected several oth'ers 
(referred to as 'cluster 1' in this report) before being diagnosed . 
This was the beginning of what was to become the largest outbreak in New South 
Wales (NSW) since 1998 and Australia's largest outbreak since 1997, with 168 cases 
notified between April and November 2012 (Figure 3.3) 6'10 Ninety-two percent (n=156) 
of cases occurred in Western and South Western Sydney. Twenty-nine percent (n=49) 
of cases were among those aged 10-19 years. Seventy-six percent (n=128) of cases 
reported unsure or no vaccination status, though 21.4% (n=36) were infants aged <1 
year who were too young to be vaccinated . Pacific Islanders represented a large 
proportion of cases at 21.4% (n=36). Cases acquired in a healthcare setting comprised 
21.4% of cases (n=36). 11 
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This report describes the investigation conducted to identify the source of infection for 
a cluster of four cases (referred to as 'cluster 2' in this report) infected in the CHW ED 
on 11 May in the context of the beginning stages of the state-wide outbreak and the 
loca l level respon se effort. This cluster was likely linked ind irect ly to the index case and 
'cluster 1'. 
METHODS 
Case identification, follow-up and management 
The NSW Public Health Act 2010 requires doctors and laboratory clinicians to notify all 
measles cases to the local PHU.12 In accordance with the national guidelines, both 
confirmed and probable cases are to be notified. 13 Confirmed cases require either 
laboratory definitive evidence or a combination of both clinical and epidemiological 
evidence. 14 Fo r the purposes of the state-wide outbreak, all cases with a symptom 
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onset between 7 April and 29 November with an estab lished epidemiological li nk to 
Western Sydney or Sydney South Western LHDs with no history of recent overseas 
travel and a D8 or unknown genotype were defined as outbreak cases. 
Case investigation and public health response followed national guidelines. 
Vaccination status was confirmed when possible through the Australian Childhood 
Immunisation Register (ACIR) for those aged 16 and under. Once a case was notified, 
contacts were followed up and preventative measures in the form of vaccination or 
NHIG were recommended and offered when appropriate. Other contro l and 
prevention mechanisms including alerts distributed to health facilities, media briefs 
and emergency vacc ination clinics held in high-risk areas were enacted throughout the 
course of the outbreak. 
Following th e notification of the index case, public health staff interviewed the index 
case to determine the case's movements and identify any exposed contacts. 
Individuals who could be identified to have been in the same location as the index case 
at the same time or up to two hours after the index case departed were followed up. 
Any other subsequent infections were identified via notification to the PHU. Those 
who were identified who had an onset of illness 7-18 days after contact with the index 
case were presumed to be epidemiologica lly linked to the index case. 
Investigation into the source of infection of the CHW ED cluster 
Four measles notifications we re rece ived with in a six day period and it was revealed 
via interviews that all four had been present in the CHW ED on 11 May. These 'primary 
cases ' were defined as those four cases which were notified to the PHU and who had 
been present in the CHW ED on 11 May with an onset of illness compatible with having 
been exposed on 11 May. It was presumed that these cases acquired their infection 
from a commo n source and an invest igation into the probable source case was 
launched. 'Probable source case' was defined as a case who, while infectious, had 
contact with a notified primary case, with the contact between the two occurring 
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within a timeframe compatible with the incubation period of th e primary case . Similar 
to the index case and the first cluster of cases, contro l procedures for this second 
cluster of cases followed Austra lian national guidelines. 
The ED Director supplied an electronic list of all ED attendances for 11 May 2012 which 
included Medical Record Number (MRN), date of birth, times of arrival, triage and 
departure. El ectronic ED patient notes were accessed to review details regarding 
presenting cond ition, history, provisional diagnosis and discharge. The ACIR was 
consulted for individuals' immunisation status when appropriate. 
Th e complete list of attendees for 11 May was pared down according to the times that 
individuals were present in the ED. Current national protocols st ipulate th at contacts 
be followed up for up to two hours after the index case has departed. 13 Based on th ese 
guidelines, patients were excluded as probable source cases if they were discharged 
before 19:00 as th ey would not have been able to infect Case 3 if th ey departed any 
earlier. Patients were also excluded if they arrived in the ED waiting room after 21:30 
as they would not have been able to infect Case 4 who was discharged to a ward at 
21:20. 
Th e complete list of attendees was further restricted by presenting condition (Figure 
3. 7). Patients whose presenting problems included trauma, mental health issues, 
central nervous system symptoms, urological symptoms, constipa tion, appendicitis, 
routine childhood examination and dental concerns were excluded. 
Having excluded those who did not fit the timeframe deta iled above or those whose 
conditions were not compatible with measles, the remaining patients were closely 
assessed according to symptoms recorded in hospital notes and immunisation status 
obtained from the ACIR. A suspect case was defined as any patient that presented with 
fever and other symptoms consistent with measles (cough; coryza; conjunctivitis; rash) 
who was unvaccinated or partially vaccinated for measles. Children listed as 'did not 
wait' were reviewed by immunisation status and symptoms. If no information was 
present, their parents were contacted for an interview (Appendix 3.A). 
Additionally, in an attempt to determine whether a more precise location of exposure 
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within the ED could be determined, we attempted to recreate the movements of cases 
within the ED using ED notes, an ED map (Appendix 3.8) and the hospital's official 
incident report. Though three of the confirmed cases had waited in the ED waiting 
room before being examined by ED staff, Case 4 was brought in by ambulance using an 
alternate entrance . This information assisted us to further hone in on the probable 
time and location of exposure as well as to rule out anyone who had not actually 
entered the ED. 
RESULTS 
Case identification and follow-up 
During follow-up of the outbreak's index case, the PHU received notification of three 
other cases who were epidemiologically linked to the index case, including the index 
case's 11 month old nephew and a 22 year old male with whom he had played team 
sports. A separate notification was received by the PHU of a 34 year old male who had 
been in the ED of a large area hospital at the same time as the index case (Figure 3.4). 
This case was overlooked in contact tracing efforts as his name had not appeared on 
lists provided to the PHU by the hospital. Following this initial cluster of cases {'cluster 
1') directly linked to the index case, a subsequent cluster of four notifications {'cluster 
2') was received by the PHU within six days (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.4. Timeline of 'cluster 1' measles onset dates and lines of transmission, Western 
Sydney LHD, April 2012 
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Figure 3.5.Timeline of 'cluster 2' measles onset dates and lines of transmission, Western 
Sydney LHD, May/June 2012 
Interviews with parents/guardians of these four primary notified cases revealed that 
all had been present in the CHW ED on 11 May. All four cases had illness onset which 
was compatible with having been exposed on 11 May. All four were present in the ED 
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in the latter ha lf of the day and into the night (Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6. Documented time present in ED for cases 2-5, 11-12 May 2012 
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Of the four cases who were exposed in the ED on 11 May, three were too young to 
have been vaccinated (range: 7-11 months old). The other case was a 17 yea r old girl 
w ith no record of receipt of measles vaccinations. 
With the exception of Case 4, each of the confirmed cases had delayed diagnoses 
following multiple presentations to the ED as well as to various loca l medical centres. 
Two of the four cases presented four times before being diagnosed; one presented 
t wice and on e (Case 4) was diagnosed on first presentation. With the exception of Case 
4, each of the others wai t ed a median of five days between onset dat e and diagnosis 
date (Table 3.1). These de layed diagnoses likely contributed to the perpetuation of th e 
state-wide outbreak. 
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Table 3.1. Patient journeys from measles onset until diagnosis for cases 2-5 
Case Onset date Total number Diagnosis Number of 
of date days from 
presentations onset to 
diagnosis 
Case 2 20/5/2012 4 25/5/2012 5 
11mo* female 
Case 3 22/5/2012 4 28/5/2012 6 
7mo male 
Case 4 23/5/2012 1 24/5/2012 1 
lOmo female 
Case 5 24/5/2012 2 28/5/2012 4 
17yo female 
*mo: month old; yo: year old 
Parents of confirmed cases identified contacts and locations where their child had 
been while infectious. Contacts included household members; in-patients who had 
been in the same ward as cases; contacts from ED and medical centre waiting rooms, 
schools and retail outlets. 
PHU and surge staff conducted contact tracing to assess the risk of infection; 
determine current health and vaccination status; recommend and explain 
interventions and detail appropriate actions required upon becoming symptomatic. 
Measles fact sheets were emailed or posted to provide additional information . In total, 
270 individuals required contact tracing. 
PEP clinics were held due to a high number of susceptible individuals being exposed at 
the ED. Prophylaxis administered at the clinic included MMR vaccine or NHIG. Each 
individual was reviewed using post-exposure guidelines to determine the appropriate 
prophylaxis to be administered . In the follow-up of this cluster, NHIG was administered 
to 18 exposed individuals; 8 were recommended to receive MMR vaccine. One 
hundred letters were sent to those who could not be reached in person during contact 
tracing efforts. Additional alerts were administered by the school of the 17 year old 
case to all students and to area schools whose students had attended a recent school 
formal the case had attended while infectious. 
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Investigation into the source of infection for the CHW ED 
cluster 
There were 162 children who presented to the ED on 11 May 2012 of which 92 were 
excluded as probab le source cases based on the timing of their presentations (Figure 
3.7). The four confirmed measles cases were also excluded, resulting in 66 remaining 
children. Additionally, 17 children who presented wi t h cond it ions which were 
incompatible with measles were excluded. Other prel iminary exclusions included nine 
patients who did not wait: three fu lly immunised patients, t hree afebril e patients, and 
three who were followed up by ED staff. 
The ED medica l charts for the rema ining 40 patients were rev iewed. Of t hese, a 
number of pat ients were excluded as they were afebril e (n=23); had rece ived two 
doses of MMR (n=9); we re diagnosed with cervica l lymp hadenopathy and t onsil litis 
(n=l), Respiratory Syncyt ial Virus (n=l) and men ingococcal infection (n=l). 
Phone interviews with parents of five suspect patients were conducted. The median 
age of suspect cases was 17 months (range: 9 months- 7 years). All five suspect 
patients were reported to have recovered soon after presentation at the ED. One 
patient had recently been exposed to a sporadic case of measles at a local medical 
centre; however, the sporadic case was later identified as genotype B3. 
Interviews did not yield a source case . The parents/guardians of al l five suspected 
patients reported that their ch ild had received other diagnoses and had improved 
upon prescribed treatment; had not had other meas les-like symptoms beyond those 
identified in their charts; or was immunised. 
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Figure 3.7. Algorithm used to identify suspect measles source cases responsible for the CHW 
ED exposure on 11 May 2012 
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DISCUSSION 
Though Australian measles vaccination coverage rates are high, 15 under-immunised 
demographics exist, including those too young for vaccination; young adults who 
missed out on schoo l-based catch-up campaigns; those born overseas; travellers and 
vaccination objectors. Consequently, imported cases can trigger outbreaks given the 
right circumstances. Busy EDs and GP clinics are perfect locations for transmission to 
occur as they host large numbers of ill and susceptible individuals who may be present 
for long periods of time. Hea lthcare setting transmission has been a common 
characteristic of recent measles outbreaks in developed countries and presents an 
obstacle to securing and maintaining measles elimination. 8• 9• 16· 19 
Though EDs and GPs may be settings which are ripe for transmission to occur, 
transmission in healthcare settings is also fu ell ed by misdiagnosis. Symptoms of 
measles are non-specific and most clinicians have never experienced a measles 
presentation. In recent Australian and overseas outbreaks there have been multiple 
instances of cases presenting to a healthcare facility more than on_ce before receiving 
diagnosis. 19· 21 Indeed, three of the four cases which prompted this investigat ion had 
multiple presentations to a healthcare facility before being diagnosed with measles. 
Though the source of infection could not be identifi ed, nor the specific line of 
transmission between th e two clusters proven, given the timeframe and the 
genotyping, it is highly likely that the first four cases in the outbreak-including the 
index case-were epidemiological ly linked to this second cluster of four cases who 
acquired measles from an unknown source in the CHW ED. Case 3 from 'cluster 1' and 
cases 2 and 4 from 'cluster 2' were all D8 genotype; D8 is commonly found in 
Southeast Asia. 22 The common genotype makes it more likely, too, that the second 
cluster was infected by a common source on 11 May when the cluster overlapped in 
location and time. This highlights the importance of genotyping not on ly for 
establishing lines of transmission during an outbreak but also for determining that an 
outbreak was imported, which is crucial for verifying elimination of the disease. 
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This investigation was limited in several ways. First, the ED medical records that we 
relied upon were not necessarily complete, nor were they consistent or standardised 
for all patients . This was true of diagnostic notes as well as notes describing where a 
patient was within the ED and the time that the patient was in that location . The 
interviews we ultimately conducted occurred after 11 May and therefore parents may 
not have been able to recollect exact details of their child's illness or visit to the ED. 
The information provided by parents may also have been biased if they intentionally or 
unintentionally misclassified their child's symptoms. We may have received a more 
thorough and potentially accurate clinical history of each suspect case if we had 
systematically asked if each had experienced-yes or no-fever, rash, cough, coryza and 
conjunctivitis rather than asking the parents to tell us what symptoms their child had 
experienced . Moreover, several parents we spoke to were non -native English speakers 
and this may have impacted on the accuracy of the information we obtained. Also, we 
may have too narrowly limited the time range for possible exposure based on times 
noted in the ED records. If a patient was noted as having been discharged at 21:30, for 
example, it is possible they did not depart the hospital at 21:30, but rather remained 
on the premises for some time after that. Lastl y, cases are assumed to be at their most 
infectious during the prodromal (fever; cough; coryza; conjunctivitis) stage before rash 
develops. If the patient had presented to the ED for another condition, the relatively 
common prodromal symptoms, if they existed, may not have been noted . Moreover, 
prodromal measles symptoms could have easily been misdiagnosed as these 
symptoms can be indicative of a multitude of illnesses. Similarly, a probable source 
case with an atypical presentation may have been overlooked. A probable source case 
may also have been fully vaccinated and excluded on this basis. Finally, the infected 
'source' individual may not have been a patient included on our original list. 
Missing the opportunity to quickly diagnose and isolate a single case of measles can 
perpetuate large-scale and costly outbreaks like the 2012 NSW outbreak-the 
country's largest since 1997.6 Investigating all measles infections and lines of 
transmission where possible assists Australia's goal of maintaining and ultimately 
ratifying elimination status. Moreover, detailing cases of healthcare transmissions such 
as those described in this report may raise awareness about how and why healthcare 
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settings continue to be common locations for transmissions during outbreaks. This in 
turn may highlight specific lessons to be learned regarding improving infect ion contro l 
and response in future outbreaks. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are broad recommendations for improving future control and response 
efforts based on participation in the local public health response effort. Additional 
recommendations specific to control and prevention of transmissions in healthcare 
settings appear in Part Two of Chapter 4. 
1. Given th e time and resource intensiveness of the contact tracing effort, a thorough 
cost-effectiveness ana lysis following the conclusion of the outbreak would be 
beneficial in order to inform policy decisions surrounding future outbreak response 
efforts. 
2. An evaluation of the effectiveness of any campaigns which were held to educate 
members of the public-particularly specific ethn ic groups-about the existence of the 
measles outbreak and the importance of immunisation would also be beneficial. For 
example, this could include eva luation of the effect of media campaigns and 
immunisation clinics targeting Pacific Islander communities. Evaluation shou ld include 
a cost-effectiveness component. 
3. Periodic refresher training of health practitioners likely to be involved in future 
outbreak control efforts may ensure that future efforts can proceed more efficiently 
and may also assist by spreading awareness of measles symptoms and epidemiology 
during non-outbreak times. Training could include measles immunology and contro l 
guidelines. 
4. Socia l research examining under-immunised demographic groups to better 
understand the barriers to improving vaccination uptake in these groups could inform 
strategies for targeted vaccination campaigns as well as strateg ies for targeting 
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awareness/education campaigns during future outbreaks. 
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Appendix 3.A. Questionnaire for CHW cluster investigation 
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Paediatric Hospital Emergency Department Western Sydney 
11 May 2012 
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SECTION 1: CONTACT DETAILS 
Surname: _____ ____ ______ _________ _ 
First name: ______________________ _ 
Telephone: _ _ _____ ___ ___ ___ ____ _ 
INTERVIEWER SCRIPT: 
"Good morning/afternoon. My name is ____ and I'm calling from the Parramatta 
public health unit in Sydney. I was hoping to speak with the parents/guardian of 
I am calling in regards to your child being at the emergency 
department at the Children's Hospital at Westmead in May. Records from the 
emergency department indicate _ _ ___ was present on 11th May. A number of 
children who were at the ED on the same day as ______ became infected with 
measles. We are trying to investigate the source of infection and whether there might 
have been other children who became infected with measles. We would like to ask you 
a few questions, it should take approximately ten minutes to · complete. All the 
information we collect is confidential and only authorised public health staff will have 
access to this information. Would it be possible for you to answer our questions?" 
* If parent/guardian unavailable, ask what is the best tim e to call back. 
Verbal consent given for interview: 
Yes D 
No □ 
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SECTION 2: PERSONAL DETAILS 
Age:[D 
Address: ___________________ ______ _ 
Immunisation status (measles): _________________ _ 
Number/sand age/s of sibling/s: 
"Does ___ attend childcare/preschool?" 
□ □ Yes No If yes, where (name)? __________ _ 
SECTION 3: HEALTH INFORMATION 
"How is he/she going?" 
"How long was ____ unwell for after being discharged from frospital?" 
"Did the doctor prescribe any medicine upon discharge?" 
□ □ Yes No 
"If yes, what medicines?" 
97 
"Did he/she get better after taking the medicine?" 
□ □ □ Yes No Unsure 
"Did _____ get any new symptoms after being discharged from hospital?" 
□ □ □ Yes No Unsure 
"If yes, could you please describe the symptoms?" 
"How long did these symptoms last for?" 
"Did you take him/her to see a doctor or need to return to hospital following his/her ED 
visit?" 
□ □ □ Yes No Unsure 
"If yes, which doctor/hospital?" 
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"Prior to his/her visit on 11th May, did you visit any other doctor's surgeries or 
hospital?" 
□ □ □ Yes No Unsure 
"If yes, which doctor/hospital?" 
SECTION 3: POTENTIAL EXPOSURE INFORMATION 
"How long you were in the hospital for on the 11th May?" 
"How long did you wait in the ED waiting room?" 
'Thanks for your time to day, would you mind if we contacted you in the future to 
clarifying anything else? Please do not hesitate to contact the infectious disease control 
team at the Parramatta public health unit on 9840 3603 if you have any questions." 
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Appendix 3.B. CHW ED and movements of measles cases, 11 May 2012 
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Appendix 3.C. Presentation delivered to NCIRS Journal Club and 
to CHW Infectious Disease Meeting, November 2012 
Presentation drafted and delivered by Dr Shopna Bag, Ms May Chiew and Ms Alexis 
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PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
Certain characteristics of recent measles outbreaks in Australia and other developed 
countries have been indicative of the changing epidemiology of measles in an era of 
elimination. In countries where elimination has been achieved, cases are rare and 
typically imported either by travellers or immigrants from countries where indigenous 
transmission still occurs and vaccination coverage is low. Another problematic 
demographic consists of young adults who may have missed out on vaccination. 
These characteristics were epitomised by the New South Wales (NSW) 2012 outbreak, 
described in detail in Chapter 3. The index case was an Australian-born young adult 
aged 25 years who likely missed out on the school-based catch-up component of the 
Measles Control Campaign launched in 1998. Of the ensuing outbreak cases, a large 
number occurred among those aged 20-59 years, and a surprisingly high proportion 
was aged 10-19 years. Most of these were unvaccinated or were unsure of t heir 
vaccination status. Moreover, a disproportionate number of total outbreak cases, as 
well as those cases aged 10-19 years, were individuals of Pacific Islander descent. 
Another common characteristic in this era of measles elimination-when cases are 
rare and painstaking efforts are made to trace all possible lines of transmission-has 
been the frequent identification of healthcare settings as the loci of measles 
transmission. The reasons these transmissions occur are well understood. With the 
relative rarity of measles, and its symptoms being somewhat non-specific, 
presentations to healthcare facilities are often missed, and failure to isolate cases 
efficiently and effectively has contributed to the propagation of outbreaks. The NSW 
2012 outbreak proved a case in point; healthcare transmissions were common, as was 
the high riumber of infants aged <1 year infected at a healthcare facility . 
This chapter consists of two separate sections. While standing alone, they are united 
by their common theme of measles in an elimination era . Part One presents vaccine 
effectiveness analyses conducted for the NSW 2012 outbreak and for national 
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notifications from 2006-2012. Part Two consists of an analysis of the role of healthcare 
setting transmissions in perpetuating the 2012 outbreak. 
The beginning pieces of this chapter (Preface; Abbreviations; List of Tables; List of 
Figures) refer to both Part One and Part Two of this chapter. They are then presented 
as stand-alone reports with individual abstracts. References included at the end of the 
chapter are for both Parts comb ined. 
Investigatory role 
Though I pr imarily assisted Western Sydney with the measles outbreak response, I also 
cleaned and entered case data for the Sydney South Western Public Health Unit (PHU). 
Moreover, when the NSW Ministry of Health assumed coordination of the outbreak 
respon se, I assisted the Communicable Disease Branch with ep idemiological ana lysis of 
the outbreak with a focus on healthcare setting transmissions. While doing so, I 
drafted a briefing report updating the NSW Measles Expert Working Group on 
healthcare setting tran smissions and the efficacy of the two hour contact tracing rule. 
This work provided the initi al foundation for a presentation which· I delivered at the 
2013 joint Communicable Disease Control (CDC) and Australasian Society for Infectious 
Diseases (ASID) Conference in Canberra in March 2013. 
This work then developed into the collaboratively written draft paper, included in Part 
Two of this chapter. The draft was written by my Master of Philosophy Applied 
Epidemiology (MAE) and National Centre for Immunisation Research and Survei llance 
(NCIRS) colleague Ms May Chiew (first author) and me (second author). To date, we 
have contributed equally to the draft. Other co-authors included Dr Shopna Bag, Ms 
Kirsty Hope, Ms Sophie Norton, Dr Stephen Conaty, Dr Vicky Sheppeard and Professor 
Peter McIntyre. The draft will be submitted to the Western Pacific Surveil lance and 
Response (WPSAR) Journal in 2014. 
To conclude the measles-related work I had undertaken during my MAE, I decided to 
conduct vaccine effectiveness (VE) analyses for the NSW outbreak and for national 
notifications for the period 2006-2012. With guidance from Dr Helen Quinn-who also 
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assisted by extracting controls from the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register 
(ACIR) for the case-control component using an NCIRS SAS program-I compiled, 
cleaned and analysed the data and wrote the report which is included in Part One of 
this chapter. 
Lessons learned 
The impetus for my healthcare setting transmission work arose from my time spent 
participating in the measles outbreak response effort. Participating in the response 
effort firstly at the local level with the Western Sydney PHU, and then following the 
response effort as the outbreak grew and became managed by the NSW Ministry of 
Health, was a valuable experience. Spending time at the Ministry provided insight into 
responding to outbreaks at the state level. 
The primary lessons learned, however, concerned data analysis. Analysing healthcare 
transmissions required compiling, cleaning and entering case information data from 
case interviews and medical records; organising the data into a useable state was 
messy and time-consuming. Interpreting these data was challenging. For example, the 
detail included for some cases was extensive while for others it was minimal. For some 
cases, self-reported vaccination status was accepted as proof of _vaccination while for 
others it was not. 
Finally, conducting the healthcare transmission analysis highlighted a lesson which was 
significant for this project as well as others. That lesson was the importance of honing 
in on the 'take home' messages of one's work and figuring out the best way to clearly 
present that information-and how doing this for an oral presentation differs from 
doing so for a written manuscript. 
This was my first exposure to the different types of VE analyses and what is required to 
conduct each. Upon reviewing each method, I opted not to employ the screening 
method because I had access to reliable denominator data. For the screening method, 
VE is approximated by comparing the proportion of vaccinated individuals with disease 
to the proportion of vaccinated individuals in the general population. My VE analysis 
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which was conducted using attack rates for the NSW outbreak cohort therefore 
provided sounder resu lts than the screening method would have. It may be useful, 
however, to conduct th e screening method to serve as a sensitivity analysis for 
va li dation of my results. 
In addition to the analysis I conducted using attack rates for the outbreak cohort, I was 
fortunate to be able to conduct a case-control study to est imate VE for national 
notifications. This involved extracting and matching controls and having to consider 
issues of confounding. Moreover, this analysis allowed me to utilise Stata for more 
advanced analysis incorporating conditional logistic regression. Finally, conducting VE 
analyses demonstrated the limitations of routinely collected surveillance data, w ith th e 
incompleteness of vaccination status fields impacting upon my results. Having 
witnessed the files for many outbreak cases, howeve r, I better understand the origins 
of NNDSS data and why data fields may be incomplete. 
Lastly, both components of this chapter presented a useful opportunity for 
consolidating my ep idemiological skills within the context of vaccine preventable 
disease (VPD) policy and practice, perfectly uniting my MAE learning wi th skil ls specific 
to my placement at NCIRS. 
Public health impact 
To ensure effecti ve measles control and prevention strategies, formulating them 
within the appropriate context is critical. For most developed countries, the context is 
that of elimination. With this in mind, this chapter aims broadly to highlight 
characteristics of measles in an era of elim ination. 
Part One consists of vaccine effectiveness analyses. Such ana lyses are critical 
components for evaluating vaccination schedules and bolstering vaccine confidence 
among members of the public and healthcare providers. More importantly, these 
analyses provide evidence that the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine has been 
effective, while serving as reminders to focus efforts on improving vaccination 
coverage. For this reason, my report is being provided to the NSW Ministry of Hea lth, 
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the Measles Elimination Working Party and the Measles Verification Committee. 
Part Two is an analysis of the role of healthcare setting transmissions in the NSW 2012 
outbreak. As noted earlier, healthcare facilities have persisted as common 
transmission settings in recent measles outbreaks in post-elimination countries. 
Understanding how and why this continues to occur is imperative for improving 
prevention and control policy and practice. My initial brief written for the NSW 
Measles Expert Working Group concluded the two hour contact tracing rule may not 
be efficient or necessary in this post-elimination era. Since the NSW outbreak, the 
NSW Ministry of Health has been reviewing the efficacy of the two hour contact 
tracing guideline . My brief has contributed to that review. 
Finally, little has been published providing detailed accounts of healthcare 
transmissions in recent outbreaks; the report included in Part Two of this chapter 
(which will be submitted to the WPSAR Journal in 2014), and my presentation to the 
joint CDC and ASID Conference in March 2013 (Appendix 4.B), will go some way to 
rectifying this knowledge gap. 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
Outbreaks present opportunities to analyse vaccine effectiveness which is important 
for excluding vaccine failure as a contributing component to an outbreak. Such 
analyses are also critical contributions to maintaining public and provider confidence in 
vaccines. This report assesses vaccine effectiveness for the NSW 2012 measles 
outbreak. It also estimates vaccine effect iveness at the population level using national 
notifications from 2006-2012. 
Methods 
Notification data for both the outbreak analysis and the population-based analysis 
were obtained from the NNDSS. Vaccination status was classified according to whether 
a case had received zero, one or two doses of measles containing vaccine. For both 
analyses, cases aged <1 year and those w ith unknown vaccination status were 
excluded. For the outbreak analysis, vaccine effectiveness was estimated for the t wo 
primary area health districts (South Western Sydney and Western Sydney) that were 
affected by the outbreak by calculating attack rates using population data from the 
NSW Government and vaccinat ion coverage estimates from the ACIR. For the national 
analysis, all children with disease onset between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 
2012 who were born after 1997 were included. These cases were matched to controls 
extracted from the ACIR according to date of birth and jurisdiction of residence. 
Vaccine effectiveness estimates were calculated based on dosage using odds ratios 
generated from emp loying conditional logistic regression . 
Results 
For the outbreak cohort, vaccine effectiveness was estimated at 98 .6% (9S% 
Confidence Interval (Cl): 98.1-99.0%) and 97.6% (9S% Cl: 95.2-98.8%) for one dose for 
South Western Sydney and Western Sydney respectively. For at least one dose, vaccine 
effectiveness was est imated at 98.5% (9S% Cl: 97.9-99 .0%) for South Western Sydney 
and 96.9% (95% Cl: 94.1-98.4%) for Western Sydney. In the population-based analys is, 
123 
vaccine effectiveness was estimated at 96.7% (95% Cl: 94.5-98.0%) for one dose 
compared with zero doses and 99 .7% (95% Cl: 99.2-99.9%) for two doses compared 
with zero doses. For at least one dose, effectiveness was estimated at 98. 7% (95% Cl: 
97.9-99.2%) compared with zero doses. 
Conclusion 
Vaccine effectiveness estimates suggest that the vaccine was adequate to protect 
against measles infection in both the NSW 2012 outbreak and at the population level 
from 2006-2012 as revealed by the case-contro l ana lysis. Consequently, it is 
vaccinat ion coverage gaps which present t he serious barrier to Austra lia's maintaining 
and ratifying measles elimination status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012 Australia experienced its largest measles outbreak since 1997. Commencing in 
NSW in April with an imported case in a 25 year old Australian traveller, the outbreak 
persisted through November, resulting in 168 notified cases. 
The National Immunisation Program (NIP) has funded the MMR vaccine since the late 
1980s, with two doses recommended since 1992. As part of the effort to eliminate 
measles, various funded catch-up campaigns have attempted to ensure that anyone 
born since the 1970s has received two doses of measles containing vaccine; anyone 
born since 1966 has been recommended receipt of two doses. 1 The second dose has 
been scheduled for 4 years of age since 2000, although this has recently changed to 18 
months of age commencing in July 2013 with the introduction of the measles-mumps-
rubella-varicella (MMRV) vaccine.2• 3 
Though efforts to eliminate measles have resulted in a notable decrease in 
notifications since the mid-1990s, vaccination coverage rates hover below 95% which 
is considered optimal for herd immunity to protect against outbreaks. 4 Consequently, 
imported cases continue to trigger outbreaks like the one that occurred in NSW in 
2012. 
Outbreaks provide ideal opportunities to assess vaccine effectiveness; such 
assessments are important for determining whether or not an outbreak was due to 
vaccine failure or failure to vaccinate . Few measles vaccine effectiveness analyses have 
been published in Australia since the Measles Control Campaign of the late 1990s, with 
the exception of one that assessed vaccine effectiveness following a 2006 outbreak in 
NSW.5 
This report assesses vaccine effectiveness for the NSW 2012 outbreak and at the 
population level between 2006-2012. Epidemiological trends for measles cases are 
also described . 
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METHODS 
NSW outbreak 
Case definition and case ascertainment 
Measles is required by legislation to be notified in all Australian states and territori es 
using the nationa l notifiable diseases case definition which stipulates that both 
probable and confirmed cases should be notified to public hea lth authorities. 6 A 
confirmed case requires laboratory definitive evidence or a combination of clinical and 
epidemiological evidence. A probable case requires laboratory suggestive evidence 
and clinical evidence (Table 4.1} . 
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Table 4.1. National case definition for measles notifications" 
Confirmed case 
Laboratory definitive evidence (one of the fol lowing) 
Isolation of measles virus OR 
Detection of measles virus by nucleic acid testing OR 
Detection of measles virus antigen OR 
lmmunoglobulin G (lgG) seroconvers ion or a significant increase in antibody 
level or a fourfold or greater ri se in titre to measles virus EXCEPT if th e case 
has received a measles-containing vaccine eight days to eight weeks before 
testing. (NOTE: paired sera must be t est ed in para lle l) OR 
Detect ion of measles virus-specific lgM antibody confirmed in an approved 
reference laboratory EXCEPT if t he case has received a measles-containing 
vaccine eight days to eight weeks before t esting 
Clinical evidence (all of the following) 
A generalised maculopapular rash last ing th ree or more days AND 
Fever (at least 38° C if measured) at the time of rash onset AND 
Cough OR coryza OR conjunctivitis OR Koplik Spots 
Epidemiological evidence 
Contact between two peopl e involving a plausible mode of transmiss ion at a 
ti me when: 
a. one of them is likely t o be infectious (approximately five days before to 
four days after rash onset) 
AND 
b. t he other has an illness that starts with in seven to 18 (usua lly 10) days 
aft er th is contact 
AND 
2. At least one case in the chain of epidemiologically linked cases (which may 
involve many cases) is laboratory confirmed 
Probable case 
Laboratory suggestive evidence 
Detection of measles specific lgM an t ibody other th an by an approved 
reference la boratory EXCEPT if the case has received a measles-containing 
vaccine eight days to eight weeks before testi ng 
Clinical evidence 
As with confirmed cases 
Case investigation and public health response to the NSW 2012 outbreak adhered to 
th e Australian national guidelines.7 All confirmed cases with symptom onset date 
between 7 Apr il and 29 November 2012, an epidemiological link to South Western 
Sydney or Western Sydney Local Hea lth Districts (LHDs) where th e majority of 
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outbreak cases occurred, with no history of recent overseas travel, and an unknown or 
D8 genotype were considered part of the outbreak. Any case lacking a clear 
epidemiological li nk to a confirmed outbreak case was genotyped at a reference 
laboratory. Where possible, vacc ination status was validated using the ACIR. The ACIR 
is a population -based register which includes al l children of citizens and permanent 
resid ents enro lled in the national publicly funded healthcare system, regardless of 
vaccination status (99% enro lment by 12 months of age8). 
Vaccine effectiveness estimates 
Vaccination status was cla ssified according to whether the case had received zero, one 
or two doses, or whether the case's vaccination status was unknown. Cases aged <l 
year of age were excluded from vaccine effectiveness ana lysis because they were not 
eligible for vaccination according to the immunisation schedu le. Cases with unknown 
vaccinat ion status were also excluded. Any dose recorded as having been administered 
within two weeks prior to a diagnosis date was excluded from the ana lysis. 
Cases were classified according to LHD and vaccine effect iveness ·was calcu lated for 
Western Sydney and South Western Sydney LHDs using the following formula 9 : 
Vaccine effectiveness= (ARU-ARV)/ARU*lO0 
ARU: Attack rate unvaccinated 
ARV: Attack rate vaccinated 
Attack rates per 100,000 population were calculated by applying LHD vaccination 
coverage estimates (personal communication, December 2013; Mr Brynley Hull, 
Epidemiologist, NCIRS) to LHD estimated resident population data. 10 Vaccine 
effectiveness was calculated for one dose and for at least one dose. Ninety-five 
percent Cls were calculated for the risk ratios generated from th e formula above. 
130 
Population-based analysis 
Case definition and study population 
Measles cases were defined as outlined above accord ing to the national definition. All 
measles cases notified to the NNDSS with an onset between 1 January 2006 and 31 
December 2012 born after 1996 were included. Data were restricted to 2006-2012 
because the completeness of vaccination status data included in the NNDSS for all 
states and territories was adequate from 2006. Because the ACIR began in 1996, it on ly 
contains ch ildren aged <17 years. Therefore, as controls were extracted from the ACIR 
and matched according to age, only cases aged <17 years were included in the 
analysis. Those aged <1 year were also excluded from analysis because they were not 
eligible for measles vaccination. 
NCIRS holds a de-identified data set for the ACIR. For each case, controls were 
randomly sampled from the ACIR and matched to cases by date of birth +/- one day 
and state or t erritory of residence. As the ana lysis relies on discordance in vaccination 
status between cases and matched contro ls, and given the high vacc ine cove rage for 
one and two doses of measles-containing vaccines {93.9% at 24 months and 89.6% at 5 
years)4 and the ready availability of controls from the ACIR, 20 ~~e-matched controls 
were sampled for each case to maximise precision. 
Vaccination status for cases was obtained from the relevant NNDSS fields as recorded 
by each state and territory. Status was summarised as zero, one or two doses or 
unknown. Where the NNDSS had only classified a case as partially or fully vaccinated, 
this was interpreted according to the case's age and the vaccination schedule in place 
at th e time of illness. Any dose which was recorded to have been administered within 
two weeks prior to diagnosis was excluded from analysis. Vaccination status for 
controls, as well as gender and Indigenous status, was obtained from the ACIR. 
Controls could not be included in the analys is if they had received a dose within 0-14 
days prior to onset of illness in th eir matched case. Comparisons of characteristics 
between cases and controls were performed using the Pearson x2 test and a 
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significance level of p<0.05. 
Vaccine effectiveness estimates 
Cases and controls were ultimately analysed in Stata 12 after being matched using SAS 
9.2 and exported between programs using Excel 2010. Conditional logistic regressions 
controlling for age and jurisdiction were conducted to estimate odds ratios (ORs) for 
receipt of one and two doses for cases compared with their matched controls. Logistic 
regression was also conducted to estimate ORs for cases receiving at least one dose 
compared with their matched controls. Vaccine effectiveness est imates and 95% Cls 
were then calculated based on the OR using the following formu la9 : 
Vaccine effectiveness= (1-OR)* 100 
Ethics approva l was not required for these vaccine effectiveness analyses as de-
identified NNDSS and ACIR data are routinely provided to NCIRS for the purposes of 
disease surveillance as out lined in a funding agreement with the DOH. 
RESULTS 
NSW outbreak 
Cohort characteristics 
Of the 168 total cases in the NSW 2012 outbreak, 92.9% (n=156) occurred in South 
Western and Western Sydney LHDs. Thirty-six (21.4%) of the total outbreak cases were 
infants too young to be vaccinated. Forty-nine (29.2%) cases occurred among those 
aged 10-19 years. Seventy-three of the 168 cases (43.5%) were reported as 
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unvaccinated; seven of these 73 had reportedly rece ived vaccination during the 
exposure period and therefore these seven were classified as unvaccinated . Forty 
(23 .8%) had unknown vaccination status . For those with unknown vaccination status, 
72.5% were aged 20-59 years and 25 .0% were aged 10-14 years. Only one case aged 
<10 years had unknown vaccination status . Figure 4.1 displays cases by age group and 
vaccination status. 
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Figure 4.1. Number of notified measles cases by age group and vaccination status, NSW 
outbreak, 2012 
Vaccine effectiveness estimates 
Of the 168 outbreak cases, 36 were excluded because they were infants aged <l year 
who were too young for vaccination . Forty cases with unknown vaccination status 
were also excluded. Ninety-two cases remained eligible for the vaccine effectiveness 
analysis (Appendix 4.A) . 
Of these 92 cases, 73 were from South Western Sydney LHD and 16 from Western 
Sydney LHD. The estimated resident population for South Western Sydney LHD was 
875,384; it was 846,174 for Western Sydney LHD. Estimated vaccination coverage (one 
dose) was 94.0% and 93.7% for South Western Sydney and Western Sydney LHDs 
respectively. 
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Vaccine effectiveness for each LHD for one dose and at least one dose is detailed in 
Table 4.2 . For both districts, all estimates ranged between 96.9% and 98.6%. 
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Table 4.2. Measles attack rates per 100,000 population and estimated MMR vaccine effectiveness by dosage, South Western and Western Sydney LHDs, 2012 
South Western Sydney LHD 
Number vaccinated Attack rate vaccinated per Number unvaccinated Attack rate unvaccinated per Vaccine effectiveness 
cases 100,000 population cases 100,000 population (95% Confidence Interval) 
(vaccinated (unvacc inated 
population=822,860) population=52,523) 
One dose 13 1.6 59 112.3 98.6% (98.1-99.0%) 
At least one 14 1.7 98.5% (97.9-98.9%) 
dose 
Western Sydney LHD 
Number vaccinated Attack rate vaccinated per Number unvaccinated Attack rate unvaccinated per Vaccine effectiveness 
cases 100,000 population cases 100,000 population (95% Confidence Interval) 
(vaccinated (unvacci nated 
population=792,865) population=53,308) 
One dose 4 0.5 11 20.6 97.6% (95.2-98.8%) 
At least one 5 0.6 96.9% (94.1-98.4%) 
dose 
Population-based analysis 
Secular trends among measles notifications 
Between 1995-2012, 4,111 measles notifications we re reported to the NNDSS. Efforts 
to ach ieve an d maintain measles eliminat ion have resulted in a decrease in 
notifications in Austra lia since 1995 (Figure 4.2). In 1995, there were 1,182 
notifications of measles in Aust ralia . This decreased throughout the 1990s, and from 
2000-2012, notifications ranged from 10-199 annually. Notifications from NSW 
(n =l,716) an d Queensland (n =768)-two of Australia's most populou s stat es-have 
comprised 60% of all notifications. Since 2000, a disproportionate amount of 
notifications has been for those aged 20-59 years. However, notifications in 2011-
2012 also included an increase in cases aged 10-19 years. Most 2012 notifications 
were from th e NSW outbreak and notable among those cases was th e increase in 
notifications among in fan t s <1 year of age who were too young t o be vaccinated. 
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Vaccine effectiveness estimates 
Afte r excluding all notifications wi th disease onset prior to 2006 and those with a date 
of birth prior to 1997 or aged <l year at the time of ill ness, 207 notifications remained. 
The majority of these notifications (73.4%, n=152) were from NSW and Queensland. In 
t erms of age, the majority of cases (40.1%, n=83) were aged 1-4 years; 30.4% (n=63) 
were aged 5- 9 years and 29.5% (n=61) were aged 10-15 years. 
Eighteen cases were excluded from the analysis due to their unknown vaccination 
status . More than half of the excluded cases (55.5%, n=l0) were aged 10-15 years. All 
but one excluded notification resided in either NSW or Victoria. Seven cases included 
in the analysis were classified as having received zero doses of vaccine because they 
had received a dose immediately after exposure. Ultimately, 189 cases were included 
in the vaccine effectiveness analysis (Appendix 4.A). Of these, 24.9% (n=47) were also 
cases included in the NSW outbreak analysis. 
Twenty controls were extracted from the ACIR for each control, resulting in a total of 
3,780 controls. There were no significant differences between cases and controls in 
terms of gender or Indigenous status (Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3. Characteristics of cases and controls included in the population-based measles 
vaccine effectiveness analysis 
Cases(%) Controls (%) p value 
n=189 n=3780 
Gender Male 92 (48.7%) 1,975 (52.2%} 0.34 
Female 97(51.3%) 1,805 (47.8%) 
Indigenous Indigenous 8 (4.2%) 200 (5.3%) 0.52 
status* 
Non- 161 (85.2%) 3,171 (83.9%) 
Indigenous 
Number of 0 160 (84.7%) 437 (11.6%) <0.001 
doses 
1 22 (11.6%) 1,403 (37.1%) 
2 7 (3.7%) 1,940 (51.3%) 
*20 cases and 409 controls had unknown Indigenous status. 
Th e estim ated vaccine effectiveness for one dose MMR was 96.7% (95% Cl: 94.5-
98.0%). For at least one dose, vaccine effectiveness was estimated to be 98.7% (95% 
Cl: 97.9-99.2%) and for 2 doses it was 99.7% (95% Cl: 99.2-99.9%). 
DISCUSSION 
This analysis demonstrates that the measles vacc ine has been effective and that 
vaccine failure did not cause the NSW outbreak. Vaccine effectiveness increased 
slightly by dose for the national analysis. Regarding th e outbreak analysis, vaccine 
effectiveness was slight ly higher for those residing in South Western Sydney as 
compared with Western Sydney, albeit w ith overlapping Cls. Th ese vacc ine 
effectiveness ca lculations were simi lar to that reported by Sheppeard et al following a 
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2006 NSW outbreak where employment of the screening method yielded 96% vaccine 
effectiveness.5 Recent vaccine effectiveness analyses from other developed countries 
have also concluded similar effectiveness, 12·14 with the exception of a 2008 ana lysis of 
the population-wide outbreak in Ukraine which concluded 93.1% effectiveness for two 
doses. 15 
Though it was unlikely that poor vacc ine effect iveness had played a part in 
contributing to measles transmission in Australia over the period of 2006- 2012, it is 
nevertheless important to conduct such an analysis to rule out vaccine effectiveness as 
a con t ributing factor. This is a critical component of evaluat ing the immunisation 
schedule and any changes it has undergone. As Australia strives to maintain and ratify 
elimination status - broad ly defined as the absence of t ransmission of endemic 
measles - 16 it is critical not only to understand why and how transmission continues to 
occur, but also to be able to document all evidence which exp lains current meas les 
epidemiology. This vaccine effectiveness analysis is an important contribution to this 
evidence. 
Selection and misclassificat ion biases are known to affect vaccine effectiveness 
analyses. Specifica lly, problems with case definitions, case ascertainment and 
ascertainment of vaccination status may bias analysis. 17 Notification procedures and a 
standardised and sensit ive case definition make it unlikely that many cases were 
missed, neither nationally notified nor NSW outbreak specific cases . Clinical features, 
high infectivity of the illness and the requirement for laboratory evidence for all 
probab le as well as confirmed cases make it unlikely that cases will ultimately be 
misclassified. 18 Moreover, suspected cases found to not be measles are not reported 
to the NNDSS19 and were not included in the NSW outbreak cohort. 
Bias associated with vaccination status classification is likely the most serious 
limitation to this analysis. Vaccination status was obtained from the NNDSS data and 
reliant upon the information provided by each state and territory. While vaccination 
status is sometimes va lidated by med ical records and ACIR data, often it is reliant upon 
self-reporting which may be subject to recall bias. Studies have demonstrated that 
parental recall of vaccination status may overestimate vaccination coverage, though 
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requirement for written verification may lead to underestim ates. 20, 21 It is evident from 
reviewing notes from th e NSW outbreak cases that sometimes self-reports we re 
accepted as proof of vaccin ation and other times th ey were not. For the purposes of 
this ana lysis, vaccination sta tus was accepted as what eve r was reported in the relevant 
NNDSS field. 
With 40 cases from the NSW outbreak analysis and 18 ca ses from populati on-ba sed 
analysis excluded due to unknown vaccinat ion sta tus, it is evident that vaccination 
status data completeness in th e NNDSS could be improved . Because there was a high 
proportion of cases with unknow n vaccination status who were consequent ly excluded 
from the analyses,9, 22 each of th ese ana lyses li ke ly would have benefitted from 
sensitivity analyses assessing what th e vaccine effectiveness estimates would have 
been if all those with unknow n vaccination status had been included as unvaccinated 
cases or if all those with unknown vaccination status had been included as having 
received at least one dose of vaccine. 
Admittedly, in this report, the high number of cases with unknown vaccination status 
may have been influenced by more th an just incomplete NNDSS data. It has been 
suggested that th e ACIR may underestimate coverage by 5% for both fi rst and second 
doses of meas les containing vaccines. 23 Moreover, incomplete ACIR record s for older 
children who we re included in the Regist er in its incipient years w hen reporting was 
not as robust may have contributed to the high proportion of cases with unknown 
vaccination status included in th e popul ation-based ana lysis. Again, se nsitivity analyses 
may improve the validity of thi s work in light of this additional limitation. 
It is likely that a proportion of those cases with unknown vaccination status among 
those included in the populat ion-based ana lys is were of Pa cifi c Islander background. 
Though no offi cial NSW outbreak data are available summari sing vaccination status by 
ethnicity, 36 cases in th e outbreak were of Pacific Island descent, and of those, 29 
(80.1%) were Samoan . Those of Pacific Islander background we re overrepresented 
among outbreak cases aged 10-19 years. 24 Anecdotal evidence reported by Najjar et al 
suggest that South Western Sydney high schoo l student s of Pacific Islander backgrou nd 
may have missed out on routine childhood vaccinations both before and after th eir 
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arrival in Australia. 24 Based on this knowledge of the outbreak cases, and given that 
most cases included in the population-based analysis were from Queensland and 
NSW-the states with the highest proportions of Samoan born populations 25-it is 
reasonable to suggest that a proportion of cases with unknown vaccination status in 
the national notification data were likely of Pacific Islander background. Although 
vaccination coverage among Pacific Island nations varies, 26 World Health Organization 
(WHO)-UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) estimates of Samoan vaccination 
coverage from 2003-2011 range from 45-67%; it is only in 2012 that estimates appear 
higher at 85%. 26 Consequently, many of the cases with unknown vaccination status 
excluded from the population-based analysis may have been more likely to have been 
unvaccinated than vaccinated if they were indeed of Pacific Islander descent. This 
would have resulted in underestimated vaccine effectiveness. Admittedly, however, 
further research would be required to support the hypothesis that a proportion of 
those with unknown vaccination status were likely Pacific Islanders and therefore more 
likely to be unvaccinated. 
The final limitation of this study which should be acknowledged is that, as with any 
vaccine effectiveness analysis, confounding may be problematic. To remove the 
potential for confounding, cases and controls were matched by date of birth and 
jurisdiction of residence. Cases and controls were not significantly different in regards 
to gender or Indigenous status. 
Ruling out vaccine effectiveness as a contributing factor in recent transmission and 
outbreak events in Australia means that gaps in vaccination coverage remain 
problematic to achieving elimination. Nation-wide coverage estimates from 2010 
report 93.9% MMR coverage for those aged 24 months (birth cohort 1 January-31 
March 2011) and 89.1% for those aged 60 months, with NSW-specific coverage 
estimates at 93.8% and 89.3% for 24 months and 60 months of age respectively. 4 
These percentages, however, conceal small pockets of lower coverage rates. The 
lowest 24 month coverage rates by Medicare Local catchment are recorded by North 
Coast NSW and Eastern Sydney at 89%. The lowest 60 month coverage rate is recorded 
in Eastern Sydney at 84%. 27 These coverage estimates fall well short of the 95% mark 
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which is what WHO guidelines state is required to achieve and maintain elimination. 19 
It has been suggested that meas les elimination has been achieved in Austra li a.19 
Supportive of Australia's claim of achieving elimination, 19 se rosurvey resu lts have 
demonstrated an effective reproductive number (R) of <l, meaning that the average 
number of secondary cases produced by a typical case remains below the epidemic 
threshold and indigenous transmission has been eliminated. 28 A 2013 report by Wood 
et al, however, has noted that seropositivity has decreased since 1999 and that R cou ld 
be approaching one. 29 If this proves true, this could mean major setbacks for 
Australia's elimination progress. 
Th e 2012 NSW outbreak coho rt has highlighted areas where cove rage gaps exist, 
demonstrating that those aged 10-19 years (29.2%, n=40) and those of Pacific Islander 
descent (21.4%, n=36) comprised a high proportion of cases. 24 Those aged 10-19 years 
who were born in Australia should have received two doses of measles con taining 
vaccine as part of the 1998 Measles Control Campaign wh ich successfu lly vaccinated 
96% of the targeted primary school age group. 1 Why coverage gaps exist among this 
group is therefore particularly puzzling. Nevertheless, both this risk group and that 
comprised of individuals of Pacific Islander descent require dedicated efforts to better 
understand the nature of the coverage gaps and to appropriately target efforts to 
improve vaccination uptake. Another area of concern particular to measles 
epidemiology in this era of eliminat ion includes the high number of cases occurring 
among infants too young to be vaccinated. In the NSW outbreak, infants <l year of age 
comprised 21.4% (n=36) of cases. 24 This may be ind icative of early wan ing of maternal 
antibodies among this vulnerable age group and may become more problematic as 
more mothers are protected by vaccine-conferred immunity rather than having had 
measles illness.30-33 
This ana lysis provides evidence that vaccination failure has not contr ibuted to recent 
measles cases in Australia including those which were part of the NSW 2012 outbreak. 
Consequent ly, it provides additiona l evidence that vaccination coverage gaps remain 
problematic to Australia's goal of maintaining and ratifying eliminat ion status. It thus 
serves as a reminder that these coverage gaps must be recognised and targeted for 
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improvement . Vaccine effectiveness analyses like this one are valuable contributions 
to ma intaining pub lic and provider confidence in vaccination programs-which is also 
critical to achieving Australia's goal of sustained measles elimination. 
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PART TWO 
THE CHANGING EPIDEMIOLOGY OF 
MEASLES IN AN ERA OF ELIMINATION: 
LESSONS FROM HEALTHCARE SETTING 
TRANSMISSIONS DURING AN OUTBREAK 
IN AUSTRALIA, 2012 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
In cou ntri es where mea sl es elim ination has occurred and cases are rare, transm iss ions 
in hea lthcare facilities pers ist, perpetuating out breaks and present ing a challenge to 
achieving and maintaining elim ination. In 2012, seven years after it was argued that 
measles elim ination had been ach ieved in Australia, the country experienced its largest 
measles outb reak in 15 years. Indeed, a high proport ion of cases in this outbreak were 
heal t hcare-acquired . The objecti ve of th is ana lysis was to highl ight key character ist ics 
of healthcare-acquired cases and t o conside r whether, in a post-elim ination setting, 
measles epidemiology might have changed. 
Methods 
A healthcare-acquired measles case (secondary case) was defined as a confirmed case 
April-November 201 2 who had a coincident attendance with a measles-in fected 
individua l (source case) at a hea lthcare facility 7-18 days befo re symptom onset. We 
conducted descript ive analyses using case series dat a from the met ropo lit an Sydney 
region to examine demograph ic cha racterist ics, including age, sex, vaccination status 
and time of presentation. The number of presentations, time of presentation, 
symptoms upon presentation and iso lat ion information were obt ained for source cases 
by case interview and review of health records. The number of contact s exposed to 
source cases was provided by health authorities upon completion of contact tracing 
efforts. 
Results 
There were 36 cases of healthcare-acquired measles and 16 source cases (of which 14 
could be identified). All source and secondary cases overlapped in time, and source 
cases, on average, presented three times to a healthcare facility before being 
diagnosed. Eighty-four percent of secondary cases acquired measles from a case with 
rash . 
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Conclusion 
The most recent measles outbreak in Australia has indicated that measles 
epidemiology post-elimination may differ to that during a period of measles control. 
Given that healthcare facilities are common settings for measles transmission in 
countries nearing or having reported elimination, understanding characteristics of 
healthcare setting transmissions can assist in effectively targeting prevention 
strategies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 2003-2008, Australia, England and Wales claimed to have eliminated the 
indigenous transmission of measles. 19' 30 Despite this, all three countries have 
experienced a number of measles outbreaks in recent times. 31· 32 This includes Wales' 
largest measles outbreak in 18 years, affecting 1,325 individuals (at the time of 
writing). 33 For both England and Wales, a consequence of their large scale and 
persistent outbreaks has been the re-in troduction of indigenous measles in 2008.34 
Australian outbreaks have remained comparably smaller and it is likely that measles 
elimination has been sustained despite the country's largest outbreak in 15 years 
occurring in 2012. The US, where measles elimination was declared in 2000, 35 has also 
witnessed recent outbreaks, with over 222 cases in 2011, its largest outbreak since 
2006.36, 37 
One key characteristic observed to have perpetuated the 2012 Australian outbreak 
was the numerous transmissions which occurred in healthcare settings. Indeed, 
healthcare facilities have been reported as a prominent setting for measles 
transmiss ions in countries where measles is rare or eliminated. 38• 39 Reasons for this 
are well documented and include the low suspicion of infection among clinicians 
unfamiliar with the disease. This is further exacerbated by the difficulties inherent in 
diagnosing an illness characterised by the non-differential symptoms shared by myriad 
conditions. 40 Additionally, measles is highly infectious, and busy, dense environments 
like hospital Emergency Departments (EDs) are optimal settings to propagate 
outbreaks.38 Of concern is that immunocompromised patients who often frequent 
healthcare facilities, particularly hospitals, if infected, experience more severe disease 
outcomes than immunocompetent individuals. 39 
Although numerous measles outbreak reports have been published describing 
healthcare transmissions, 32· 41' 42 many of these reports lack detailed case 
demographics and transmission characteristics. For example, the 2012 outbreak in 
northwest England identified that nearly 30% of confirmed cases reported before 
March were exposed to a measles case in a healthcare setting32 while a separate 
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publication about this same outbreak stated that failure to isolate suspected cases had 
resulted in 'a significant number' of secondary cases. 43 No further case or healthcare 
transmission details were provided in either of these two reports. Similarly, little is 
known about the epidemiology of measles transmiss ions in Austra lian healthcare 
settings, particularly in the context of measles eliminat ion. 
This can be problematic. It is this type of research which informs updates to measles 
control and prevention strategies. Without such evidence being published, guide lines 
may consequent ly be inappropriate for responding to measles in an eliminat ion 
context. For example, because the measles virus has been demonstrated to remain 
viab le in air for up to two hours in a controlled experiment, 44 Australian guide lines 
have recommended that all individ uals present for up to two hours after a confirmed 
measles case has departed shou ld be treated as exposed contacts . The research which 
informed what has become known as the 'two hour rule'7, however, is out-dated and 
was published in an era when measles was st ill endemic. 45' 46 In an elimination era 
when cases are rare, adhering to the 'two hour rule' may be unnecessa ry and 
inefficient. 
Because littl e has been published on the characteristics of healthcare tran smissions 
during measles outbreaks, and because there is a need for this type of evidence to 
inform prevention strategies and policies appropriate to a post-elimination setting, the 
objective of this study was to describe key characteristics of the 2012 Australian 
outbreak. The three key characteristics described include: the nature of exposure and 
exposure times between source and secondary cases; the delay in diagnosis of measles 
among source cases; and the stage of measles infection when transmission typically 
occurred. 
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METHODS 
Case series data describing confirmed measles cases were obtained from metropolitan 
Sydney LHDs in NSW, Australia's most populous state, between April and November 
2012. Western Sydney, where the majority of outbreak cases resided, is cu ltura lly 
diverse. A third of its 2 million population were born overseas and it also includes the 
largest urban population of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the 
country. 47 
In line with national guidelines, a confirmed measles case required laboratory evidence 
or clinical signs of infection with an established epidemiological link. 6 Clinicians and 
laboratories are legislatively required to notify public health authorities of suspected 
and confirmed measles cases. 48 
All confi rmed cases temporally and regionally similar to the index case with genotype 
D8 or unknown were considered as belonging to this outbreak. Genotyping of 
specimens was conducted at the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory 
(VIDRL).7 
Health authorit ies interviewed cases using a standardised questionnaire to obta in 
demograph ic information (age, sex, ethnicity, and vaccination status), symptom onset 
date and movements during exposure and infectious periods. The exposure period was 
defined as 7-18 days prior to rash onset and the infectious per iod was defined as five 
days prior to and four days after rash onset. 
Hea lth authorities compiled details from electronic patient notes (including cl inical 
histo ry, movements in hospital, number of individuals exposed ) if cases had presented 
to an ED 7-18 days preceding onset of symptoms during either the exposu re or 
infectious period as defined above. For all ED cases, public health authorit ies obtained 
details regarding arrival, triage, time seen and discharge t ime from hosp itals. 
A healthcare facil ity was defined as any prem ises that delivered hea lthcare services 
includ ing hospital EDs, inpatient wards and General Pract ice (GP) cl in ics. A hea lthcare-
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acquired infection (secondary case) was a confirmed case between April and 
November 2012 who had a coincident attendance with a measles-infected individual 
(source case) at a healthcare facility 7-18 days before symptom onset. For the 
purposes of this analysis, the term 'transmission event' has been used to describe 
instances where source cases transmitted to secondary cases in a healthcare facility. 
Analysis was conducted using Stata 12 to describe demographic characteristics of 
source and secondary cases. Overlap times of source and secondary cases during 
presentation at a healthcare facility were calculated for each transmission event. 
For source cases, proportions were calculated for type of healthcare facility of first 
presentation, number of presentations, number of cases isolated and symptoms 
during presentations. Th e average time spent by the source case in the healthcare 
facility was calculated. For each transmission event, a crude attack rate was calculated 
with number of individuals exposed used as th e denominator. Crude attack rates were 
stratified by LHD to account for the different contact tracing procedures implemented 
by the districts. 
Ethics approval was not required as this study was part of the public health response 
to th e outbreak. 
RESULTS 
There were 168 confirmed and 2 probable cases of measles, of which 36 (2 2%) were 
defined as healthcare-acquired (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Number of confirmed and probable measles cases in the NSW outbreak by setting 
of transmission, April-November 2012 
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The median age of the healthcare-acquired cases was 9 years (range : 5 months-37 
years). Eleven cases (31%) were infants too young to be vaccinated, 16 cases (44%) 
were unvaccinated. One case (3%) had records of receiving two doses of MMR and 
three cases (8%) had received one dose of MMR. One case (3%) was a healthcare 
worker. 
Thirty-three transmissions (33/36=92%) occurred in hospital, of which 29 transmissions 
(29/33=88%) occurred in an ED or ED waiting room and four transmissions (4/33=12%) 
in a ward . Three transmissions (3/36=8%) occurred at GP clinics. 
Source cases 
The median age of known source cases (n=14) was 16 years (range: 7 months-39 
155 
years) . Two source cases acquired measles in a healthcare setting and were also 
included as healthcare-acquired cases. Twelve source cases (86%) were unimmunised 
including three source cases (21%) who were too young to be immunised. One source 
case had documented evidence of a primary dose of MMR and the vaccination status 
of another source case was unknown. Two source cases could not be identified. 
Overlap time between source and secondary case 
The median overlap time between source and secondary cases was 4 hours and 24 
minutes (range: 59 minutes-35 hours 31 minutes). All secondary cases were present at 
the same time as the source case and no transmissions occurred after the departure of 
the source case. 
Of the known source cases that transmitted infection in GP clinics, presentation and 
departure times of patients were not recorded . However, one of the three secondary 
cases that was acquired in a GP reported that a measles case was known to be present 
during their attendance at the GP. There were two transmission events which were 
triggered by unknown source cases resulting in four secondary cases for the first 
transmission event and one secondary case for the second. The four secondary cases 
resulting from the first transmission event all overlapped with each other by time and 
place. The one secondary case which resulted from the second unknown source case 
overlapped in time with three possible known source cases. 
Delay in diagnosis 
On average, source cases presented three times to a healthcare facility before being 
suspected of measles. The median number of days from symptom onset to notification 
was 5 (range : 2-23) days and the median number of days from rash onset to 
notification was 2 (range: 0-18) days. A total of 1,251 contacts were exposed to 
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measles in healthcare facilities from the 14 known source cases. 
Of the 38 known healthcare presentations by a source case, isolation occurred upon 
initial presentation to an ED once. Two other source cases were isolated after eight 
hours or more in the ED. One presentation of a source case to a GP resulted in 
isolation there; however, the source case re-presented at an ED on the same day and 
was not isolated. Three source cases were isolated upon admittance to a ward. 
Isolation practices for the 14 known source cases did not appear to improve for those 
source cases who presented later in the outbreak as compared with those who 
presented at the beginning. 
Transmission characteristics 
Of the known source cases, a total of 38 presentations to a healthcare facility 
occurred. Eighteen presentations occurred prior to rash onset and led to 5 
transmissions. Twenty presentations occurred following rash onset and resulted in 25 
transmissions. Seventeen percent (n=6} of secondary cases acquired measles from a 
case without rash compared to 83% (n=30) of secondary cases who acquired measles 
from a case with rash. 
In Western Sydney LHD, the crude attack rate for measles was 0.8% if the source case 
had no rash compared to 0.4% when the source case had a rash. In South Western 
Sydney LHD, the crude attack rate for measles was 5.1% if the source case had no rash 
compared to 11.0% if the source case had a rash. 
DISCUSSION 
A key driver of NSW 2012 measles outbreak was numerous healthcare setting 
transmissions which occurred in part because of delayed diagnosis and 
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implementation of control procedures. Key characteristics of healthcare-acquired 
transmissions during the 2012 outbreak-the largest in Australia since 1997-have 
prompted health officials to reconsider public health response practices during 
measles outbreaks. Indeed, the results of this study suggest that a re-assessment of 
current knowledge in measles epidemiology is required, specifically how epidemiology 
may be different in an elimination context. 
Contact tracing and the 'two hour rule' 
The va lue of contact tracing individual s up to two hours after an infectious case has 
departed a healthcare facility is questionable. Australia's two hour contact tra cing rule 
appears to have been based on research published during the 196Os-198Os. Under 
experimental conditions, measles virus was found to persist in air for up to two 
hours. 44 This was further suppo rted by airborne transmiss ion occurring up to two 
hours after an infectious case departed on a number of occasions.45· 46· 49 The number 
of tran sm iss ions from these reports, however, was low, at a total of six secondary 
cases,
45
· 
46
· 
49
· 
50 and al l reports were published in the US at a time when measles was 
endemic, which would make ident ifying the source of infection cha llenging. Moreover, 
many of these reports described source cases who were vigorously coughing and likely 
to be 'superspreaders'.45' 46 Reviews on nosocomial measles transmissions continue to 
use these out-dated sources as evidence of the virus persisting in air for up to two 
hours.38, 39 
Among the known source cases in this study, no transmissions were observed to occur 
outside the direct time of exposure between the source case and susceptible individual 
in the healthcare sett ing. Although the overlap times between source and secondary 
case were missing for eight transmissions, anecdotal evidence purports that an overlap 
time existed for one of these transmissions while another transmission had three 
possible source cases, all of whom overlapped in time with the secondary case . The 
over lap time for the remaining six transmissions cannot be precisely ascertained. Four 
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of these were infected at the same time from an unknown source case. Though the 
source case remained unidentified, all four secondary cases overlapped succinctly in 
time and place. The final two cases with unknown overlap times were infected at GP 
clinics for which we were unable to obtain precise patient time and location detail. 
A potential limitation to our analysis, however, was the differing contract tracing 
procedures used by LHDs in Sydney. One LHD contact traced according to the 
recommended 'two hour rule' while another contact traced up to 15 minutes after the 
infect ious case departed the healthcare faci lity. 
Nevertheless, based on our results, we believe sufficient evidence exists to question 
the necessity of the 'two hour rule'. Reports from a 2011 outbreak in Australia made a 
similar conclusion after finding all source and secondary cases had overlapped.51 In 
England and Wales, only contacts with face-to-face exposure, exposure time excessive 
of 15 minutes or immunocompromised individuals with any contact (including over a 
short period after the measles case has departed) are followed up.52 
If transmission does occur after a source case departs the exposure site, the secondary 
case wou ld likely be captured by surveillance as measles is rare and Australia has a 
sensitive surveillance system. Thorough case investigation also ensures that all cases 
exposed by a confirmed case are likely to be identified. ConseqLJently, the 'two hour 
rule' may be an inefficient and costly use of resources during times of an outbreak in 
this era of elimination. An Australian investigation into the costs associated with 
managing one measles case with 75 contacts in a 2011 outbreak estimated the 
expense at A$2,433.s3 
We recommend that a more targeted approach to contact tracing in Australia be 
adopted, particularly during outbreaks when time may be limited. Focusing only on 
individuals who were present at the same time as an infectious measles case in a 
healthcare setting would ideally minimise excess resource utilisation and be more 
appropriate for countries where measles is rare or eliminated. 
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Infectious stage of measles 
It has long been recognised that infectiousness of measles is greatest during 
prodrome 54 whereas the appearance of a rash indicates th e beginning of viral 
clearance from blood and tissue. 55 In this study, however, a large proportion of 
healthcare transmissions appeared to occur after the rash onset of the source cases. 
Other reports have documented sim ilar findings. 56' 57 This may suggest that 
infectiousness cou ld be just as high during the rash stage of illness as during the 
prodromal stage. There are, however, a number of caveats to this interpretat ion, 
including the small number of transmission events, variable wait times and times of 
exposure for the secondary cases. Additionally, in our analysis, there was one source 
case who infected 11 secondary cases; this outlier may have skewed results. 
Nevertheless, attack rates were calculated by th e number of individuals exposed at 
each presentation which may partially control for wait-times. It is unfortunate, 
however, that we were unable to obtain information on the number of suscept ible 
individuals at each presentation to obtain more valid attack rates . 
Moreover, our attack rates may be overestimates of the true attack rates. The 
denominator only included contacts of known source cases that transmitted measles 
in a healthcare setting. It excluded the healthcare contacts of measles cases who were 
infectious and presented to a healthcare facility but did not transmit infect ion. During 
this outbreak, there were 120 reported presentations (unpublished data) to a 
healthcare facility which did not result in any secondary transmissions. At the time of 
writing, however, the number of contacts from these presentations was unknown. 
Despite these limitations, th e observation that, for this study, more secondary cases 
acquired measles from source cases who had rashes than source cases who were in 
the prodromal stage of infection may serve as a reminder of the importance of 
increasing suspicion of patients presenting with rash during outbreaks. 
A rash alone, however, is not the only predictor of infectiousness and more attention 
to the optimal environment for transmission to occur would be beneficial for 
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considering improvements to control efforts. It is likely a combination of viral load and 
vigorous coughing on the part of the source case combined with the length of 
exposure, physical layout of the exposure site, and the number of susceptible 
individuals present which contribute to wide-scale transmission events. Nevertheless, 
improved recording of clinical details of cases and suspected cases during times of 
outbreak may assist in improving our understanding of measles infectiousness. 
Delayed diagnosis 
Delayed diagnosis and subsequent multiple presentations of measles cases were 
problematic during this outbreak and are common outbreak characteristics in 
countries where measles is rare. 39• 58 This contributes to the number of transmission 
events occurring within healthcare settings. A recent review found that up to 50% of 
cases in developed countries, particularly where measles elimination was established, 
had been acquired in a healthcare setting .59 
At first presentation, only a low proportion of cases are suspected of having measles60 
because it is difficult to clinically distinguish from other viral systemic illnesses. A 
patient in the early stages of measles may present with a combination of non-
differential symptoms, including fever and perhaps only one of the following: cough, 
coryza and conjunctivitis. Differential diagnoses include influenza and other common 
respiratory viral infections and allergic rhinitis. Even with the characteristic 
maculopapular rash, a measles diagnosis may be overlooked because of the disease's 
rareness and similarities to adeno- and enteroviral infection, other exanthems of 
childhood and drug allergy. 39' 56 Unable to obtain a successful diagnosis on first 
presentation, most source cases presented multiple times to both the same healthcare 
facility as their first presentation and to other healthcare facilities . 
Although public health alerts were disseminated to healthcare facilities during this 
outbreak, including faxing and telephoning GPs in the worst affected areas, awareness 
did not appear to increase as the outbreak continued . Multiple healthcare 
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presentations by source cases were observed to occur even during the peak of the 
outbreak. More innovative approaches may be requ ired to improve future control 
efforts, including establishing alerts that are triggered when 'feve r' and ' rash' are 
entered into electronic medical records, however, such measures are yet to be 
eva luated .61' 62 
Our results identified that even during the peak of the outbreak a number of measles 
cases who presented with rash were not suspected of having measles and 
subsequently were not isolated. Although a number of source cases was documented 
as having been isolated, isolation was enacted too late to prevent secondary 
transmission or isolation was ineffective. While iso lation of an infectious case in a 
negative pressure room is the preferred method,7 in many healthcare facilities this 
type of room is not available. A more feasible option may include confinement of a 
suspect case in a single private room with a face mask. 63 In busy EDs, however, single 
rooms may be scarce. In this outbreak, isolation practices were documented to have 
differed not only between hospitals but also within hospitals. Isolation practices may 
prove more effective if procedures are standardised and consistent. 
Though several key limitations of this study have been detailed above, others are 
worth briefly noting. Though presentations by source cases to a healthcare facility may 
have been missed (eg, if the case presented at another GP/ ED) this is unlikely as cases 
were interviewed using a standardised questionnaire and cases are unlikely to forget 
seeking medical attention. Th ere is a possibility that isolation of a suspected case could 
have occurred that was not captured in GP/ED medical records. If this detail was 
missing from medical records, however, the information wou ld likely have been 
collected by public health authorities through communication with the attending 
clinician. Ultimately, if time and resources had permitted, it would have been ideal to 
compare the source cases who presented multiple times to a control group of 
individuals who were recognised immediately at a healthcare facility to determine if 
any risk factors led to misdiagnosis of measles. Such an approach may assist in better 
tailoring efforts to improve measles detection by clinicians during outbreaks. 
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CONCLUSION 
As more countries progress towards measles elimination, transmission in healthcare 
facilities assumes increasing importance as a remaining obstacle to improving measles 
control and prevention of outbreaks. Though imported measles cases wi ll continue to 
challenge countries which have achieved elimination status, transmissions in 
healthcare facilities can surely be addressed more effective ly to ensure that healthcare 
facilities are not contributing to outbreaks. Measles must remain high on the list of 
possible diagnoses when patients present with febrile rash. Diagnosis must be prompt 
and subsequent isolation appropriate. Observations from NSW 2012 outbreak suggest 
that these are areas which require improvement. Moreover, contact tracing 
procedures based on out-dated evidence may require revision to be better suited to 
the post-elimination context. Contact tracing all those who have been in the vicinity of 
the known case for up to two hours after the case departed may not be efficient or 
necessary in the elimination era. Instead, focussing on those who have had direct 
contact with a known case may be a more efficient use of resources. Continual 
strengthening of the evidence base with outbreak reports such as this may assist in 
improving our understanding of the pathogenicity and epidemiology of measles and 
consequently how best to target awareness as well as control an-d prevention efforts. 
Failing to do so may jeopardise the goal of maintaining and ratifying elimination status 
in Australia and elsewhere. 
163 
REFERENCES 
1. Turnbull FM, Burgess MA, McIntyre PB, Lambert SB, Gilbert GL, Gidding HF, et al. 
The Australian measles control campaign, 1998. Bull World Health Organ. 
2001;79(9):882-8. 
2. National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS). Significant 
events in measles, mumps and rubella vaccination practice in Australia. [Internet] 2013 
[cited 2013 December 28]; Available from: 
http://www. n ci rs .ed u .a u/i mm u n isatio n/h i story/M ea sles-m umps-rube Ila-hi story-
Dece m be r-2013. pdf. 
3. Australian Techn ical Advisory Group on Immu nisation (ATAGI). The Austra lian 
Immunisation Ha ndbook. 10th ed . Canberra: Australian Government Department of 
Health and Ageing; 2013. 
4. Hull B, Dey A, Menzies R, McIntyre P. Annua l immunisation coverage report, 2010. 
Commun Dis lntell. 2013;37(1):E21-E39. 
5. Sheppeard V, Forssm an B, Ferson M, Moreira C, Campbell-Lloyd S, Dwyer D, et al. 
Vaccine failures and vaccine effect iveness in children during measles outbreaks in New 
South Wales, March-May 2006. Commun Dis lntell. 2009;33(1):21-6. 
6. Austra lian Government Department of Health and Ageing. Australian national 
notifiable diseases case definitions: measles case definition. [Internet] 2004 [cited 
2013 February 22]; Available from: 
http://www. hea Ith .gov. a u/i nte rnet/ ma i n/p u bl ish i ng. n sf/ Content/ cd a-su rvei I-n n d ss-
ca sed efs-cd measl.htm. 
7. Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing. Series of national 
guidelines. Measles . National guidelines for public health units. 2009 [updated 19 
February 2009; cited 2012 21 November]; Available from : 
http://www. h ea Ith. gov. au /internet/ main /publishing_ nsf /Conte nt/5 SAD 336 B864C7 2 03 
CA2 5 7 5 5 F00030 7 B 6/$ Fi I e/ measles-song. pdf. 
8. Hull BP, Deeks SL, McIntyre PB. The Australian Childhood Immunisation Register-A 
model for universal immunisation registers? Vaccine. 2009 Aug 13;27(37):5054-60. 
164 
9. Orenstein W, Bernier R, Dondero T, Hinman A, Marks J, Bart K, et al. Field 
evaluation of vaccine efficacy. Bull World Health Organ. 1985;65(6):1055-68. 
10. NSW Government. Health statistics New South Wales: population growth by LHD. 
2011 [cited 2014 February 4]; Available from: 
http://www. hea lthstats.nsw.gov.a u/lnd icator /dem pop lh n map. 
11. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) . Number of notifications 
of measles, received from state and territory health authorities in the period of 1991 
to 2012 and year-to-date notifications for 2013. Canberra 2013. 
12. Arenz 5, Schmitt H, Tischer A, von Kries R. Effectiveness of measles vaccinat ion 
after household exposure during a measles outbreak: a household contact study in 
Coburg, Bavaria. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2005;24(8):697-9. 
13. Wichmann 0, Hellenbrand W, Sagebiel D, Sat ibanez 5, Ahlemeyer G, Vogt G, et al. 
Large measles outbreak at a German public school, 2006. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 
2007;26(9):782-6. 
14. Yeung LF, Lurie P, Dayan G, Eduardo E, Britz PH, Redd SB, et al. A limited measles 
outbreak in a highly vaccinated US boarding school. Pediatrics. 2005 December 1, 
2005; 116( 6): 1287-91. 
15. Velicko I, Muller L, Pebody R, Gergonne B, Aidyralieva C, Kostiuchenko N, et al. 
Nationwide measles epidemic in Ukraine: the effect of low vaccine effectiveness. 
Vaccine. 2008;26(52):6980-5. 
16. World Health Organization Regional Office for the Western Pacific (WPRO). Field 
guidelines for measles elimination. Geneva 2004 [cited 2014 Janaury 2]. Available 
from: 
http://www. wpro. w ho.int/pub I ication s/ docs/Field Gu id el in es for M easies EI i min atio n 
0F24.pdf. 
17. Torvaldsen 5, McIntyre P. Observational methods in epidem iologic assessment of 
vaccine effect iveness. Commun Dis lntell Q Rep . 2002;26(3):451-7. 
18. Orenste in W, Hinman A, Papania M. Evolution of measles elimination strategies in 
the United States. J Infect Dis . 2004;189(Supplement 1):517-522. 
19. Heywood A, Gidding HF, Riddell MA, McIntyre PB, MacIntyre CR, Kelly H. 
Elimination of endemic measles transmission in Australia. Bull World Health Organ . 
165 
2009;87:64-71. 
20. Lister S, McIntyre P, Burgess M, O'Brien E. Immunisation coverage in Australian 
children: a systemat ic review. Commun Dis Intel !. 1999;23:145-70. 
21. Hawe P. Measles control: a best-pract ice challenge in public health. Aust J Public 
Hea lth. 1994;18(3):241-3. 
22. Orenste in W, Bernier R, Hinman A. Assessing vaccine efficacy in the field: further 
observations. Epidmiol Rev. 1988;10:212-41. 
23. Hull B, Lawrence G, MacIntyre R, McIntyre P. Immunisat ion coverage in Australia 
corrected for under-reporting to the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register Aust 
N Z J Public Health . 2003;27:533-8. 
24. Najjar Z, Hope K, Clark P, Nguyen 0, Rosewell A, Conaty S. Sustained outbreak of 
measles in New South Wales, 2012: risks for measles elimination in Australia. Western 
Pac Surveill Response J. 2013;5(1}:1-7. 
25. Australian Government Department of Immigrat ion and Citizenship. Community 
information summary: Samoa-born. 2011 [c ited 2014 February 7]; Available from: 
http://www.google .com.au/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDo 
QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.immi.gov.au%2Fmedia%2Fpublications%2Fstatistics 
%2Fcomm-
summ%2 F pdf%2Fsamoa. pdf&ei=Ki70Uvm O4mtkA WN 5YHwAg& usg=AFQjCN FwKw3z 
m xWKC fDikCJZWAA3ciWg&sig2 =IXIGtioKOoAi-
lo6m iM L9A&bvm=bv. 60983673,d .dGI. 
26. World Health Organization (WHO}. WHO vaccine -preven table diseases: monitoring 
system: 2013 global summary. 2014 [cited 2014 February 6]; Available from: 
http ://apps. who . int/immunization mon itoring/globa lsu mma ry. 
27. National Health Performance Authority. Hea lthy communities: immun isation rates 
for children in 2011-2012. Sydney2013. 
28. Gidding H, Wood J, MacIntyre R, Kelly H, Lambert S, Gi lbert G, et al. Sustained 
measles elimination in Australia and priorities for long term maintenance. Vaccine. 
2007;25( 18} :35 7 4-80. 
29. Wood J, Heywood A, McIntyre P, MacIntyre R. Declining seropositivity in Australia 
and elimination status. Communicable Disease Control Conference; 2013 March 19-
166 
20; Canberra, Australia 2013. 
30. Ramsay ME, Jin L, White J, Litton P, Cohen B, Brown D. Th e elimination of 
indigenous measles transmission in England and Wales. J Infect Dis. 2003 May 15;187 
Suppl 1:5198-207. 
31. Wise J. Measles outbreak hits northeast En gland. BMJ. 2013;346:f662. 
32. Vivancos R, Keenan A, Farmer S, Atkinson J, Coffey E, Dardamissis E, et al. An 
ongoing large outbreak of measles in Merseyside, En gland, January to June 2012. Euro 
survei llance. 2012;17(29). 
33. Public Hea lth Wales. Measles outbreak cases rise again as schoo l vaccinations 
enter fin al week. [Internet] 2013; Ava ilab le from: 
http ://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitespl us/888/news/2732 7. 
34. Measles once again endemic in th e United Kingdom. Euro Survei ll. 2008 Jul 
3;13 (27). 
35. Katz SL, Hinman AR. Summary and conclusions: measles elimination meeting, 16-17 
March 2000. J Infect Dis. 2004 May 1;189 Suppl 1:543-7. 
36. Parker AA, Staggs W, Dayan GH, Ortega-Sanchez IR, Rota PA, Lowe L, et al. 
Implications of a 2005 measles outbreak in Indiana for sustained elimination of 
measles in th e United States. N Engl J Med. 2006 Aug 3;355(5):447-55. 
37. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Measles - United States, 2011. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2012 Apr 20;61:253-7. 
38. Biellik RJ, Clements CJ. Strategies for minimizing nosocomial measles transmission. 
Bull World Hea lth Organ. 1997;75(4):367-75. 
39. Botelho-Nevers E, Gautret P, Biellik R, Brouqui P. Nosocomial transmiss ion of 
measles: An updated review. Vaccine. 2012;30(27):3996-4001. 
40. Durrheim DN, Kelly H, Ferson MJ, Featherstone D. Remaining measl es cha llenges in 
Aust ralia. Medical Journal of Australia. [Review]. 2007;187(3):181-4. 
41. Sn iadack DH, Mendoza-Aldana J, Jee Y, Bayu tas B, Lorenzo-Mariano KM. Progress 
and challenges for measles elimination by 2012 in the Western Pacifi c Region. J Infect 
Dis. 2011 Jul;204 Suppl 1:5439-46. 
42. Fielding JE. An outbrea k of measles in Ade laide. Commun Dis lntell Q Rep . 
2005;29(1) :80-2. 
167 
43. Lamden KH, Vivancos R, Mccann R, Ghebrehewet S. Why is measles so difficult? 
BMJ. 2013;346(f245). 
44. De Jong JG, Winkler KC. SURVIVAL OF MEASLES VIRUS IN AIR. Nature. 1964 Mar 
7;201:1054-5. 
45. Remington PL, Hall WN, Davis IH, Herald A, Gunn RA. Airborne transmiss ion of 
measles in a physician's office. JAMA. 1985 Mar 15;253(11):1574-7. 
46. McIntyre PB, Gidding HF, Gilbert GL. Measles in an era of measles control. Med J 
Aust. 2000 Feb 7;172(3):103-4. 
47. NSW Government. About Western Sydney: demographics. [internet]; Available 
from: http://www. western syd n ey. n sw .gov. au/ a bo ut-weste rn-syd n ey/ d em ogra phi cs/. 
48. New South Wales Government. Public Health Act 2010 No 127. [cited 2012 
November 23]; online:[Availabl e from: 
http ://www. legis lation . nsw.gov.a u/viewto p/i nforce/act+ 10+ 1991 +Fl RST +0+N/. 
49. Sienko DG, Friedman C, McGee HB, Allen MJ, Simonsen WF, Wentworth BB, et al. A 
measles outbreak at university medical settings involving health care providers. Am J 
Public Hea lth. 1987 Sep;77(9):1222-4. 
50 . Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Measles--Hawaii. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep. 1984 Dec 21;33(50):702, 7-11. 
51. Hope K, Boyd R, Conaty S, Maywood P. Measles transmission in health care waiting 
rooms: implications for public health response. Western Pac Surveill Response J. 2012 
Oct;3(4):33-8. 
52. Health Protection Agency . HPA National Measles Guidelines: local and regional 
services 2010. 
53. Flego K, Belshaw D, Sheppeard V, Weston K. Impact of a measles outbreak in 
Western Sydney on public health resources. Commun Dis lntell . 2013;1N PRESS. 
54. Perry RT, Halsey NA. The clinical significance of measles: a review. J Infect Di s. 2004 
May 1;189 Suppl 1:S4-16. 
55. Griffin DE, Ward BJ, Esolen LM. Pathogenesis of measles virus infection: an 
hypothesis for altered immune responses. J Infect Dis. 1994 Nov;170 Suppl 1:524-31. 
56. W HO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific. Measles elimination, hepatitis B 
control and poliomyelitis erad ication. Report of the regional committee summary 
168 
records of the plenary meetings. Manila 2005. 
57 . Sydney South Eastern Public Health Unit Infectious Diseases Team and Director. 
Outbreak report : measles cluster in south eastern Sydney with transmission in a 
general practice waiting room. Commun Dis lntell. 2001;25(1). 
58. Sugerman DE, Barskey AE, Delea MG, Ortega-Sanchez IR, Bi D, Ralston KJ, et al. 
Measles outbreak in a highly vaccinated population, San Diego, 2008: role of the 
intentiona lly u ndervacci nated. Pediatrics. 2010 Apr;125( 4): 7 4 7-55. 
59. Maltezou HC, Wicker S. Measles in health-care settings. Am J Infect Control. 2013 
Jul;41(7):661-3. 
60. Farrington CP, Grant AD. The distribution of time to extinction in subcritical 
branching processes: app li cations to outbreaks of infectious disease. J Appl Probab. 
1999;36(3):771-9. 
61. Lurio J, Morrison FP, Pichardo M, Berg R, Buck MD, Wu W, et al. Using electronic 
hea lth record alerts to provide public hea lth situational awareness to clinicians. J Am 
Med Inform Assoc. 2010 Mar-Apr;17(2):217-9. 
62. Revere D, Nelson K, Thiede H, Duchin J, Stergachis A, Baseman J. Public health 
emergency preparedness and response communications with health care providers: a 
literature review. BMC Public Health. 2011;11:337. 
63. Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, Jackson M, Chiarello L. 2007 Guideline for Isolation 
Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agen ts in Health Care Settings. Am J 
Infect Control. 2007 Dec;35(10 Suppl 2):565-164. 
169 
0 r--rl 
V> 
LLJ 
u
 
C z LLJ 
0.. 
0.. 
<( 
N
 
"
 
r
l 
Appendix 4.A. Flow diagram showing case selection for vaccine 
effectiveness analyses 
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PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
The National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) is contracted 
by the Department of Health (DOH) to deliver periodic vaccine preventable disease 
(VPD) reports. These reports utilise routinely collected surveillance data to analyse 
disease trends in the context of the current National Immunisation Program (NIP). I 
was asked to write the pertussis report covering the years 2006-2012; it is included in 
this chapter. 
Investigatory role 
To conduct the pertussis analysis, I acquired the complete pertussis notifications 
dataset from the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS). With 
instruction and oversight from Dr Helen Quinn, I performed all cleaning, recoding of 
variables, calculation of rates and incidence rate ratios, and table and graph 
generation. Dr Quinn extracted, cleaned and organised the hospitalisation and 
mortality data. For the report included within this chapter, co-authored by Dr Quinn 
and Professor Peter McIntyre, I drafted, revised, and conducted all analysis and data 
presentation with one exception: the graph displaying the ratio of hospitalisation to 
notification rates for those aged <6 months (Figure 5.6). This was created by Dr Quinn 
for a previous report. 
lessons learned 
The lessons learned from this project were substantial. With limited data analysis 
experience coming into the Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology (MAE) 
program, even cleaning a large dataset was a task I was unsure how to approach. 
However, my work placement supervisor Dr Quinn was extremely patient. After 
walking me through the basics of using Excel as a starting point to explore the data, 
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she worked closely with me to understand what was necessary to make the dataset 
workable for my purposes, including identifying and removing extraneous information, 
and re-coding and creating new variables, and generating a series of charts and graphs 
appropriate for my report . 
Later, as a result of th e MAE intensive course in data ana lysis, I became comfortable 
with Stata and its methodologies. Realising it was a super ior tool for analysis, I used 
th e program to re-do all my prior Excel ca lculations, although I was, nonetheless, sti ll 
appreciative of having taken the time to learn Exce l. As someone who was rather 
apprehensive about conduct ing data analysis and using statistical software, I surpr ised 
myself with my ca pabili ties. More surp ri singly, I rea lised I actually enjoyed data 
analysis; it was so different from working wi th words, my more familiar medium. 
Beyond conquering my data analysis apprehensions, and having armed myse lf with 
skills in Exce l and Stata, I lea rned several sma ller, specific lessons. Firstly, I rea lised that 
working w ith such large datasets can be painstaking, and errors easily introduced. The 
' results' generated in my Exce l analysis did not initially match the numbers outputted 
when I employed Stata; this requ ired a careful re-checking of my initial clean ing, 
categorisation/re-coding, etc. Secondly, this was my first exposure to NNDSS and 
Australi an Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data and thi s required some familiarisation before 
being ab le to work w ith each dataset. 
The ana lyti ca l interpret ation of the data was also instru ctive. Analysing tren ds in VPDs 
proved comp lex; for examp le, maintaining linkages between which age cohort 
received which vaccina tion in which year was challenging. This project also gave me a 
deeper appreciat ion fo r th e complexities involved in formulating an effecti ve 
vaccination po licy. 'Targets' are in flux and dynamic, and issues of wan ing immu ni ty 
and vaccine effectiveness must be factored in. Earlier, I might have predict ed that data 
analysis would have been the only challenging component within this project; as it 
tran spired, interpreting th e resul ts was equa lly taxing. 
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Public health impact 
As trends in VPDs are dynamic, periodically compiling surveillance data and analysing 
these trends is imperative. This input is vital to informing effective and appropriate 
immu nisation policy. To that end, the report which fo llows was written in fulfilment of 
NCIRS's requirement to conduct VPD reports for the DOH. NCIRS's VPD reports are 
wide ly acknowledged by the Australian health community as comprehensive 
references for VPD trends. 
In add ition to being provided to the DOH, this report was also provided to the 
Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) and the Australian Technica l 
Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) to advise stakeholders about the current 
epidemiology of pertussis. It w ill be published in Communicable Diseases Intelligence 
(CDI). 
The results of this particular analysis (2006-2012) demonstrate that pertussis 
notification rates have remained at epidemic levels, with the very young being affected 
most severely. High rates among young children are suggest ive of early waning of the 
ace llular vaccine. This requires a review of the optimal age of vaccination, and whether 
or not booster doses-such as the 18 month old dose removed from the immunisation 
schedu le in 2003-should be reconsidered. Thi s report was subn:itted to the Pertussis 
Working Party. Components of it have been used in the Party's final advice 
recommending the re-instatement of the booster dose. 
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ABSTRACT 
Despite pertussis vaccine being available since the 1940s and immunisation programs 
using combined diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP) being in place since the 
mid-1950s, pertussis has been the most common ly notified VPD in Australia over the 
past 20 years. Pertussis notification and hospitalisation data have been ava il able at the 
national leve l since 1993, and provide different perspectives for understanding 
ep idemiological trends. This report follows on from a previous review of Australian 
pertussis epidemiology from 1995-2005 and summarises routinely collected 
notification, hospita lisat ion and mortality data for 2006-2012. During this seven year 
period, the average annual notification rate was more than 2.8 times that of the 
previous decade though hospitalisat ion and mortality rates have remained comparable 
to rates experienced in the previous decade. There was a significant change in the 
pattern of age-specific notification rates, with the steepest increases seen among 
chi ldren less th an 10 years, especially those 2-4 years and 6-9 years of age. South 
Austra lia experienced a peak in notifications among those aged 5-9 and 10-12 years 
prior to oth er st ates and territories. Likely reasons for the overall increase in 
notifications as well as the changes in age-specific patterns include increased 
diagnostic testing and more rapid waning of effectiveness post vaccinat ion with 
acel lular compared to who le ce ll vacc in es, exacerbated by cessation of the 18 month 
dose in the NIP from 2003. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, universal childhood immunisation with combined DTP vaccine began in 
1953 and was continued in the national schedul e when it commenced in 1975. Since 
1982, the primary schedule has recommended infant doses at 2, 4 and 6 months, but 
both the number and timing of booster doses and vaccines in use have changed 
substantially since then. Recent modifications have included the switch for all 
scheduled doses from the diphtheria-tetanus-whole cell pertussis vaccine (DTPw) to 
the diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis vaccine (DTPa) in 1999; the change in 
recommendation for the 5th dose to be administered at 4 years rather than 4-5 years 
of age in 2000; the removal of the 18 month booster in 2003; and the addition in 2004 
of the adolescent booster reduced antigen content diphtheria-tetanus-acellular 
pertussis vaccine dose (dTpa) recommended with varying ages of administration by 
jurisdiction .1 
Despite a well-established immunisation program and high vaccine coverage,2 
pertussis continues to be the most commonly notified VPD in Australia ,3 with increases 
in national notification rates over the past 20 years, in different age groups and 
epidemic cycles. Similar trends have occurred in other developed countries, though 
typically later than Australia. 4-7 
Several changes in diagnostic testing are likely to have contributed to the observed 
increase in pertussis notifications. First, the availability and use of serologic testing in 
adolescents and adults increased from the early 1990s. Second, from 2000, 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) became available as a diagnostic test, initially in 
hospitals and then, with changes in reimbursement arrangements, also in primary care 
from 2007.8 Third, use in primary care was facilitated by laboratories accepting 
specimens collected by throat swab, as well as nasopharyngeal aspirate, which 
particularly facilitated testing of young children. Laboratories are legally mandated to 
report positive tests for pertussis under Australian public health laws. In the case of 
notifications based on PCR, which are accepted as confirmed cases without 
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supplementary clinical criteria being required, diagnostic testing changes directly 
contributed to the rise in notifications. 
Beyond the influence of changes in diagnostic practice, recent evidence has shown 
that protection from the ace llular vacc ine-universa lly adopted in Australia in 1999-is 
not as long-lasting as that from the whole cell vaccine. 9· 11 In turn, shorter duration of 
immunity has the potential to magnify the impact of changes to the vaccination 
schedule with subsequent epidemic cycles. This is likely to have occurred among 
children aged 1-3 years following th e remova l of the 18 month booster.12 
Th is analysis provides a detailed overview of Australian pertussis trends nationally, 
regionally and by age group from 2006-2012, following a similar review for the period 
1995-2005. Trends are considered both in historical context and in th e context of 
recent changes to the NIP. 
METHODS 
Data sources 
Notifications 
In Australia, pertussis is notifiable by each state and territory; both confirmed and 
probable pertussis cases require notification. For the period under review, a confirmed 
case required either laboratory confirmation or a combination of laboratory suggestive 
and clinical evidence. A confirmed case could also consist of clinical and 
epidemiological evidence. A probable case required clinical evidence on ly. Laboratory 
confirmation included isolation of Bordetello pertussis or detection by PCR. Laboratory 
suggestive evidence included serology (single point high titre or seroconversion) or an 
immunofluorescence assay. 13 
For this report, notification data were obtained from the NNDSS. All state and territory 
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pertussis notifications with a diagnosis date between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 
2012 were included. Laboratory diagnostic data were available for all states and 
territories except Tasmania; limited data were available for South Australia. For all 
other jurisdictions, completeness ranged from 86.3% (Victoria) to 99.3% (Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT)). For the purpose of this review, where mu ltiple diagnostic 
methods were recorded in the dataset, the case was classified as having been 
diagnosed by the most sensitive method. 14 Typically, this was PCR. 
As part of this review, an ecological analysis of vaccine cohorts based on individual 
jurisdicti on of birth was conducted. This analysis involved South Austra lia and New 
South Wales (NSW) as representing the two differing time periods when DTPa was 
adopted by states and territories. South Australia and the Northern Territory 
introduced the acellular vaccine in 1997; the other states and territories did so in 1999. 
For each of these two jurisdictions, further sub-grouping was performed based on 
birth cohort and subsequent eligibility for different vaccine types: whole cell vaccine 
for all doses, who le ce ll vaccine for the primary series, or acellular vaccine for all doses. 
Rates over time for children aged 5-9 and 10-12 years were then calculated for these 
groups. 
This report forms an extension of a previous analysis which reviewed pertussis t rends 
from 1995-2005. Data from the previous analysis have been referred to and 
incorporated into several graphs in order to provide broader context. 3 
Hospitalisation and mortality data 
Hospitalisation data were obtained from the AIHW National Hospital Morbidity 
Database which compiles administrative, demographic and clinical informat ion about 
pat ients admitted to public and private hospitals. For this report, all hospitalisation 
admissions between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2010 we re included. Eligib le 
hospitalisation admissions were extracted based on the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision, Australian 
Modification (ICD-10-AM), code A37 (whooping cough), or a subcode, listed as the 
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principal or other diagnosis. 
Mortality data we re obtained from the NNDSS data fi eld which recorded wheth er the 
notifi ed case had died from pertussis. 
Population estimates 
National, ju risdictional and age-specific mid-year estimated resident population data 
were obtained from the ABS. 15 
Data analysis 
Annual notifi cat ion numbers and diagnostic t est data were reviewed nationally, 
regionally, and by age group for the time period of 2006-2012. National, regional and 
age group-specific rates were calculated using ABS population data. Simil arly, 
hosp ita lisations were reviewed for 2006-2010 with national, regional and age group-
specific rates calcu lated. M edians we re used to summari se hospitalisation admission 
length of stay data. Mortality data were reviewed national ly by age group for the 
period of 2006-2012. 
Analysis was conducted using Stata 12 and Exce l 2010. 
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RESULTS 
Secular trends 
From 2006-2012, 156,200 notifications were recorded by the NNDSS (Tab le 5.1) . The 
average annual national rate for this seven year period was 103.1 per 100,000 
population, varying from a low of 23.1 to a high of 173.3 per 100,000 population in 
2007 and 201 1 respectively. Though national notification rates initially fell during the 
period 2006-2007 from those in 2005, rates steadily increased from 2008 through 
2011. This pattern of decreasing not ifications followed by a consistently upward trend 
with varying peak years was largely repeated across all jurisd ict ions but in different 
t ime frames. In 2006 and 2007, notification rates for those <15 years of age were 
lower than those aged :!:15 years, but this pattern reversed in 2008-2012 such that 
notification rates in those <15 years of age became more than double those in persons 
:!:15 years (F igure 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Annual pertussis notification and hospitalisation rates per 100,000 population, 
Australia, by state and territory, 2006-2012* 
. 
" 
2006 Notifications 139.0 54.0 77.2 53.1 8.4 12.9 46.1 20.8 47.2 
Hospitalisations 4.9 3.2 0.3 2.6 0.4 0.8 4.3 1.0 2.3 
2007 Notifications 23.9 23.5 28.4 36.7 5.1 6.3 12.6 20.2 23.1 
Hospitalisations 1.4 1.5 0.6 2.1 0.2 0.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 
2008 Notifications 92.5 108.0 41.7 53.0 39.9 21.3 216.4 32.7 66.8 
Hospitalisations 3.9 5.6 2.0 2.7 2.2 1.9 14.0 2.0 3.6 
2009 Notifications 332.6 176.1 99.2 142.4 122.8 34.7 94.8 70.3 136.8 
Hospitalisations 14.2 9.4 4.0 6.9 5.8 2.4 7.9 3.8 7.0 
2010 Notifications 453.6 130.4 197.6 185.8 55.3 63.2 142.8 129.5 157.7 
Hospitalisations 17.4 4.6 3.0 6.8 2.8 3.3 10.4 6.0 6.2 
2011 Notifications 143.4 182.3 225.4 200.9 68.9 169.6 163.4 156.3 173.3 
Hospitalisations 
2012 Notifications 54.4 80.7 117.7 168.3 246.5 142.8 128.0 79.8 107.6 
Total number notifications 20039 53573 2826 36926 2777 10444 1820 27795 156200 
Total number hospitalisations 676 1700 35 911 57 194 85 750 4408 
Average rate notifications 177.8 108.6 114.3 122.0 79.0 67.0 116.2 74.0 103.1 
Average rate hospitalisations 8.5 4.9 2.0 4.3 2.3 1.8 7.7 2.8 4.1 
*Note: Hospitalisation data available through 2010. 
Figures in bold are peak notification rates for each state/territory, 2006-2012. 
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Figure 5.1. Pertussis notification rates per 100,000 population by year of onset, and 
incidence rate ratios (IRRs) comparing <15 year olds with the remainder of the population, 
Australia, 1995-2012 
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ICD coded hospitalisations are collected by a separate process to notifications, with 
hospitalisation status not available in th e NNDSS data set. Between 2006-2010, 4,408 
hospitalisations were coded as pertussis comprising only 3.9-S.6% of the number of 
notifications over thi s period; the pattern of hospitalisation rates generally reflected 
those of notification rates (Table 5.1). 
Over this period, 73.8% of total ICD coded hospitalisations had a whooping cough code 
as the principal diagnosis, decreasing with age from 89.2% for those aged <6 months, 
to 50.0% for those aged <:65 years. Between 2006-2010, there was little difference 
between the average percentage of all age primary diagnoses coded as Bordetella 
pertussis (49.0%) compared with those coded as whooping cough unspecified. 
However, for those aged <6 months, the percentage of diagnoses coded as Bordetella 
pertussis (57.6%) increased, becoming in 2010 higher than the proportion coded as 
whooping cough unspecified for the first time in the five year period since 2006. 
State and territory variations 
Jurisdictional notification rates for the period of 2006-2012 are presented in Table 5.1. 
Together, NSW (n=53,573) and Queensland (n=36,926) contributed 57.9% of all 
national notifications during the seven year period. South Australia had the highest 
annual notificat ion rate at 453.6 per 100,000 {2010) as well as the highest average 
jurisdictional rate for the seven year period at 177.8 per 100,000. All states and 
territories, however, reported peak average annual notification rates which ranged 
from 1.8 to 4.6 times higher than those for the same jurisdictions during the previous 
decade. 3 With respect to timing, the Northern Territory and Tasmania had earlier 
epidemic peaks occurring in 2008-2009; most other sta tes and territories peaked later 
between 2010-2011, with Western Australia the la st to reach epidemic levels in 2011-
2012 (Table 5.1; Figure 5.2; Figure 5.3). By 2012, notification rates had decreased in 
most jurisdictions, with the notable exception of Tasmania where rates had climbed. 
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 present notification patterns for each state and territory 
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during 2006- 2012. Figure 5.3 also shows jurisd ictional hospitalisation rates from 2006-
2010, demonst rating th at hospi tali sa tion pattern s closely followed notification 
patterns, but on a reduced sca le. 
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Figure 5.2. Australian state and territory pertussis notification rates per 100,000 population 
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203 
250 'ACT 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 .1- ,,......, · - - -
m ITT 
mJ 
so 1 2000 NSW 
45 1800 
40 1600 
35 1 1400 
:.o l 1200 
25 11)(l(J 
20 800 
600 
200 
A ~ l~i 
r 100 
100 
90 
1ml 
80 0 
35 800 
~ 40 i 
:: 1 600 
70 ~ 
60 2 
" i~J 50 l ~ 40 0 • 20 15 400 ~ I 10 , 10 200 i 180 
Tas 
10 
1200 'SA 25 
90 100 7 
1000 80 140 I 20 
70 
800 
600 
i 400 
200 
120 1 J1 60 1' . 15 100 r 50 I ' 80 40 1 10 
60 l20 t,f-,J\ /,, , 30 20 
1W0 130 
Vic 120 
1000 1·10 
100 
a I 
B ; 
a ~ 
30 
D 20 
o ~ .. ~ #._,..,. 6° 
~gf3t3t3gg::g::ggg~;:';:::::;:~~ 
~~ ~ ~!~ ~ ~f~i~~~~i& 
Monthandyearofonset 
- No!ificat1ons --- -Hospita li sations 
Note: Scales vary between jurisdictions. 
*Hospitalisation data available through 2010. 
40 1 5 
0 , ~ , ... .!~ 
-- ~ = 
·: .. ~ ,: B rn 
B ® 
~ 80 
D M 
D W 
100 , W 
o-::-e .~o
liiI&iiit~lli~i;I 
Monthandyearofonset 
- Nollficatrons - - - - Hosp1talisat1ons 
~ 
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and territory by year and month of onset or admission, 2006-2012* 
Age distribution 
Age-specific notification rates are displayed in Figure 5.4. During the seven year period, 
the average notification rate for those aged <15 years was 205.6 per 100,000 (range: 
16.4-434.3) compared with 79.0 per 100,000 (range: 24.8-118 .5) for those aged ~15 
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years. For infants and children aged <15 years, notification rates increased steeply 
from 2007, while rates for those aged 2:15 years were lower, with a less dramatic 
increase through 2010. By 2012, rates for both of these broad age groups were 
decreasing. The proportion of total notified cases aged 2:15 years was 93.0% in 2006; 
this decreased to 57.8% by 2012 . 
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From 2008-2011, high notification rates were seen in infants aged 0-5 months (Figure 
5.4). The highest rates for those aged 6 months-4 years were seen in children aged 3 
years, peaking at 411.0 per 100,000 in 2011. However, the highest rates among all age 
groups were those for children aged 5-9 years. From 2008, rates among children in 
this age group were incrementally higher for each single year age group from 5-8 
years, peaking at 627.9 and 651.0 per 100,000 for those aged 7 and 8 years 
respectively. Children aged 10-14 years also had relatively high average notification 
rates, peaking in 2011 at 397.0 per 100,000. Within this age group, during the 
investigation period, rates were more than 1.8 times higher for those aged 10-12 
years compared with those aged 13-14 years-peaking at 659.5 per 100,000 in 2011 
for those aged 10 years. Among older age groups, rates were considerably lower, 
averaging 62.1 and 47.2 per 100,000 for those aged 15-19 and 20-29 years 
respectively. For those aged 30-64 years, rates were highest for those aged 40-44 
years, averaging 99.8 per 100,000. For those aged 65 years and older, the average rate 
was 86.0 per 100,000. 
Appendix 5.A details all jurisdictional notification rates during the investigation period 
by age group. Across states and territories, age trends varied, with the lowest 
notification rates among those <:15 years of age. In the ACT and NSW, the highest 
notification rates were in children aged 5-9 years during 2010-2011. In the Northern 
Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia the 
highest notification rates were seen among infants <6 months of age in varying 
individual years between 2008 and 2011. The highest age-specific jurisdictional 
notification rates were in South Australia, where rates of 1119.3 per 100,000 were 
recorded for infants aged <6 months and 1117.4 per 100,000 among children aged 5-9 
years in 2010. In South Australia, high rates were also experienced by those aged 10-
12 years, with a peak of 1158.9 per 100,000 in 2010. Figure 5.5 displays rates for those 
aged 5-9 and 10-12 years for South Australia compared with the same age groups in 
NSW by birth cohort. Rates peaked for those aged 5-9 and 10-12 years in South 
Australia a year earlier than in NSW. 
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Figure S.S. Pertussis notification rates per 100,000 populat ion for children 5- 9 and 10- 12 
years of age, by birth cohort, NSW and South Australia, 1995-2012 
Historic.rlly, among infants <6 months of age, rates of ICD coded hosp ita lisations have 
been higher than notification rates . From 2007, however, notification rates for this age 
group have been consistently higher than hospitalisation rates (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.6. Ratio of national pertussis hospitalisation* to notification rates for infants <6 
months of age, 1995-2010 
The highest hospitalisation rates occurred among those aged ~3 months, increasing 
steeply between 2007 and 2009. Though rates were comparatively lower for infants 
and children aged 6 months to 4 years, this age group also experienced a sharp 
increase in hospitalisations from 2007-2009. Of all persons aged >4 years, adults aged 
<!65 years had the highest hospitalisation rates (Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.7. Age-specific pertussis hospitalisation rates per 100,000 population for groups <6 
months and ~6 months of age, Australia, 1995-2010* 
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Diagnostic method 
Compared with the previous decade, the completeness of NNDSS diagnostic testing 
data has improved. For the period of 1995-2005, diagnostic test was recorded for 
50.1% of notifications, increasing to 85 .8% of notifications for the period of 2006-
2012. Over the investigation period, an increasing proportion of all notifications with 
method of diagnosis recorded were PCR tested : 6.9% in 2006 compared with 58.7% in 
2012. For young children, the increase in the percentage of diagnoses by PCR testing 
was rapid, with a more gradual upswing of PCR testing among adults . The proportion 
of PCR confirmed diagnoses decreased with age, as the proportion of serologic 
diagnoses increased (Figure 5.8). During the seven year period, for those aged <1 year, 
cultu re was recorded as the diagnostic method for n=67 (1.5%) of notifications (range: 
0-6.0%). For the same age group, both culture and PCR were recorded for 1.8% of 
notifications (range: 0-4.3%). 
210 
~-- --- ------ -----~------ - --- ------ ~ 
1200 l <1 years ■ [ 100 
1000 ! ~ / - . ■ .: 
600 
600 
400 
200 
i'l 
80 0[ 59years 7000 
• 6000 
; 5000 ,I 
~ 4000 / 
1 3000 
Z 2000 
1000 
0 ~ ~ 
1400 , 15-19 years 
1200 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
8 
i'l i'l 
l!I :;: 
~ ~ i:: ~ 
10 
60 « 
50 ~ 
40 ~ 
30 
20 
10 
0 
/.----------- ■ : 
----~ 100 10 
60 « 
50 ~ 
40 ~ 
: l 
10 
~ g: 0 ~ "' 0 
g ~ i:: ii ii 
~ 
Year 
g 
i'l 
Year 
i'l 
100 
80 
60 ~ 
40 ~ 
20 
i:: ~ 
- cunuie - PCR - serology --e- %PCR 
Note: Scales vary between age groups. 
4000 11-4 years 
3500 1 ~-----· 
3000 - _,,,,..,,.. 
2500 i . / 
2000 ~ 
1500 i 
1000 j 
500 j o·--~ g g ~ ~ i:: ii i:: 
Year 
100 
90 
80 70 
60 « 
50 ~ 
40 ~ 
30 
20 
10 
0 
sooo •10-14 years 
• 5000 ! JI 100 ; - - - - • 90 ~ 80 l~~iil ~! 
N i'l ~ ~ ~ 
100 18000 ?:20 years 90 
16000 80 
14 000 70 
:~: : ~ 
- ~-6000 30 
4000 ~~ 
2000 o 
0 
~ i'l ~ :;: i'l 
Year 
ii ~ ~ 
- culture - PCR - Serology ---%PCR 
Figure 5.8. Number of pertussis diagnostic tests conducted by diagnostic method used and 
what percentage consisted of PCR testing, by age group, Australia, 2006-2012 
Severe morbidity and mortality 
During the period of investigation, 11 notified cases were reported to have died from 
pertussis. Of these, ten deaths were in unvaccinated infants <2 months of age and one 
was an adult aged 70 years. Though there were twice as many infants <6 months of 
age hospitalised for pertussis than adults aged ~65 years, the median length of stay per 
hospital admission was longer for the older adult age group (median: 7 days) than for 
the infant group (median : 4 days; Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Severe morbidity and mortality of pertussis, Australia, 2006-2012'·' 
Age group Hospital admissions 
n (rate per 100,000) 
<6mo; 1832 (257.9) 
6mo-4yo 557 (9.0) 
5-9yo 113 (1.7) 
10-64yo 1166 (1.4) 
~65yo 740 (4.9) 
All ages 4408 (4.1) 
Deaths are for the period 2006-2012. 
' Length of stay is for the period 2006-2010. 
; Mo: months old; yo: years old 
DISCUSSION 
Median length of Deaths· 
stay (days)t 
n (range) n 
. -
-·--
4 (1-292) 10 
2 (1-313) 0 
2 (1-477) 0 
3 (1-139) 0 
7 (1-364) 1 
3 (1-477) 11 
---
Between 2006-2012, the average notification rate (103.1 per 100,000) was 2.8 times 
that of the previous decade. 3 Unlike the previous decade, the expected 3-4 year 
epidemic cycles16 were not apparent, replaced by sustained epidemic level rates, 
which peaked in 2009 and 2011 depending upon jurisdiction. This national picture is 
similar to previously published jurisdictional reviews of notifications for the same time 
period. 17' 18 
Although notifications are still believed to be underreported, 19• 20 improved 
surveillance and laboratory diagnostics as well as heightened awareness among 
clinicians have led to increased testing and notification of disease.21-23 In particular, the 
general availability of commercial PCR kits 24 as well as the high sensitivity of PCR 
testing-as has been noted elsewhere 2s-have encouraged clinicians to test more, 
thus contributing to th e rise in notifications. 
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It is unlikely, however, that the increase in pertussis notifications documented here is 
solely attributable to increased testing and diagnosis.8• 12' 25 The hospitalisation rates 
presented in this report-which rose similar ly to notification rates but not to the same 
magnitude-support this claim, as hospitalisation data are likely a more stable and 
reliable indication of true disease incidence. Because PCR testing has been widely 
employed by hospitals since about 2000, hospitalisation data may have been less 
influenced by the increased adoption of PCR t esting in primary care. It is notable that 
hospitalisation rates in the 2009 epidemic were simil ar to those recorded in 1997, 
despite the increased availability of PCR testing from 2000. 26 Similarly, the number of 
deaths for this seven year revi ew period rem ained comparable to th e number of 
deaths notified in the previou s decade. 
During the period from 1995-2005, notification rates for Australian adults we re much 
higher than in comparable countries internationally.27-29 In contra st, in 2006-2012 the 
highest rates occurred among younger age groups, specifically in infants aged <6 
months and children aged 5-9 years. Recent outbreaks in the US, UK, Canada and New 
Zea land have also been characterised by high rates in infants too young to be 
vaccinated.4' 30· 33 High rates in infants have been common for several decades. When 
notifications were largely reliant upon clinical diagnoses, higher rates were often 
detected in hospitalisation data because infant cases admitted to hospital were not 
notified. Since the increased use of PCR testing in Australia, however, this differential 
between notificat ion and hospitalisat ion data for infants has diminished. 34 
Although evidence that a single dose of DTPa provides some level of protection against 
severe disease, infants are still vulnerable to infection prior to receiving th e first 
scheduled dose, which is evident by the fact that 10 of 11 deaths reported in this seven 
year period were in infants aged <2 months.35' 36 Recent trials have invest igated the 
delivery of pertussis vacc ine at birth .37-40 Th e cocooning strategy (vaccinat ing close 
contacts of infants to reduce the likelihood of exposure) and maternal vaccina tion 
have been recommended for preventing infection in very young infants and have been 
given equal preference in the most recent Australian Immunisat ion Handbook. 41 
Maternal vaccination has also been recommended by the US, UK, Canada and New 
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Zealand . 30, 31, 42, 43 
High rates in children may have resulted in part from the NIP switch to the DTPa 
vaccine which does not confer immunity for as long as the DTPw vaccine .1°· 44·49 
Specific estimates of the duration of immunity afforded by the whole-ce ll vaccine 
range from 4-14 years, though studies suggest that immun ity confe rred by the 
acellu lar vaccine may on ly last five years or less. 9• 50 Average notification rates from 
2006-2012 for children aged 7 and 8 years were more than four times as high as those 
experienced by the same age group from 1995- 2005. This suggests that immunity 
waned in the period fo llowing receipt of the 4 year old dose, for which coverage was 
estimated to be high, 51·53 before the adolescent booster could be administered. 
Similarly, high rates among US children aged 8-12 years were documented from 2005 
and correspond to the first cohort of children to receive a schedu le containing all 
acellular vacc ines.54' 55 In Austra lia, at the state and terr itory leve l, th e DTPa vacc ine 
was adopted for t he pr imary se ri es in South Austra lia and the Nort hern Territory in 
1997 before being adopted Australi a-wide for al l childhood doses in 1999. This is likely 
to have contr ibuted to notifi cation rates for those aged 5-9 and 10-12 years in South 
Austral ia peaking earlier t han in NSW, despite these states sha r"i ng simi lar overa ll 
epidemic patterns. 
NIP schedule changes, specifically the 2003 removal of the 18 month booster dose, 
likely also influenced notification rates among younger age groups by exacerbating the 
impact of the decreased efficacy and longevity of t he acellular vaccine. The remova l of 
the 18 month booster expanded the time interval between doses from 6 months to 4 
years of age leaving those aged 1-3 years vu lnerable to waning immunity and resulting 
in record high notification rates for those aged 1-4 years from 2008. 12 Australian 
serosurvey results from 2007 support th is claim, reporting that among chi ldren 1-4 
years of age, prevalence of undetectable immunoglobulin G (lgG) levels had increased 
from 25% in 1997-98 to 62% in 2007. 12 
Based on evid ence of waning immunity, as well as evidence that todd lers serve as an 
important source of infection for infants too young to be vaccinated, 56-58 the current 
Immuni sa t ion Hand book advises that an additional dose of DTPa in the 2nd year of life 
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will minimise the likelihood of a child develop ing pertussis prior to their scheduled 
booster dose at 3.5 to 4 years of age. 41 This is in line with the World Health 
Organization's {WHO's) 2010 recommendation that a booster be given in th e second 
year of life unless country-specific epidemiological evidence su pports delaying this 
until preschool.59 
The decreased notificat ion rates among older age groups demonstrated in thi s analysis 
were likely partially influenced by the 2003 NIP addition of the adolescent booster 
recommended for those aged 15-17 years. The reduced antigen booster (dTpa) 
emp loyed for the adolescent dose has been demonstrated effective, despite va riation 
in coverage and timing of programs across state and territories .60• 61 Both th e US and 
Canada have reported temporally similar decreases in disease among adolescents 
following the addition of adolescent booste rs .62' 63 In response to concern about 
waning immunity, ATAGI has recommended shifting the fifth dose to 11-13 years to 
decrease the time betwee n the primary childhood series and adolescent booster.64 
Though notification rates appeared to decrease som ewhat in 2012, average rat es for 
the period of invest igation were dramatically higher than those experienced in the 
previou s decade. Interpretation s of these high rates, however, must be kept w ithin the 
proper context. Because of the increase in comm unity PCR t estin g, base line pertussis 
rates may well remain higher than they we re prior to this change in diagnostic 
practice. Nevertheless, in light of the fact that this review demonstrates th at pertussis 
notification rates are once again highest among the young, strategies targeted at 
reducing disease among infants must continue to be pursued . Du e to the dynamic 
nature of pertussi s immunity, it is imperative to continue exploring a broad range of 
both scientific and policy solutions. 
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Appendix 5.A. Age-specific pertussis notifcation and hospitalisation rates per 100,000 population for 
each state and territory, Australia, 2006-2012* 
2006 Notifications 0.0 32.4 29.2 9.3 36.7 94.4 100.4 
Hospitalisations 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
2007 Notifications 43.9 15.5 4.9 0.0 27.9 32.8 39.2 
Hospitalisations 86.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2008 Notifications 87.1 25.1 58.6 47.1 23.5 41.6 46.7 
Hospitalisations 86.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.9 
2009 Notifications 247 .8 78.3 82.4 51.9 46.9 104.4 143.5 
Hospitalisations 371.7 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 5.6 
2010 Notifications 159.1 99.3 503.5 377.1 74.4 172.7 221.5 
Hospitalisations 156.0 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 5.4 
2011 Notifications 320.6 171.4 363.7 343.2 104.0 201.6 333.5 
2012 Notifications 78.0 62.4 130.7 247.9 66.3 106.5 153.2 
verage rate notifications 137.0 71.2 169.2 152.4 54.2 109.1 153.4 
verage rate hospitalisations 144.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.9 
*Hospital isation data ava ilable through 2010. 
2006 Notifications 161.4 27.4 13.4 18.7 35.2 64.1 60.5 
Hospitalisations 176.9 7.4 0.7 1.1 0.2 1.2 5.0 
2007 Notifications 137.7 28.1 24.2 18.3 17.9 23.1 22.3 
Hospitalisations 109.1 5.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.0 
2008 Notifications 571.7 233.3 278.9 270.1 135.7 65.9 50.4 
Hospitalisations 456.8 16.3 3.0 0.7 1.3 1.4 3.6 
2009 Notifications 911.2 579.4 605.0 342.0 141.1 97.2 63.1 
Hospitalisations 728.3 28.0 3.4 3.8 1.7 2.0 8.3 
2010 Notifications 418.2 284.1 626.2 365.0 88.3 62.9 44.9 
Hospitalisations 285.8 12.1 3.2 0.9 0.6 1.9 4.1 
2011 Notifications 648.9 492.4 931.1 526.2 77.2 77.0 55.3 
N 
N 
°' 2012 Notifications 337.2 239.2 343.6 205.2 33.3 38.3 32.4 
Average rate notifications 459.8 273.2 403.3 248.1 75.8 61.3 46.8 
Average rate hospitalisations 355.0 13.9 2.1 1.3 0.8 1.4 4.6 
2006 Notifications 109.2 6.3 0.0 0.0 64.4 59.0 51.3 
Hospitalisations 163.8 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 10.3 
2007 Notifications 53.9 12.5 5.8 0.0 0.0 13.1 48.2 
Hospitalisations 54.0 6.2 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 
2008 Notifications 880.6 277.5 368.1 317.9 121.9 176.0 275.7 
Hospitalisations 827.1 49.6 5.7 0.0 12.1 2.1 9.2 
2009 Notifications 465.8 126.3 137.5 119.7 42.0 87.7 61.0 
Hospitalisations 619.5 12.1 5.7 0.0 5.9 1.4 0.0 
2010 Notifications 317.5 172.4 315.0 194.0 90.4 116.2 164.8 
Hospitalisations 690.8 6.0 5.7 0.0 5.9 4.7 8.2 
2011 Notifications 597.8 197.9 535.0 448.5 61.9 86.7 210.7 
N I N --.J 2012 Notifications 452.0 196.4 377.2 300.8 36.9 80.4 71.7 
Average rate notifications 414.5 142.6 249.5 196.7 59.9 89.1 127.8 
Average rate hospitalisations 476.9 16.0 3.4 0.0 4.9 2.4 5.5 
~-.L!~ 
2006 Notifications 61.6 13.7 8.3 36.9 47.6 55.8 95.7 
Hospitalisations 50.8 2.9 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.9 7.1 
2007 Notifications 52.9 7.3 6.8 11.7 31.7 37.7 79.0 
Hospitalisations 52.7 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.5 4.5 
2008 Notifications 147.6 28.0 26.4 39.3 38.3 51.7 96.7 
Hospitalisations 120.0 2.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.2 7.5 
2009 Notifications 404.7 136.8 181.2 162.0 101.3 132.4 170.7 
Hospitalisations 353.8 14.0 2.8 2.4 1.0 3.1 9.1 
2010 Notifications 471.7 179.6 334.4 262.1 102.9 163.1 210.7 
Hospitalisations 353.1 12.2 2.8 2.0 1.0 2.9 11.3 
2011 Notifications 488.2 263.2 471.8 404.6 105.4 152.9 191.6 
N 
N 
00 2012 Notifications 344.6 233.6 397.6 339.6 74.6 119.4 176.9 
Average rate notifications 287.6 127.9 207.9 180.0 72.3 103.2 148.6 
Average rate hospitalisations 193.0 6.9 1.4 1.2 0.6 2.1 8.0 
2006 Notifications 11.1 7.4 19.9 26.5 83.0 174.4 169.9 
Hospitalisations 44.4 4.9 1.0 1.0 2.9 4 .0 11.0 
2007 Notifications 0.0 14.7 7.4 9.9 16.0 28.5 26.2 
Hospitalisations 10.6 2.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.5 
2008 Notifications 163.3 51.4 74.3 74.7 57 .0 97.6 113.8 
Hospitalisations 192.3 3.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 2.4 6.1 
2009 Notifications 847.8 338.6 602.2 582.7 181.8 313 .7 247.9 
Hospitalisations 673.1 26.7 12.7 6.0 2.0 7.6 18.5 
2010 Notifications 1119.3 493 .1 1117.4 872.4 238.1 392.6 334.6 
Hospitalisations 794.4 39.5 9.6 14.0 6.0 7.9 25.1 
2011 Notifications 277.2 212.2 244.9 191.1 58.5 132.2 137.8 
N I N \D 2012 Notifications 108.1 50.5 127.9 93.6 21.9 46.4 52.1 
Average rate notifications 366.0 169.9 310.7 263.5 94.1 169.8 154.4 
Average rate hospitalisations 352.5 15.9 5.3 4.4 2.4 4.7 12.8 
2006 Notifications 62.8 3.7 0.0 11.7 0.0 8.7 12.6 
Hospitalisations 31.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 
2007 Notifications 30.2 7.3 3.2 2.9 2.9 4.5 8.2 
Hospitalisations 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2008 Notifications 303.9 70.8 60.7 83.2 58.4 28.0 26.7 
Hospitalisations 180.1 10.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 
2009 Notifications 722.1 224.3 162.1 211.3 134.5 107.4 57.0 
Hospitalisations 295.7 23.5 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.7 3.9 
2010 Notifications 258.5 82.5 62.0 54.2 67.3 51.9 39.0 
Hospitalisations 320.4 6.6 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 1.3 
2011 Notifications 256.2 114.9 156.1 197.8 26.5 51.7 41.4 
N 
w 
0 2012 Notifications 1328.3 677.7 786.9 691.2 130.0 141.7 111.0 
Average rate notifications 422.4 171.1 173.9 175.3 60.0 56.7 43 .9 
Average rate hospitalisations 164.7 9.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.6 1.6 
2006 Notifications 30.7 2.8 3.7 6.2 15.5 23.7 32.8 
Hospitalisations 67.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.5 
2007 Notific.ations 58.8 14.5 13.1 17.6 17.8 21.3 21.2 
Hospitalisations 81.6 2.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.3 
2008 Notifications 141.3 25.5 25.9 41.6 20.7 34.0 28.6 
Hospitalisations 134.6 4.7 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.8 
2009 Notifications 302.3 74.8 72.4 81.l 43.5 68.7 72.0 
Hospitalisations 328.8 4.8 0.9 1.2 0.3 1.2 3.5 
2010 Notifications 470.3 133.7 207.6 256.3 75.6 113.1 119.5 
Hospitalisations 437.5 8.2 3.0 0.9 1.1 2.3 7.7 
2011 Notifications 434.8 189.7 282.3 263.3 75.4 134.0 164.1 
N 
w 
>--' 2012 Notifications 232.9 98.9 106.6 95.6 31.2 70.0 101.7 
Average rate notifications 241.8 79.5 102.5 108.2 40.1 67.5 79.3 
Average rate hospitalisations 212.4 4.1 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.1 3.4 
2006 Notifications 66.9 17.1 10.3 5.6 12.3 13.1 13 .2 
Hospitalisations 74.3 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
2007 Notifications 7.0 4.9 2.2 2.8 5.3 7.2 7.2 
Hospitalisations 13.8 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
2008 Notifications 198.2 30.6 20.9 10.3 10.5 20.2 24.9 
Hospitalisations 184.1 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 
2009 Notifications 240.7 53.1 58.4 31.2 17.4 31.2 30.8 
Hospitalisations 201.1 8.2 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.4 
2010 Notifications 313.0 89.3 122.4 118.5 40.1 49.7 59.3 
Hospitalisations 239.2 7.2 1.4 1.3 0.0 1.2 2.9 
2011 Notifications 610.9 285.9 520.3 474.1 71.7 108.4 116.8 
N 
w 
N 2012 Notifications 375.7 284.0 247.9 263.1 63.7 104.5 144.5 
Average rate notifications 267.2 116.4 145.1 131.2 31.9 49.9 60.0 
Average rate hospitalisations 145.9 5.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 1.0 
(Y) 
(Y) 
N
 

CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION OF A 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
Australian post-licensure surveillance for 
intussusception associated with receipt of 
rotavirus vaccines 
U
) 
M
 
N
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
Invest igatory role 
Lessons learned 
Public health 
Acknowledgements 
ABBREVIATIONS 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
239 
243 
245 
246 
247 
EVALUATION OF AUSTRALIAN POST-LICENSURE SURVEILLANCE FOR INTUSSUSCEPTION 
ASSOCIATED WITH RECEIPT OF ROTAVIRUS VACCINES 
INTRODUCTION 
249 
251 
OVERVIEW: THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTA NCE OF ROTAVIRU S AND 
INTUSSUSCEPTION 251 
EVALUTION RATIONALE AND AIMS ........... ................... ..... ... .................... ...... ...... .... 257 
METHODS OF EVALUATION ..... .... ..... . .... ... ..... .. ... .... .... ..... .................. .................... 259 
RESULTS ........... .... .................... .. .. ...... .. .... ... ... ..... . .. ... ... ... .. ... .. . . ... ... ... .. .. ... . .. ..... 263 
INTERNATIONAL RELEVANCE .. ............. ..... .... .. ............. ... ...... . .. ... .. ..... ..... ............... 288 
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ...... .. ...... ............ ...... .......... ... .......... ...... 
··· ····· · ··· ···· ········ 289 
CONCLUSION .... .. ..... ... .. ...... .. ... .. ... ............ .. ....... .... .. .. ............... ............ ...... ...... 291 
REFERENCES ....... . ............ .. ... .......... ...... ..... .. .......... . .. .... ... ......... .. . ... ... ...... ... .... 293 
237 
APPENDICES 299 
Appendix 6.A. Overview of how a case of IS is detected and reported by ADRS 
Appendix 6.B. Overview of how a case of IS is detected and reported by APSU 
Appendix 6.C. Overview of how an IS case is detected and reported by PAEDS 
Appendix 6.D. Overview of how hospita lisation inpatient data are used for IS 
Appendix 6.E. Stakeholder questionnaire used for eva luation 
Appendix 6.F. Presentation delivered at the 7'h Bi-regional TEPHINET Scientific 
Conference, Danang, Vietnam, November 2013 
238 
PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
Because of a demonstrated risk of intussusception (IS) associated with the first 
rotavirus vaccine, RotaShield, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended 
post-licensure safety surveillance when Rotarix and RotaTeq rotavirus vaccines were 
introduced in the mid-2000s. 
To accomplish IS surveillance in Australia, an ad hoc combination of four different 
surveillance systems emerged somewhat organically. Nonetheless, the strategy was 
effective, achieving both IS surveillance and identifying a small IS risk associated with 
receipt of both vaccines. 
The National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) recognised 
evaluating this non-traditional surveillance effort wou ld be constructive. By 
highlighting the contribution of each surveillance system and the efficacy of combining 
them, future surveillance efforts might be better structured and designed to include 
multiple surveillance components. NCIRS invited me to conduct th is evaluation. It is 
included in its entirety in this chapter. 
Investigatory role 
I was responsible for all aspects of this evaluation, including format design, 
determining the evidence needed to assess this non-traditional surveillance system, 
compiling this evidence and then conducting the analysis. An abstract rega rding the 
evaluation was accepted for an oral presentation at the 7t h Training Programs in 
Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Bi-regional 
Scientific Conference (Appendix 6.F), and I was fortunate to travel to Vietnam to 
present my preliminary results to an international audience. 
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Lessons learned 
Structuring this evaluation was challenging. Because of the non-traditional nature of 
the surveillance system, determining exactly the evaluation's limits and scope, and 
how to best assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the contributing 
surveillance systems was problematic. This was positive, however; it forced me to 
better comprehend concepts like sensitivity and predictive value positive (PPV). It 
impressed upon me that these are more than surveillance system attributes. Rather, 
they represent complex trade-offs, which may require, for example, careful 
consideration of the costs involved with detecting too many false positives. 
Conducting the evaluation involved seeking stakeholder feedback and to do this I 
distributed a questionnaire to 40 individuals and received six replies. I had been 
advised by NCIRS colleagues which stakeholders were the most appropriate to target 
and had knowledgeable NCIRS staff review the questionnaire. I believe that the low 
response rate was purely due to how busy the stakeholders were and that they did not 
value the purpose of the evaluation. While this was frustrating, it was an instructive 
experience. If I had the opportunity to re-do the evaluation, I would contact each 
stakeholder individually and seek to interview as many as possible. I believe this would 
likely yield better participation as well as richer qualitative data. 
The evaluation also illuminated the complexity facing policy makers when assessing 
vaccine-associated risks and benefits. While IS can be a severe condition for young 
infants, the incidence of IS, whether vaccine-associated or not, is rare. Conversely, 
rotavirus infection represents a considerable burden of disease globally, including high 
mortality rates associated with the illness for children in developing nations. 
Lastly, presenting the preliminary results of this evaluation at the TEHPINET 
Conference in Vietnam to an international audience was an invaluable experience. 
Moreover, with attendees hailing from a variety of countries, all with diverse 
specialities and frames of reference, it was a lesson in tailoring the messages of a 
presentation to the audience. 
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Public health impact 
In 2010 the Austra lian Government suspended the seasonal influenza vaccine for 
children aged <5 years due to increased febrile convulsions among this age group. An 
independent review led by Professor John Horva th ensued, the resu lts of which were 
made public in 2011, w ith the fi na l report suggest ing that Austra lian adverse event 
following immunisation (AEFI) surveil lance and respo nse cou ld be improved. 
My evaluation of Australia's IS surveillance response-a novel method of AEFI 
surveillance-suggests a poten tial method of improvement. Until mine, no formal 
evaluation of thi s combinatorial IS response had been undertaken. My findings 
demonstrated that, despite being unplanned and somewhat ad hoc, by incorporat ing 
multiple surveillance systems it was capable of capi ta lising on the strengths of each. 
Furthermore, by formalising and publicising the effort's achievements, and thus 
increa si ng recognition of th ese successes amongst the relevant public hea lth and 
vaccine safet y authorities, it may be employed to inform future sim ilar vaccine safety 
surveillance efforts. To this end, NCIRS w ill present the evaluation to the Department 
of Health (DOH), the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) and the Advisory 
Committee on the Safety of Vaccines (ACSOV). 
AEFI surveillance-in whatever manifestation-is a key component in ensuring and 
maintaining confidence in vaccines. This is particularly important for rotav irus 
vaccines. Given the legacy of th e RotaShield vaccine, IS monitoring is imperative to 
help guarantee that rotavirus vaccines remain available and affordab le for all 
children-especially those in developing nations. 
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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
Rotash ield was th e first available rot avirus vacc ine. Its use, however, was problematic; 
increased IS ri sk led to withdrawa l from American usage in 1999. In 2007, when two 
new rotavi ru s vacc in es were introduced worldwide, Austral ia employed specific IS 
surveillance mechan isms beyond just passive AEFI reporting . This stu dy eva luated the 
systems used to determine if such a mixed surveillance model could be considered for 
other new vaccines. 
Methods 
Australia's IS surveillance was evaluated using WHO and Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) framewo rks. All four contributing surveillance mechanisms (th e 
TGA's passive ADRS; APSU; PAEDS system; and hospitalisation inpatient databases) 
we re assessed for data quality, t imel iness, sensiti vity, PPV, causa lity ascert ainment, 
representativeness and usefulness. 
Results 
National pa ssive AD RS su rve ill ance was we ll-estab lished but insensitive-detecting 44 
IS cases compared w ith 79 by APSU and 251 by PAEDS. These active systems, al though 
providing greater clinical data including medica l history and vaccina tion status 
confirmation, were not instituted prior to vaccine introduction . As these acti ve 
systems were senti nel, some IS cases may not have been detected. Int ernat iona l 
Stat istical Classification of Diseases and Related Heal th Prob lems (ICD) coded cases 
from hospitalisation inpatient dat abases were representative, and data analysis was 
aided by using Brighto n Collabo rat ion criteria. Case review, however, was labour-
in tensive . 
Conclusion 
Passive surveill ance alone was unlikely to detect increased IS risk associated with 
current rotavirus vaccines. Acti ve surveillance was cr it ical in evaluating IS risk and led 
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to the first published study of IS risk associated with the new rotavirus vaccines. Data 
analysis from large inpatient databases also contributed significantly. This experience 
demonstrates that AEFI surveillance reliant upon multiple surveillance mechanisms is 
effective and this model may be adapted to other new vaccines. Such a model, 
however, could benefit from improved planning and coordination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report evaluates Australia's effort to conduct post-licensing surveillance for IS 
following the introduction of the RotaTeq and Rotarix rotavirus vaccines in 2007. 
Safety monitoring was necessary due to a link confirmed in 1998 between receipt of 
RotaShield, the first licensed rotavirus vaccine, and an increased IS risk. 1 
The evaluation begins with a brief overview of the public health importance of both IS 
and rotavirus gastroenteritis in Australia and globally, followed by a summary of the 
RotaShield incident and its impact on the next generation of rotavi rus vaccines. It then 
describes the Australian IS surveillance system that evolved, consisting of four 
contributing surveillance systems. It evaluates specific attributes of each system using 
an amalgamation of WHO and US CDC evaluation tools.2-4 Finally, it considers the 
efficacy of the system as a whole for detecting IS as an AEFI, and whether it succeeded 
in achieving its surveillance objectives. 
OVERVIEW: THE PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE OF 
ROTAVIRUS AND INTUSSUSCEPTION 
Rotavirus 
Globally, rotavirus is the most common cause of severe gastroenteritis for infants and 
children <5 years of age. Compared with other causes of diarrhoea, rotavirus-
associated diarrhoea is responsible for higher dehydration and hospitalisation rates,5 
contributing annually to approximately 23 million outpatient visits, 2.3 million 
hospitalisations, and over half a million deaths. Eighty-five percent of deaths occur in 
developing countries.6 
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Figure 6.1. Global rotavirus mortality rates per 100,000 population for children <5 years of 
age, 20087 
Worldwide, most children experience an episode of rotavirus gastroenteritis by their 
fifth birthday.6 Because rotavirus is highly prevalent, improving sanitation and hygiene 
does not equate to reduced transmission ; effective vaccines are thus the primary 
source of prevention.6 
In Australia, before the introduction of the rotavirus vaccines in the mid-2000s, 
rotavirus gastroenteritis comprised an estimated 10,000 hospitalisations, 22,000 
Emergency Department (ED) presentations and 115,000 visits to a general practice 
(GP) physician for children <5 years of age,8 with one death per year attributed to the 
virus.5' 9 Noticeably higher rates of severe disease afflicted Indigenous populations, 
with infant hospitalisation rates five times those of non-Indigenous populations .5 
Annually, Australian costs associated with rotavirus were estimated at $30 million. 8 
Following the introduction of the rotavirus vaccines in Australia, a sustained decrease 
in rotavirus hospitalisations was observed for the 2008 and 2009 seasons. Though a 
75% reduction was observed across all age groups-suggesting a positive impact on 
herd immunity-the reduction was particularly prevalent for infants: a 93% reduction 
compared with the six years prior to vaccine introduction. 9 At the global level, a 2010 
systematic review of published efficacy and effectiveness trials of rotavirus vaccines 
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estimated that RotaTeq and Rotarix could prevent 74% (95% Confidence Interval (Cl): 
35-90%) of rotavirus deaths and 47-57% of rotavirus hospitalisations. 10 
lntussusception 
The most common cause of bowel obstruction in infants and young children, IS is the 
invagination of a segment of proximal bowel into a more distal portion resulting in 
intestinal obstruction. IS is an uncommon event, estimated at less than one per 1,000 
live births in many developed countries_ll In most cases, the cause of the IS remains 
unknown. 12' 13 
Diagnosis of IS includes identifying invagination of the intestine using contrast enema 
(air or liquid), ultrasound or surgery. 14 Without prompt treatment, bleeding and/or 
intestinal perforation can occur and may be life threatening, although IS deaths are 
rare in th e developed world .11 In developing countries with limited resources and 
medical expertise, however, mortality has been estimated at more than 20%. 12 
Th ere is no known association between naturally occurring rotavirus infection and IS; 
there is, however, an established risk associated with the rotavirus vaccine and IS 
which wi ll be subsequently detailed. Nonetheless, the precise mechanism is not wholly 
understood. Regionally, because the incidence of IS varies significantly, with countries 
like Vietnam and China reporting much higher rates, 11 it has been postulated that 
there may be 'genet ic, ethnic, infectious or environmental factors' which contribute to 
IS. No conclusive evidence, however, has confirmed this. 11 Baseline IS data from most 
developing countries are lacking. 15· 16 
In Australia, between 1994 and 2000, there were approximately 1,794 IS 
hospitalisations in infants and one reported death. 11 Rates among Indigenous 
Australi<;1n infants are lower than those observed in non-Indigenous infants. 11 
Compared with the burden of rotavirus gastroenteritis, the burden of IS is considerably 
lower in both developed and developing countries. 
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The RotaShield incident and its legacy 
The first rotavirus vaccine, RotaShield (Wyeth-Lederle), was licensed in 1998. 
RotaShield was a tetravalent rhesus rotavirus vaccine that had been demonstrated 
safe in clinical trials conducted in the US, Finland and Venezuela. In these trials, 
RotaShield was shown to prevent more than 90% of hospital admissions due to 
rotavirus diarrhoea in the US and 79% in Venezuela .17 
Nine months aft er licensing RotaShield, th e US CDC reported an increase in IS cases 
following receipt of RotaShield as detected by their passive surveillance system, the 
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS). Between September 1998 and July 
1999, 15 cases among infants who had received RotaShield were reported compared 
to four IS reports in the previous seven years. 18 Studies determined that the ri sk 
associated with RotaShield resulted in one excess case of IS per approximately 5,000-
10,000 children vaccinated. 19 
Subsequent research confirmed the causal relationship between receipt of RotaShield 
vacc ination and IS; RotaSh ield was consequently removed from th e market before ever 
having been introduced in any other countries. 16• 20 This was a disappointing setback to 
advancing the fight against rotavirus which was far more prevalent than IS. 
Despite this setback, because rotavirus gastroenteritis was responsible for such 
extensive and costly morbidity and mortality for infants and young children globally10• 
17
, a strong impetus to develop a safe alternative vaccine persisted. Efforts resulted in 
two new rotavirus vaccines being developed and introduced for use in the mid-2000s: 
RotaTeq (Merck) and Rotarix (GlaxoSmithKl ine) . Both vaccines underwent pre-
licensure clinical trials in th e US, Finland and Latin American countr ies. Tri als were 
designed to be large enough to detect a risk of IS sim il ar to that which had been 
identified with th e RotaShield vaccine. No increased risk was observed in any clinical 
trial. 
254 
Table 6.1. History and overview of licensed rotavirus vaccines6' 21 
Vaccine RotaShield Rotarix RotaTeq 
Licensed date 1998 (only released in 2006 2006 
US) (registered in (registered in 
Australia; included in Australia; included in 
NIP* from 2007) NIP from 2007) 
Manufacturer Wyeth-Lederle GlaxoSmithKline Merck 
Vaccines 
Type of vaccine Tetrava lent rhesus- Monovalent human Pentavalent human-
human vaccine containing bovine reassortant 
vaccine Glp[8] stra in vaccine containing Gl, 
(RVl) G2, G3, G4 and Pla[8] 
strains (RVS) 
Recommended 3 doses 2 doses 3 doses 
dosage (2, 4, 6 months) (2, 4 months) (2, 4, 6 months) 
Status Withdrawn in 1999 Currently in use Currently in use 
*NIP: National Immunisation Program 
Because of the legacy of the RotaShield vaccine, IS survei llance was acknowledged as 
an important accompaniment to the introduct ion of the new rotavirus vaccines. This 
surveillance recommendation was formalised by th e WHO in 2009 when it officially 
endorsed routine rotavirus vaccination for all infants. 22 
Beyond the utility of IS monitoring to provide country level incidence data, safety 
monitoring was also desired for its contribution to the exist ing IS evidence base and for 
highlighting regional IS differences. Additionally, with the Lancet's 1998 Wakefield 
publication (since retracted) linking the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine to 
autism occurring at the same time as questions were raised about RotaShield safety, 
vaccine confidence had been negatively impacted. Safety monitoring has been critical 
for restoring and maintaining confidence, both from the perspective of the 
international health community and from the public. Moreover, documenting the 
safety and effectiveness of the rotavirus vaccines in developed nations plays an 
important role in ensu ring that these much-needed vacc ines remain available and 
affordable for low- and middle-income countries. 
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Australian IS surveillance 
Both RotaTeq and Rotarix vaccines were registered in Australia in 2006 and included in 
the National Immun isation Program (NIP) from 2007. Because of differing purchasing 
arrangements, states and t erritories were ab le t o independently choose which vaccine 
to administer (Figure 6.2). This resulted in an approximate ly eq ual number of ch il dren 
receiving each vaccine. 16 
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Figure 6.2. Type of rotavirus vaccine used by each Australian state and territory 
*Western Australia: Dates are indicated because vaccine type was switched. 
'Northern Territory: Date is indicated because vaccine was introduced earlier than in the 
other states/territories. 
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No safety data existed outside of that available from the post-licensure clinical trials 
and consequently the recommended upper age limit for receiving the first dose of 
RotaTeq was 12.9 weeks and Rotarix was 14.9 weeks. 16 Between 1 July 2007 and 31 
December 2008, 87% of all eligible infants was given at least one dose of a rotavirus 
vaccination and 84% of those completed two or three doses as advised by the relevant 
schedule. 16 
Because of the established link between RotaShield and IS, survei llance for IS 
commenced in July 2007 by the Austral ian Paediatric Surveillance Unit (APSU), a 
national active surveillance system which monitors rare childhood diseases. Relatively 
quickly, APSU was able to demonstrate a small but apparent association between IS 
and the new vaccines. 23 To determine the extent of the increased risk of IS, the 
Australian Government commissioned a series of research efforts. Though no 
formalised system specifically for monitoring IS incidence existed, nor a plan outlining 
how to conduct such surveillance, there were a variety of su rveillan ce mechanisms 
wh ich nonetheless could contribute information. Consequently, an 'organic' IS 
surveillance was activated utilising data from severa l surveillance systems (APSU; 
PAEDS; ADRS; hospitalisation inpatient databases) to capitalise on the strengths of 
each. Australia was one of the first countries to contribute comprehensive post-
licensure research involving analyses of both new vaccines. 
For the purposes of this evaluation, "surveillance system" will be used to refer to the 
four contributing systems when they are not referred to specifically by name. "IS 
surveillance" will be used to refer broadly to Australia's effort to conduct post-
licensure safety survei llance relying on input from the four contributing systems. 
EVALUTION RATIONALE AND AIMS 
Because none of the surveillance systems used for this post-licensure IS surveillance 
was established solely to monitor IS following rotavirus vaccinat ion, each source had 
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its individual strengths and limitations when it came to doing so, and thus one system 
alone was assumed inadequate for thorough sa fety surveillance of this rare event. 
Moreover, th e Australian Government desired more than signal detection or incidence 
rate estimates, knowing that case identification was necessary to assess thoroughly 
the association between the vaccines and IS. Though the merits of the individual 
surveillance systems used for IS surveillance had each been assessed to some extent, 
no efforts to date had considered whether or not post-licensure vaccine safety 
survei llance util ising multiple surveillance systems was a reliable method for 
monitoring a serious safety concern associated with the introduction of a new vaccine. 
This eva luation described Australia's experience using multiple surveillance systems for 
conducting IS surveillance, and subsequently highlighted the lessons learned and 
recommendations. In light of the 2011 Horvath Review's recommendation for the 
evaluation of the benefits of additional surveillance mechanisms for AEFI detection, 24 
this evaluation may have been particularly salient. 
Specifically, this eva luat ion aimed to: 
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• describe the surveillance which evolved to monitor IS following receipt of the 
new rotavirus vaccines; 
• assess the attributes of th e individual surveil lance systems used for IS 
surveillance; 
• eva luate th e usefulness and utility of the IS survei ll ance system; and 
• identify whether or not the objectives of the IS surveillance were met. 
METHODS OF EVALUATION 
This evaluation employed several eva luat ion frameworks created by the WHO and the 
US CDC, including: 
• Updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems (2001; 
coc)3 
• Post-marketing surveillance of ratavirus vaccine safety (2009; WH0)4 
Using guidance from an amalgamation of these frameworks, this evaluation described 
the 15 surveillance, eva luated the attributes and utility of the contributing su rveillance 
systems, and determined the efficacy of the 15 surveillance. The four contributing 
surveillance systems were considered individually as well as how they function ed 
together to accomplish 15 surveillance. As mentioned previously, the four surveillance 
systems included: 
• the TGA's ADRS 
• APSU 
• PAEDS 
• National and state/territory hospitalisation inpatient databases 
System description 
Background information regarding the four surveillance systems used for the 15 
surveillance was obtained from the surveillance systems' websites, directly from the 
data custodians or through NCIRS. Where necessary, this included access to the raw 
data sets for relevant years. Additionally, several published and unpublished analyses 
and review papers describing the individual surveillance systems were readily available 
for consultation . Both the raw data sets and the written analyses contributed to the 
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evaluation of the attributes of each surveillance system individually and their collective 
utility. 
Because of NCIRS's role in advising the Government about vaccine policy and practice, 
any information that was not available in written format was obtained through 
discussions with appropriate NCIRS staff who were involved both with th e decision to 
add the rotavirus vaccines to the NIP and with the safety monitoring wh ich 
subsequent ly occurred. 
Stakeholder involvement 
Stakeholders were given a questionnaire seeking th eir observations and opinions 
regarding aspects of the IS surveillance. Staff at NCIRS who were knowledgeable about 
this assisted in identifying key stakeholders and reviewing the questionnaire. 
Stakeholders included members of ATAG I as well as members of ACSOV and ACSOM 
(Table 6.2). The questionnaire was distributed via email with two reminders sent. The 
questionnaire was distributed to 40 individuals and six replies were received. 
Questions were primarily open-ended and ind ividuals were asked about the perceived 
objectives, management and outcomes of IS surveillance . 
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Table 6.2. Identification and description of stakeholders questioned about the IS 
surveillance25' 26 
Stakeholder group Role of stakeholder group 
Australian Technical Advisory Group on Advises Minister for Health on the Immunise 
Immunisation (ATAGI) Australia Program and related issues 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Provides advice and recommendations to 
Vaccines (ACSOV) the Minister for Health and the TGA on the 
safety, risk assessment and risk management 
of vaccines 
Advisory Committee on the Safety of Provides advice and recommendations to 
Medicines (ACSOM) the TGA on the safety, risk assessment and 
risk management of medicines. May also 
provide advice to the TGA on other matters 
related to the detection, assessment, 
understanding and prevention of adverse 
effects (pharmacovigilance) and any other 
matters referred to it by the TGA 
Evaluation of attributes 
As recommended by the CDC's Updated guidelines for evaluating public health 
surveillance systems3, the following specific attributes outlined in Table 6.3 were 
assessed for each surveillance system wh ich contributed to the IS surveillance. 
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Table 6.3. Description of attributes evaluated for contributing surveillance systems 
Attribute Description 
Data quality The completeness and validi ty of the data 
Timeliness The time between steps in the data flow process into and 
out of the databases of each data source 
Ability to be quickly implemented to achieve objectives of 
AEFI surveillance 
Sensitivity Ability to capture as many cases as possible; compared 
between sources 
Causality ascertainment Ability to provide information which supports a cau sa lity 
relationship between vaccination and IS 
Posit ive Predict ive Value The proportion of IS cases detected which are confirmed as 
(PPV) t rue IS cases 
Representa t iveness Descript ion of how representative detected IS cases are of IS 
cases in the wider population 
Not all attributes recommended by the CDC's Updated guidelines for evaluating public 
health surveillance systems were deemed usefu l or appropriate for this survei llance 
evaluation and severa l were therefore excluded . Causality ascertainment, though not 
an attribute included in the CDC guidelines, was included because it is an integral part 
of AEFI surve illance .27 
All attributes were assessed by reviewing the published IS analyses and relevant 
literature, questioning individuals w ho work with the data, or accessing ra w data sets. 
For sensitivity, this attribute was also assessed across the data sources by comparing IS 
cases detected by each. Similarly, PPV was also compared across data sources usi ng 
Brighton Collaboration cr iteria definitions. 28 The Brighton Collaboration is an 
international volunta ry network of health professionals who have developed 
standardised AEFI case definitions with the aim of improving quality and comparability 
of vaccine safety data. 29 A case which is a confirmed Brighton Level 1 has a high leve l 
of diagnost ic certainty. 
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Evaluation of utility 
Th e CDC defines the utility or usefulness of a survei llance system by its contribution or 
value added, not merely by its ability to detect cases.2' 3 
To determine the usefulness of the IS surveillance, the evaluation reviewed the 
system's objectives to assess whether or not these were met, and summarised the 
system's impact on and contribution to existing evidence, policy and practice. 
RESULTS 
Description of the IS surveillance 
Purpose 
Because of the RotaShield experience, it was necessary to incorporate concurrent 
vaccine safety monitoring with the introduction of the new rotavirus vaccines. Though 
pre-licensure clinical trials of RotaTeq and Rotarix had not detected an increased risk 
of IS associated with vaccina tion, pre-licensure trials were designed to detect risks on a 
similar scale to what had been observed with the RotaShield vaccine. Th ere was st ill 
the possibility that a sma ller scale risk could have occurred. Moreover, as IS appears to 
vary substantially depending on region and demography, an increased risk could sti ll 
have existed outside of th e regions where the clinica l trials were conducted. 
Additionally, the pre-licensure clinical trials involved administering the two vaccines 
according to str ict age schedules, meaning th at there was still the possibility that an 
increased IS risk could be apparent if the vaccines were administered at ages outside 
of these schedules. 14 
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Objectives 
Because th ere was no one mechanism for conducting surveillance for IS occurring as 
an adverse event associated with vaccination, no pre-defined objectives existed for 
conducting this surveillance. When asked what the objectives of the IS surveillance 
were, no stakeholder (n=6) replying to the distributed questionnaire could confidently 
identify objectives. Answers included to monitor the number of IS hospital admissions; 
for APSU to monitor IS cases; for PAEDS to monitor admissions and patient outcomes. 
Al l respondents, however, were confident that surveillance was in place at the time 
the two vaccines were licensed. Additionally, when asked about who was in charge of 
coordinating and overseeing the IS surveillance effort which occurred with the 
introduction of the rotavirus vaccines, most stakeholders (n=S/6) who completed the 
questionnaire were unsure or attributed responsibility solely to either ADRS, APSU or 
PAEDS. 
The WHO's Post-marketing surveillance of rotavirus vaccine safety states that the main 
objective of post-marketing surve illance shou ld be to 'identify adverse events, and in 
particular rare or unanticipated adverse events, that may be associated with specific 
vaccines, to distinguish those that are causally related to vaccination and to estimate 
their incidence'.4 In line with these guidelines, Australia 's objectives for IS surveillance 
following the introduction of the rotavirus vaccines, though unspecified, included : 
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• Detecting all suspect ed IS cases; 
• Identifying those cases for which a causal link could be identified with receipt 
of either rotavirus vacc ine; 
• Compiling thorough and useful case data when possible to contribute to the 
national epidemiological profile of IS, as the condition varies demographically 
and regionally; 
• Compiling thorough and usefu l case data to inform incidence and ri sk analyses. 
Contributing surveillance systems: description, purpose, 
objectives 
ADRS 
Histori cally, the only Australian system established for reporting vaccine related 
adverse events has been the TGA's passive system which has existed specifically for 
that purpose, w ith a formal database (ADRS) since 2000. Managed by the TGA's Office 
of Product Review, it records adverse events associated with immunisation and drug 
reactions reported by immunisa tion providers, healthcare professionals, vaccine 
manufacturers, parents and the public. Reported AEFI are assigned a causality rating 
which attempts to estimate the likelihood that the adverse event was caused by 
vaccination. AEFI are classified as 'serious' or 'non-serious' . Reactions are coded into 
standardised terms using the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities (MedDRA). 30 
Until IS became a recognised adverse event associated with the rotavirus vaccines, the 
system would only have detected IS if it had occurred randomly as an adverse event 
associated temporally with another vaccine. A formal defin ition for IS was included in 
the system in 2006 when the rotavirus vaccines were registered. 
The objective of ADRS is to 'detect early warning signals and · generate hypotheses 
about possible new vaccine adverse events or changes in frequency of known ones' .24 
ADRS data are used for signal detection and de-identified data are routinely ana lysed 
and reported by NCIRS. Annual national surveillance summaries have been published 
in Communicable Diseases Intelligence (CDI) since 2002 and detail all va lid reports 
where the vaccine cannot be excluded as cause of the adverse event due to biological 
implausibility. 30 
APSU 
The decision was made in 2007 to incorporate IS as a monitored condition into the 
already existing national APSU which had been partly funded by the Au stralian 
Government DOH since 1993 to conduct su rvei llance of rare childhood diseases. The 
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overarching objective of APSU is to guide clinical practice and education and to 
contribute to research. 31 APSU conditions are chosen in line with national research 
priorities and consequently a decision was made to include IS from May 2007-May 
2010 to assist w ith the post-licensure safety surveillance of the new rotavirus vaccines. 
This was the first time that APSU had included an AEFI as one of its monitored 
conditions. 
APSU surveillance reli es on a network of approximately 1,250 paediatric clinicians 
reporting cases they have seen via monthly report cards. APSU follows up with 
clinicians to obtain more detail about individual cases. Data are housed within the Kids 
Research Inst itute at the Children's Hospital at Westmead (CHW). Data are released to 
investigators who collate, analyse and publish findings; study findings are reported 
every two years in the APSU Biennial Research Report. Research is also presented to 
ATAGI and other relevant groups when appropriate. APSU publishes annual reports 
detailing surveillance of monitored conditions that are communicable and vaccine 
preventable in CDI. 
PAEDS 
PAEDS is a joint collaboration between APSU and NCIRS and was launched in 2007 to 
monitor cases of rare but serious vaccine related childhood conditions, including both 
vaccine preventable diseases and AEFI. PAEDS aims to detect conditions that other 
surveillance systems do not and to gather rich clinical data about cases to support 
research. IS was included as a PAEDS condition from its piloting stage. 
The system uti lises APSU and NCIRS infrastructures and unites experts from five major 
tertiary paediatric hospitals around Australia. Data are managed from a central 
database at the Kids Research Insti tute. PAEDS investigators access data for the 
purposes of conducting research. 32 Results are presented to relevant groups like ATAGI 
when appropriate. 
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Hospitalisation inpatient databases 
The fourth surveillance system utilised for IS surveillance was hospita lisation inpatient 
databases, both at the individual state/terr itory level (m anaged by the relevant health 
department) and at th e national leve l (managed by the Australian Inst itute for Health 
and Welfare (AIHW)). The inpatient databases conta in administrative, demographic 
and clinical information about patients adm itted to public and private hospitals in 
Austra lia . They have been co ll ated at a national level since 1993. Diagnoses and 
procedures are classified accord ing to the International Stat istical Classification of 
Diseases and related Hea lth Problems (currently, Tenth Revision, Australian 
Modification (ICD-10-AM)). Though useful for IS surveillance, these data are co ll ected 
for th e purpose of planning health services, tracking indicators of health status, and 
providing statistical information to monitor the uti li sation of state hospital services. 
They are col lated at the national leve l for the purpose of co llecting in forma ti on about 
care provided to admitted patients in Austra lia hospitals. 33 
Table 6.4 summarises characteristics of these surveillance methods. Figure 6.3 
demonstrates how a case of IS may be detected and reported and the interplay of the 
four surve illance systems. The append ices provide addit iona l detail about how th e 
con tributing surveillance system fu nctions individua lly. 
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Table 6.4. Characteristics of surveillance systems contributing to the IS surveillance'0·33 
ADRS APSU PAEDS 
Description Records adverse events Records uncommon Records uncommon, 
associated with childhood diseases, serious, vaccine-related 
immunisation and drug complications of common childhood conditions 
reactions diseases or adverse 
effects of treatment 
Reporting Passive Passive Active 
Reported by Reported by Paediatric hospital-based 
immunisation providers, paediatricians surveillance 
healthcare professionals, 
vaccine manufacturers, 
parents 
and public 
Population under National; all ages National; children <15 CHW (Sydney); Royal 
surveillance years Children's Hospital 
(Melbourne); Women's 
For IS surveillance and Children's Hospital 
children <24 months (Adelaide); Princess 
Margaret Hospital 
(Perth); Royal Children's 
Hospital (Brisbane) 
Children <15 years 
For IS surveillance, 
children <24 months 
Hospitalisation data 
Record administrative, demographic 
and clinical information about 
patients admitted to public and 
private hospitals 
Data supplied by hospitals to 
state/territory health bodies; an 
aggregated de-identified minimum 
dataset is then submitted to AIHW 
Both national and state/territory 
data include persons of all ages 
presenting to the majority of public 
and private hospitals nation-wide 
"'"' a,
<.D 
ADRS 
Date established Data collected in formal 
database since 2000 
Specific IS definition as 
AEFI included in database 
since 2006 when 
rntavirus vaccines 
registered 
Administered/ TGA 
funded by 
Output Annual surveillance 
summaries published in 
CDI 
Data analysed routinely 
by NCIRS as part of its 
funding agreement with 
the DOH 
3 months after report 
entered, data made 
available to public in the 
DAENt 
*RACP: Royal Australasian College of Physicians 
t DAEN: Database of Adve rse Event Notificati ons 
APSU PAEDS Hospitalisation inpatient data 
Established in 1993 Established in 2007 National database established in 
1993 
IS from May 2007-May IS monitored from 2007 
2010 
DOH, CHW, RACP*, the Joint initiative of APSU State/territory health departments 
University of Sydney, and NCIRS and AIHW 
GlaxoSmithKline Australia 
(IS surveillance) Funded by the DOH 
Findings reported every Each condition under Most data published in reports and 
two years in the APSU surveillance has a chief bulletins at both state/territory and 
Biennial Research Report investigator and research national levels 
group who analyse and 
Survei llance of report on findings Other data available to researchers 
communicable and subject to confidentiality and other 
vaccine preventable guidelines 
diseases published every 
year since 2004 in CDI 
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Attributes 
The following section details the strengths and limitations of each surveillance system 
by assessing its individual attributes-data quality; timeliness; sensitivity; causality 
ascertainment; positive predictive value; and representativeness-as outlined in Table 
6.3. Within this section, although the strengths and limitations are referred to in the 
past tense, these surveillance systems are still currently operational. 
Data quality 
Data quality referred to the completeness and validity of the data collected by each 
surveillance system. 
In terms of contributing to IS surveillance, ADRS data quality was limited by variable 
completeness of information provided on individual data collection forms. Moreover, 
while national case definitions existed, reporting forms differed by state and territory 
resulting in compilation of slightly variant data. It is therefore likely that interpretation 
and application of these definitions varied at a state level, making analysis and case 
classification problematic. However, quality controls existed, wit~ TGA medical officers 
undertaking weekly review of all reports, and bimonthly reviews of proportional 
reporting ratios in order to detect existing signals. Nonetheless, ADRS data quality and 
utility could be improved through standardisation of objectives and interpretation of 
national case definitions as was recommended in the Horvath Review. 24 
The two active systems, APSU and PAEDS, provided superior data quality and validity. 
Firstly, although diagnosis of IS is typically straightforward, both sources-unlike ADRS 
notifications which could be reported by the general public-relied on reporting by 
health professionals and subsequent review by expert clinicians. To verify 
completeness of case ascertainment, PAEDS conducted periodic audits of medical 
records ·searching for primary and secondary ICD-coded IS cases and then comparing 
these with PAEDS data over the same time period. Both APSU and PAEDS used 
standardised protocols and questionnaires for each condition under surveillance in 
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order t o improve consistency of case reporting . 
Data within t he fourth surveillance system, hospitalisation inpatient databases, were 
collected w ith no intent ion of reporting on adverse events. Howeve r, AIHW performed 
logical validations on coded data, and coding aud its were also performed at th e 
hospital and jurisd ictional level.34 Generally, jurisdictions considered that coding of 
inpatient data in recent years has been of high quality.35 Quality may, however, have 
been limited by var iation s in recording and coding across jurisdictions and over time. 
Errors causing the ICD code to differ from the true disease may also have occurred. 
Th ese may have included both random and systematic measurement errors, 
potential ly stemming from the level of details documented in medical records, 
clinicians' level of experience or those based on transcribing, and coder errors such as 
miss-specification.36 A 2008 Canadian study ba sed on four teaching hospitals 
demonstrated cod ing of hospital discharge data sensit ivity ranged from 9.3%-83.1% 
using ICD-9-Canadian Revision and 12.7% -80.8% using ICD-10 codes, depending on 
the condition reviewed .37 
For the purposes of IS surveillance, the qua lity of inpatient data may have been limited 
by poor completeness of procedure cod e data . For example, data may not have 
included whether or not ultrasounds, enemas, or surge ry had been administered. 
Moreover, inpatient data did not collect the outcome of procedures necessary in order 
to cla ss ify cases using Brighton Collaboration criteria. In another limitat ion, inpatient 
data did not collect vaccination status, a factor req uired for risk association studies. 
However, this non-collection of procedural outcome or vacc ination status did not 
equate to poor dat a qua lity per se. But lackin g such detail, the inpatient data were 
limited in usefulness in t erms of IS survei llance w ithout conducting chart review or 
access ing data from the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR). 
Timeliness 
For the purpose of this eva luation, timelin ess referred to th e interval between an IS 
case occurrence, its detection, report of it by th e relevant survei llance method, and 
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when the findings based on compi led data were ultimately available for dissemination. 
Timeliness also referred to the speed of activation of a surveillance system to begin 
ident ifying cases. 
Tim eliness varied widely by source . For APSU, the time from diagnosis to reporting of 
cases had been estimated in a published evaluation to range from one week to six 
months.38 Eighty percent of email cards were noted to have been returned from 
participating clinicians within one week.38 APSU cases were classified every three 
months as confirmed, duplicate, error, etc, with summaries reported in CDI. 
When APSU activated emergency surveillance for the H1N1 influenza pandemic, 
however, reporting largely occurred within ten days and 60% of follow-up 
questionnaires were returned by fax immediately. Final data for the H1N1 study were 
published within six months. This demonstrated the potential for APSU to not only be 
activated quickly as a surveillance method in times of emergency, but also to provide 
results in a timely manner. 
PAEDS data were exported weekly from the hospital sites to the central database. 
Cases were identified in 'real time' with the only limitations to that being the workload 
and work schedu le of the surveillance nurses. PAEDS, like APSU, demonstrated its 
abi lity to be act ivated quickly and to provide quick data. The system was also used for 
emergency H1N1 surveillance in 2009. 39• 40 In terms of time between identifying cases 
and publishing surve illance data, the publication by Buttery et al identified IS cases 
through APSU and PAEDS from 1 July 2007 to 31 December 2008 and submitted these 
su rveillance results for publication ir. early September 2010. 
ADRS had been criticised for possible reporting delays. Though the system has 
endeavoured to improve data flow by employing TGA contact persons for each 
jurisdiction, lags in reporting continued. The Horvath Review highlighted this as one 
area of concern, suggest ing simultaneous reporting cou ld occur across jurisdictions 
with the TGA receiving reports in 'real time' rather than after the fact in batches. Upon 
receiving notifications, the TGA triaged cases as serious or non-serious, coded them 
accord ing to MedDRA criteria and entered them into the ADRS database within 48 
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hours of receipt; in 24 hours in most cases. AEFI data were made available to the 
public three months after being entered into the ADRS database in the publicly 
accessible Database of Adverse Event Notifications (DAEN). 41 
Inpatient data were slow to be compiled and made available for researchers. While 
some hospitals sent data to state/territory health departments within days of 
discharge, for others it took more than six weeks for records to be completed. Data 
then had to be transformed into analysable forms, which happened on an 
approximately six monthly basis (personal communication, October 2013; Dr Lee 
Taylor, NSW Ministry of Health). Though a hindrance to generating timely analysis, 
inpatient data allowed access to the greatest number of IS cases. Conversely, active 
surveillance systems like APSU or PAEDS may have provided quicker immediate data, 
but the time required to identify sufficient individual cases with which to conduct 
appropriately powered research may have been substantial. Consequently, for the 
purposes of IS surveillance, the strength of APSU and PAEDS data from a timeliness 
perspective was the rapid activation of each system; this ultimately provided ri ch case 
data for either limited analyses or for supplementing larger studies re liant on inpatient 
data. 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity referred to the system's ability to positively identify true cases of IS by 
determining the proportion of true IS cases detected out of all who had the condition. 
For conditions associated with vaccine sa fety, sens itivity is a desirable attribute and, 
because of the magnitude of missing potential cases, is preferential to specificity for 
signal detection .42 Note that when conducting risk association studies between 
vaccines and AEFI, the converse may be true, with specificity potentially of greater 
importance. 
Sensitivity calculations were dependent upon having accurate denominator data. As it 
was unknown how many IS cases went unreported, estimating sensitivity for each of 
the individual contributing systems was problematic. Nonetheless, it was possible 
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without denominator data to compare the number of cases detected by each system 
over the same time period. 
When comparing the systems used to identify IS cases, considerab le variation in 
sensitiv ity existed . Table 6.5 summarises the number of IS cases detected by the four 
surveillance systems for the period July 2007-May 2010. All may have been affected 
by data quality; this may have resulted in cases not having been accurately 
documented. This was particularly significant for in pat ient data, where accurate ICD-
coding from medical records was required. The passive ADRS system was known to 
suffer from under-reporting and bias in reporting of suspected events; this was clearly 
demonstrated by the comparably sma ller number of reports detected (Table 6.5). As 
demonstrated by Table 6.5, the acute and severe nature of IS meant cases were more 
li kely to be captured more comprehensive ly via paediatric specia list and 
hospitalisation data gathered by APSU, PAEDS and in the inpatient databases than by 
ADRS. 
The PAEDS system was a relatively sensitive method for detecting IS-more so than 
APSU, as not all IS cases were treated by paediatricians involved in APSU data 
collection. Moreover, because of the severe nature of IS, patients with this condition 
were more likely to have presented to a hospital in the first in_stance. In this regard, 
APSU was perhaps more suited to survei llance of non-acute conditions managed by 
paediatricians whose patients presented to their consulting rooms. 
As demonstrated in Table 6.5, inpatient databases had the ability to capture the 
largest number of cases: an estimated 31-fold more than ADRS. It shou ld be noted, 
however, that this included a substantial number of inter-hospital transfers for a single 
episode. For example, in research involving chart review of NSW !CD-coded cases, 24% 
of cases were determined to have been duplicates due to hospital transfer. 43 Another 
notable limitat ion to inpatient data was the potential for IS cases to present to an ED 
and not subsequently be included in the inpatient database. This phenomenon was 
observed at the CHW, where ten IS cases detected by PAEDS were found not to have 
been included on the inpatient database, as they were managed in the ED without 
being hospitalised.43 Simi lar findings were reported in a 2009 US study.44 
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Table 6.5. The number of IS cases detected by the four surveillance systems, Australia, July 
2007-May 2010 
System Number of IS cases 
ADRS 44 
APSU 79 
PAEDS 251 
National inpatient data bases 1,393* 
*A proportion of these cases will include duplicates due to hospital transfer. Others may not 
be tru e cases .43 
Causality ascertainment 
Causality ascertainment required assessment of the 'strength of association, 
cons istency, specificity, biologic plau si bil ity, coherence, experimenta l evidence and 
analogy'. 4 
The WHO's report on post-marketing surveil lance of rotavirus vaccine safety stated 
that the 'clearest and most reliable' method for determining whether vaccinations 
cau sed adve rse events was comparing rates in vaccinated and non,vaccinated groups 
in randomised clinica l trials. 4 When cl in ical trials were not feasible, observational 
studies were useful . 
Observational studies uti lising APSU and PAEDS data were successful in determining an 
associat ion between vaccination and IS. This was achieved by accessing ACIR data 
detailing t he number of doses of rotavirus vaccine rece ived and th e age at vaccinat ion 
in chi ldren with IS. Inpati ent data we re also able to asce rtain causa lity and estimate 
vaccination-associated risk associated by accessing add itional case information from 
med ica l record s and vaccination records from ACIR data. 
Th e WHO also affirme d th e uti lity of rev iews of serious adverse events to determin e 
the likelihood of them having been caused by vacc ination. Accordingly, ADRS 
surveillance data were useful for IS surveil lance. Although reported AEF I may or may 
not have been caused by vaccination, attempts were made by the TGA to dete rmin e 
causality. Causa lity was assigned as 'certain', 'probable' or 'possible' based on the 
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WHO Uppsala Monitoring Centre causality assessment criteria. 30 These rankings 
assessed the likelihood that the suspected vaccine or vaccines was/were associated 
with the reported adverse event. Factors contributing to the ranking included 'the 
timing of the reaction following vacc ination, the spatia l correlation of symptoms and 
signs in relation to vaccination and whether one or more vaccines were 
administered'. 30 A limitation of ADRS's causality assessments was the difficulty in 
attributing causality; because most infant vaccines were given in combination, 
determining which vaccine may have caused the suspected AEFI was largely 
impossible. Consequently, any co-administered vaccines were commonly assigned a 
causality ranking of 'suspected'. 
Positive Predictive Value (PPV} 
PPV referred to the proportion of IS cases detected which were true IS cases. For ICD-
coded inpatient data, assessing this attribute by reviewing !CD-coded cases of IS using 
Brighton Collaboration criteria was possible. 
NSW inpatient data had previously been chart reviewed and cases assigned Brighton 
criteria levels.43 Among NSW cases identified by inpatient data for the period July 
2007-June 2010, the PPV of an I CD-code of IS for any diagnosis was 61.5% (Table 6.6). 
Th e PPV for primary diagnosis was only slightly improved at 63.1%. 
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Table 6.6. Positive predictive value (%) for NSW inpatient data as compared with CHW 
PAEDS data, July 2007-June 2010 
Surveillance method Number of Total number PPV (%) 
Brighton Level 1 of ICD-coded 
cases cases 
NSW inpatient data 
ICD-cod e of IS for 110 179 61.5% 
any diagnosis 
ICD-code of IS fo r 106 168 63 .1% 
primary diagnosis 
CHW PAEDS data 51 56 91 .1% 
In contrast, for CHW PAEDS cases for th e period July 2007-June 2010, the PPV was 
91.1% (51 cases detected by PAEDS were Brighton Collaboration Level 1 at CHW/56 
total PAEDS at CHW) . Cl ea rly, PAEDS offered supe rior precision for detecting true 
cases. 
APSU and ADRS cases were not confirmed using Brighton Collabo_ration criteria and 
th erefore ascertaining PPV for these systems was not poss ibl e. 
Representativeness 
Representativeness referred to whether or not IS cases identifi ed were representat ive 
of cases in the wider population. Inpatient data we re th us likely the most 
representative, alt hough cases presentin g to an ED or that we re treated as outpatients 
may have been missed. 
Cases detected by APSU only included chi ldren <15 years of age (thou gh surveil lance 
for IS was for cases <24 months of age) who presented to paediatricians, other chi ld 
health specialists in hospita ls, private practice or community settings. In 2009, the 
APSU mai li ng li st of reporting clinici ans included approximately 92% of Royal Austra lian 
College of Physicians (RACP) Fellows who identified as paediatric specialists or 
subspecia lists in active clinical practice. Though the number of clinicians reporting in 
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each jurisdiction was proportional to the child populations of each state/territory, 
APSU has acknowledged that survei llance gaps exist among remote and rural 
populations. 38 
PAEDS cases were only ident ified in five tertiary paediatric hospitals and suffered 
similar surveillance gaps to APSU with regard to remote and rural populations. 
However, due to the clinical management required, IS cases were frequently 
tran sferred to large tertiary paediatric hospitals, many of wh ich were integrated into 
the PAEDS system. It was estimated in 2011 that the four participating PAEDS hospitals 
at that time (Royal Children's Hospital Brisbane was included in 2012) were responsible 
for approximately 70% of all admissions to all seven tertiary paediatric hospitals in 
Australia.45 Like APSU, PAEDS IS cases were defined to include only those <24 months 
of age. 
Becau se ADRS lacked sensitivity, it lacked representativeness despite being a national 
system accepting notifications from the public as we ll as health professionals. Lack of 
awareness about both the system's existence and the methodologies involved in 
reporting adverse events further compromised its potential representativeness, 
potentially resulting in substantial reporting bias. Table 6.7 provides an overview of 
characteristics of reported ADRS IS cases. 
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Table 6. 7. Characteristics of IS cases reported to ADRS, Australia, July 2007-May 2010 
Characteristics of cases reported to ADRS 
Age <1 year Unknown 
42/44 (95.5%) 2/44 (4.5%) 
Sex Male Female Unknown 
22/44 (50.0%) 20/44 (45.5%) 2/44 (4.5%) 
Jurisdiction & State/territory Total reports Reports by reporter type 
reporter 
NSW 19 Drug company 16 
State/territory 3 
Queensland 4 Hospital 2 
State/territory 2 
South Australia 2 State/territory 2 
Victoria 13 Drug company 7 
Hospi tal 2 
State/territory 4 
Western 6 State/territory 6 
Australia 
Utility and usefulness 
Usefulness of individual components 
ADRS data may have been useful for contributing to signal detection and hypothesis 
generation, and rates were able to be estimated using appropriate denominator data. 
Data quality, however, was hampered by underreporting, which was compounded by 
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the rare incidence of IS. Moreover, research using passive surveillance data is typically 
limited by biases, including that cases reported to passive systems are frequently 
biased toward those cases identified directly after vaccination. 14 In terms of output, 
su rvei llance reports including al l AEFI were published in CDI annually. As these reports 
were national summaries of all AEF I, limited detail was available specifically regarding 
IS. 
Inpat ient data were useful for providing large numbers of cases !CD-coded as IS, w hich 
assisted in ensu ring adequate power for analyses of this rarely occurring condition. 
Inpat ient dat a were also useful for contributing to ana lyses of IS incidence both pre-
and post- vaccine introduction. Inpatient data, however, were most useful as 
springboard s for research involving det ailed chart review to obtain ri ch clinical data 
and vaccination status about individual cases. 
Active surveillance, however, suffered fewer limitations; with 'verification of diagnoses 
through review of clinical features and with diagnostic evaluation of potential cases,' it 
remained the go ld standard for identifying cases of IS and was useful for con tri buting 
detailed cases for research studies. 14 
As an active surve ill ance system, APSU was more sensitive than the passive ADRS 
survei llance at detecting IS. Nevertheless, it was still limited oy underreporting and 
survei llance gaps. PAEDS, in compar ison, detected more cases than APSU, was useful 
in providing ri ch clinical deta il about cases, and provided th e opportunity to assess 
causality. PAEDS utility was further exten ded as its IS protocol and questionnaire 
informed the extensive chart review studies that occurred in NSW and nationally. Due 
t o IS's rarity, however, both APSU and PAEDS could be slow to accumulate enough 
cases to constitute a cohort sizab le enough to power observat ional research studi es. 
Despite their accumu lation of large case numbers, a useful fun ction of both APSU and 
PAE DS was their ab ility of rapid activation for emergency surveillance, th ereby 
providing timely data for researchers. Research including APSU and PAEDS data was 
integral in reporting on th e risk associated with rotavirus vaccines, th ereby 
contributing substant ial ly to the international evidence base and in forming policy both 
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nationally and internationa lly (Table 6.8). 
Utility of the IS surveillance system as a whole 
In September 2008, at the Public Health Association of Australia's (PHAA's) 11th 
National Immunisation Conference, APSU data were presented for the first time. APSU 
had been monitoring the temporal association between rotavirus vaccine receipt and 
IS since May 2007, 23 and data suggested an association in four out of 37 reported cases 
who had met the case definition criteria. This alerted Austra li an health officials to a 
potentially small risk associated with the two new vaccines, despite la rge-sca le clinical 
t rials declaring no such risk existed. 
Including PAEDS data compiled since July 2007 al lowed an expansion of this research. 46 
All confirmed cases of IS in infants aged <24 months between 1 July 2007 and 31 
December 2008 detected by both systems were assessed accord ing to vaccination 
status (ACIR data) and the time period following vaccination until IS diagnosis. This 
research suggest ed an apparent increased ri sk of IS with in one week of receiving the 
fi rst dose of either vacc in e. Howeve r, th e study also concluded IS rates did not increase 
over the course of the nine month follow-up of al l infants who were vacc inated. 
This research prompted the TGA to commission a population-based assessment of risk 
utilising inpatient data from NSW, Victoria and Western Australia, supplemented by 
additional cases detected by PAEDS with vaccination history sourced from ACIR data. 
Researchers conducted a self-controlled case series (SCCS) analysis to assess the level 
of risk associated with receipt of either vaccine and IS. The study detected an 
approximate fourfold increase in IS in the first 1-7 days fo llowing receipt of the first 
dose of both Rotarix and RotaTeq 47 -a risk estimate much lower than that associated 
with the Rotashield vaccine.48 Subsequently, the TGA issued a statement to healthcare 
providers informing them of the observed increased risk and stressing their 
commitment to continuing support of the vaccines due to the widespread benefits of 
decreasing rotavirus incidence. Contemporaneously with this study, the NSW Ministry 
of Health commi ssioned NCIRS to conduct a similar study with chart review to confirm 
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true cases. This chart review study included a SCCS analysis as wel l as detailed clinical 
comparison of cases based on their Brighton criteria leve ls. A significant ly increased IS 
risk was observed in days 1-7 and 1-21 post-first dose of Rotarix vaccination-the 
vaccine which NSW admin isters. 43 
Th e three state study was expanded to a national investigat ion for the time period of 1 
July 2007 to 31 June 2010 using similar methods and including a SCCS and risk benefit 
ana lys is. Resu lts concluded an increased IS incidence in the first 21 days fo llowing the 
first dose of vaccination for both vaccines: a 6-10 fold increase for 1-7 days and a 3-6 
fold increase for 8-21 days post-first dose of vacc inat ion . 49 Th e risk-benefit analysis 
compa red hosp italisations before and after th e introduction of the rotavirus vaccine 
and concluded a slight increase in IS hospitalisations (14 excess cases annua lly or an 
excess 5.6 per 100,000 vaccina t ed children) .49 This TGA-commissioned research 
ultimately informed changes to the product information for both Rotarix and RotaTeq 
vaccines; both refer speci fically to this Austra lian stu dy in their product information. 50• 
51 Reflecting the updated attributable risk est imates, the TGA's statement to 
healthcare providers was also re-issued, and parenta l advice regard ing IS risk 
associated with the vaccines was included on the DOH Immu nise Austra lia website. 
This study was the first of its kind in ternationally to compare IS r(sk fo llowing rece ipt of 
both vaccines in similar populations with sizable numbers of cases and over the same 
time period. Th e comparison was made possible by the fact that Australian 
ju risd ictions each de liver only one of the vacc in es. The results were globa lly sign ificant 
for vacc ine safety monitorin g, and were presented not only to ATAGI but also to the US 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). 
Utility of the system-as measured by research output and results which informed 
both nationa l and international policy-was substantial (Table 6.8). 
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Table 6.8. Research output, findings, and impact of four surveillance systems contributing to Australian IS surveillance 
Surveillance Output Research title Method of research Results 
method 
APSU Abstract presented at Preliminary national Initial prospective 4 out of 37 reported 
PHAA Conference, data on acute national case series confirmed cases May 
September 2008 23 intussusception in review of cases reported 2007-November 2007 
children aged :,_24 May 2007-November 
months from the 2007 alerted a temporal 
Australian Paediatric association between 
Surveillance Unit (APSU) rotavirus vaccine and IS 
APSU Published paper16 lntussusception All confirmed cases in An increased risk of IS 
following rotavirus infants <24 months within 1 week of 
PAEDS vaccine administration: between 1 July 2007-31 receiving first dose of 
post-marketing December 2008 either vaccine: RR for IS 
surveillance in the reviewed and within 1-7 days of 
National Immunization association with receipt of first dose of 
Program in Australia vaccination assessed 4.48 (95%(1: 0.92-
with ACIR data 13.09) for RotaTeq and 
according to time period 3.41 (95%(1: 0.70-9.96) 
following vaccination for Rotarix 
when diagnosed with IS 
Impact 
Triggered Government 
to commission 
additional research 
First publication 
worldwide to highlight 
association between 
RotaTeq and Rotarix and 
IS; 
Prompted further 
research to be 
commission by the TGA 
N 
00 
IJ1 
Surveillance Output Research title 
method 
Inpatient data Government report47 Rotavirus vaccination 
and risk of 
intussusception: a case-
series analysis in three 
states of Australia, July 
2007-December 2009 
Inpatient data Report to NSW Ministry lntussusception in 
of Health52 Australia: population-
PAEDS based risk following 
Presented at Australian monovalent human 
CDC* Conference, rotavirus vaccine 
201153,54 
Submitted for 
publication 201343 
*CDC: Communicable Disease Control (Conference); 'RI : Relative Incidence 
Method of research 
SCCS analysis using 
inpatient data (infants 
<12 months of age) 
from NSW, Victoria and 
Western Australia; 
vaccination status from 
ACIR 
NCIRS commissioned by 
NSW Ministry of Health. 
Chart review based 
study including case 
control and SCCS 
analysis for infants aged 
<12 months, July 2007-
June 2010. Included 
clinical comparison of 
cases based on Brighton 
criteria levels 
Publication did not 
include case control 
analysis 
Results Impact 
4-fold increase in IS in Informed changes to 
first 1-7 days following product information for 
first dose of either both vaccines; TGA 
vaccine. For those issues statement to 
receiving RotaTeq an healthcare providers 
increased likelihood of regarding safety of 
IS occurring for up to 3 rotavirus vaccines 
weeks after vaccination; 
1-2 excess cases of IS 
per 100,000 infants 
vaccinated or 4-5 extra 
cases a year 
SCCS analysis showed Contributed first 
increased relative Australian clinical 
incidence of IS in days assessment of vaccine 
1-7 following first dose associated IS 
of Rotarix [RI ': 11.1 hospitalisations 
{95% Cl: 2.6-48.0)]. IS according to Brighton 
episodes that were criteria level 
potentially vaccine 
attributable did not Compared risk 
differ in severity from IS estimates obtained 
occurring outside risk from Brighton Level 1 
periods confirmed cases with 
those obtained from all 
ICD-coded cases 
N 
00 
en 
Surveillance 
method 
Inpat ient data 
PAEDS 
Inpatient data 
Output 
Published paper49 
Presented to US ACI p55 
Presented to ATAGl 58 
Research title 
Increased risk of 
intussusception 
associated with both 
currently licensed 
rotavirus vaccines in 
Australia's National 
Immunization Program 
Risk of intussusceptions 
and trends in 
hospitalisations before 
and after rotavirus 
vaccination program in 
Australia 
Method of research 
From July 2007-June 
2010, infants aged <12 
months. SCCS analysis 
using inpatient data 
(infants <12 months) 
from NSW, Victoria, 
Northern Territory, 
Queensland, South 
Australia and Western 
Australia; vaccination 
status from ACI R 
Serial cross-sectional 
analysis of age-specific 
IS hospitalisation rates 
before (July 1998-June 
2007) and after (July 
2007-June 2010) 
vaccine introduction; 
risk-benefit analysis 
comparing vaccine 
attributable IS risk with 
benefits of vaccination; 
clinical case review, 
SCCS analysis cohort 
NSW children (July 
2007-June 2010) 
Results Impact 
A 6-10-fold increase in First internationally to 
risk for days 1-7 after compare ri sk following 
first dose vaccination receipt of both vaccines 
and 3-6-fold increased 
risk for days 8-21 after Prompted TGA safety 
first dose vaccination update56 
Attributable risk Prompted update by 
for both vaccines of 5.6 Department of Health 
additional cases of IS and Ageing for parents 
per 100,000 vaccinated 
infants or an estimated Prompted updating 10th 
excess of 14.3 cases edition Australian 
annually at the national Immunisation 
level Handbook57 
An RI of IS (8.4; 95%CI: Contributed historical 
2.0-35.7) in 1-7 days data to Australian IS 
after first dose of epidemiological profile 
vaccine. Risk-benefit 
analysis determined 
that vaccination 
program would avert 
1,547 cases of all-cause 
gastroenteritis 
hospitalisations per year 
among children <5 years 
of age in NSW 
Finally, an assessment of the utility of the surveillance system must include 
consideration of whether its objectives were met. Though objectives of IS surveillance 
were undefined, objectives were identified based on criteria outlined by the WH0. 4 
Table 6.9 details these objectives and how they were achieved. 
Table 6.9. Assessment of objectives of the IS surveillance 
Objective Was the objective met? Which components 
contributed 
Detecting a 11 Unknown Cannot be sure that all All 
suspected cases of IS cases were detected; 
however, given the Inpatient data 
seriousness of IS and that particularly 
cases primarily occur in important to 
infants, it is likely that ensuring all 
most cases were identified. detected 
Identifying cases for Yes Three significant studies Inpatient data 
which a causal link (not for all included chart review PAEDS 
can be identified cases) which allowed cases' 
with receipt of either vaccination history to be ACIR data 
vaccine obtained. supplemented 
Compiling thorough Yes All surveillance systems All 
and usefu l case data provided useful data to 
to contribute to the assist in better 
nationa l descriptive understanding IS in 
epidemiologica l Australia. 
profile of IS 
Compiling thorough Yes Five studies were able to Inpatient data 
and useful case data conclude estimates of PAEDS 
to inform incidence each. APSU 
and risk analyses 
ACIR data 
supplemented 
' 
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INTERNATIONAL RELEVANCE 
The US CDC's rotavirus vaccine safety website states that many of its studies have 
been unable to rule out a risk as low as that reported in Austra lia and elsewhere. 59 
Moreover, Australia provided some of the earliest international results regarding the 
small but significant ri sk that was unable to be detected in large post-licensure clinical 
trials. Data from Australia have been particularly important because the country 
administers both vaccines and has been able to contribute data regarding the safety of 
both. 
Other countries have provided evidence for there being an IS risk associated with 
receipt of the two rotavirus vaccines. Data from the US Vaccine Safety Database (VSD) 
have been used to demonstrate a potential one case of IS per 20,000 fully vaccinated 
infants who received Rotarix. The US Food and Drug Admin istration (FDA) has 
published a study estimating a possible 11.5 additional cases of IS per 100,000 US 
infants within the first 21 days following receipt of the first dose of RotaTeq. Increased 
risks have been demonstrated in Mexico and Brazil: in Mexico, in the first week 
following the first dose of Rotarix and in Brazil in the first week following the second 
dose of Rotarix. These studies, with the data from Australia's studies, led the CDC to 
conclude that there may be 13 excess cases of IS per 100,000 infants 
Further international studies are required to better understand the regional and 
demographic variabi lity of IS risk associated w ith rotavirus vaccine receipt. Moreover, 
since many vaccine products are now 'primarily licensed in, or deve loped for, exclusive 
use in low- and middle-income countries' 60, post-licensure safety survei llan ce efforts in 
these countries are particularly important (although the financial and infrastructural 
challenges to do so should not be underestimated). Indeed, the WHO Global Advisory 
Committee on Vaccine Safety has recomm ended a standardised approach for vaccine 
safety monitoring in all countries administering rotavirus vaccines and for all countries 
intending to introduce the vaccines. 61 A standa rdised approach will allow for easily 
understood and comparable data. 
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Some level of passive surveillance has already been estab lished in many lower and 
middle income countries. 60 Howeve r, due to t he limi t ed efficacy of passive surveillance 
data, countries with limited resources ma y be better off establishing a netwo rk of 
hospitals-or even a single hospital if funds extend no furth er - with functioning 
healthcare databases that cou ld be accessed retrospectively for review. This wou ld 
require existin g databases to con tain enough data with sufficient detail to be useful for 
such analysis. Such a system wou ld allow for some degree of base estimates and for 
th e epidemiological profile of IS cases t o be ascertained. As a second step, these same 
hospitals could consider implementing a type of acti ve surveillance sim ilar to PAEDS 
wi th several individua ls tasked with detecting cases. Without such hospital-based 
acti vi ties, countries employing solely passive surve illance wil l have lim ited abilities to 
ana lyse and interpret vaccine sa fety associated r isks. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
While Australian IS surve il lance was effective, usefu l and influential, its success was 
based on its opt imisa tion of four existing surveillance systems. As future efforts to 
monitor vaccine safety may well rely upon mult iple surveil lance methods, ensuring 
such efforts are coordinated and planned from the outset will be critical, with clear 
objectives and desired output as well as delegated management roles. Additiona l 
recommendat ions are outl ined below. 
Recommendation 1: 
Future efforts at post-licensure vaccine safety surveillance should be clea rly planned 
and managed, with objectives articulated from the start. To this end, establishing a 
Post- licensure Vaccine Safety Surveillance Working Group may be beneficial. The 
Group could be ca lled upon when needed to outline surveillance objectives, 
management, resources requi red, type of research stud ies necessary, t imeline, and 
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desired output. Moreover, coordination of research studies commiss ioned by the 
Government should be clear, with clear delineation of responsibilities. 
Recommendation 2: 
In line with Horvath Review recommendations, and in order to maximise the 
usefulness of the surveillance system, this eva luat ion stresses the need for harmonised 
passive surveil lance system reporting and information fl ows across jurisdictions. 
Passive surveillance for rare AEFI can be important for detecting signals and improving 
the system would be beneficial. For example, one standardised AEFI reporting form to 
be used by all states and territories could improve consistency of data collected and 
reported to ADRS. 
Recommendation 3: 
Though funding-dependent, expansion of the PAEDS network to include all states and 
territories, particularly the Northern Territory if a suitable paediatric facility could be 
adapted for PAEDS purposes, would maximise the PAEDS system's efficacy and 
consequently its usefu lness for vaccine safety monitoring. 
Recommendation 4: 
It would be beneficial for strengthening vaccine safety monitoring if ACIR data included 
all life-time vaccinations received and not only those received through the age of 
seven years. This would allow for more comprehensive monitoring of vaccine safety. 
Recommendation 5: 
Although data linkage may be challenging, doing so would benefit vacc ine safety 
surveillance immensely. One examp le, as suggested by a stakeholder, would be li nking 
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ACIR and inpatient data. Another stakeholder suggestion was that reporting cases 'real 
time' to the TGA through electronic-based ED and inpatient data systems would 
ensure all PAEDS and APSU cases could be reported to the TGA in 'real time'. This same 
stakeholder concluded that Australia needs 'an active surveillance system for AEFI that 
is national, prospective, and timely. Ideally this system should be coordinated by a 
commonwealth agency such as [the] TGA'. 
Recommendation 6: 
This evaluation would be enhanced by future research involving a capture-recapture 
analysis to provide an estimate of total IS cases by comparing the proportion of IS 
cases detected by each surveillance method to the proportion of overlapping cases 
detected by multiple methods. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-licensure vaccine safety surveillance is vital to maintain public confidence in 
vaccines, particularly so with rotavirus vaccines because of RotaShield's problematic 
introduction and subsequent withdrawal from the US market. Australia's novel 
approach to IS surveillance, utilising multiple surveillance methods, has proved 
successful. Not only has this increased public confidence in the vaccines, it has 
demonstrated that a combinatorial approach may offer maximal effectiveness. This 
experience may assist future efforts within Australia to conduct vaccine safety 
surveillance. 
This evaluation also demonstrates the strengths and limitations of individual 
contributing surveillance methods. These details may assist countries with limited 
resources to better understand how to maximise existing surveillance resources or 
which additional surveillance methods would be the most beneficial to improving 
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vaccine safety surveillance if funding exists. 
Moreover, w ith respect to low- and middle-income countries, high levels of confidence 
in rotavirus vacc ines are of particular importance. It is in these countri es where 
rotavirus-associated morbidity and mortality levels remain high. Since vaccination has 
proved extremely successful at decreasing rotavirus incidence, the WHO continues to 
recommend the vaccines remain available despite the small vaccine-related IS risk. 
However, because of th eir relatively high expense, low- and middle- income countries 
often rely on funding assistance to supply rotavirus vaccin es; without robust vaccine 
confidence, such assistance may not be forthcoming. 
292 
REFERENCES 
1. Centers for Disease C, Prevention. ln tussusception among recipients of rotavirus 
vaccine-United States, 1998-1999. MMWR - Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report. 
1999;48(27) :5 77-81. 
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Framework for eva luating public 
health survei llance systems for early detection of outbreaks. MMWR. 2004;53(RR5):1-
13. 
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Updated guidelines for evaluating 
public health survei lllance systems. MMWR. 2001;55(RR13):1-35. 
4. World Health Organization. Post-marketing surveil lance of rotavirus vaccine safety. 
Geneva: WHO2009. 
5. Newall AT, MacIntyre R, Wang H, Hull B, Macartney K. Burden of severe rotavirus 
disease in Australia. J Paediatr Child Health. 2006;42(9):521-7. 
6. Yen C, Tate JE, Patel MM, Cortese MM, Lopman B, Fleming J, et al. Rotavirus 
vaccines: update on global impact and future priorities. Hum Vaccin. 2011 
Dec; 7( 12): 1282-90. 
7. World Hea lth Organization (WHO), cartographer Rotavirus ·morta lity in children 
younger than 5 years, 2008. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO); 2012. 
8. Galati JC, Harsley S, Richmond P, Carlin JB . The burden of rotavirus-related illness 
among young children on the Australian health care system. Australian & New Zealand 
Journal of Public Health. 2006;30(5):416-21. 
9. Macartney KK, Porwal M, Dalton D, Cripps T, Maldigri T, Isaacs D, et al. Decline in 
rotavirus hospitalisations following introduction of Australia's national rotavirus 
immunisation programme. J Paediatr Child Health. 2011;47(5):266-70. 
10. Munos M, Fischer Wa lker C, Black R. The effect of rotavirus vaccine on diarrhoea 
mortality. International Journal of Epidemiology. 2010;39:i56-i62. 
11. Justice F, Carlin J, Bines J. Changing epidemiology of intussusception in Australia. J 
Paediatr Child Health. 2005 Sep-Oct;41(9-10):475-8. 
12. Bines JE, Kohl KS, Forster J, Zanardi LR, Davis RL, Hansen J, et al. Acute 
293 
intussusception in infants and children as an adve rse event following immunizat ion : 
case definition and gu idelin es of data collection, analysis, and presentation. Vaccine. 
2004 Jan 26;22(5-6):569-74. 
13. Centers fo r Disea se Control and Prevention. Rotaviru s vaccine (RotaSh ield) and 
intussusception. [Internet] 2010 [cited 2013 April 8]; Available from: 
http://www. cd c.gov /va cci n es/vp d-vac/ rota vi ru s/vac-rotas hie Id-
h istori ca I. htm#intussusception. 
14. Bin es JE, Patel M, Parashar U. Assessment of postlicensure sa fety of rotavirus 
vaccines, with emphasis on intussusception . J Infect Di s. 2009 Nov 1;200 Suppl 1:5282-
90. 
15. Bin es J, Ivanoff B. Acute intussuscept ion in in fants and children : a globa l 
perspecti ve. Geneva : World Heal th Organization 2002. 
16. Buttery JP, Danchin MH, Lee KJ, Carlin JB, McIntyre PB, Elliott EJ, et al. 
lntussusception following rotavirus vaccine administration: post-marketing 
survei ll ance in the National Immunization Program in Australia. Vaccine. 
2011 ;29(16):3061-6 . 
17. Gla ss R, Parashar U, Bresee J, Turcios R, Fischer T, Widdowson M, et al. Rotavirus 
vacc ines: current prospects and future challenges. Lan cet. 2006;368:323 -32. 
18. Zan ard i L, Haber P, Mootrey G, Niu M, Wha rton M, th e VAERS Wo rking Group. 
lntussusception among recipients of rotaviru s vaccine : reports to the Vaccine Adverse 
Event Reporting System. Ped iatrics . 2001;107(6):1-6. 
19. Murphy TV, Gargiullo PM, Massoudi MS, Nelson DB, Jumaan AO, Okoro CA, et al. 
lntussusception among infants given an ora l rotavirus vacc ine. [erratum appears in N 
Engl J Med 2001 May 17;344(20):1564]. New England Journal of Medicine. 
2001;344(8) :564-72. 
20. Offit P. Rotavirus vaccines : round two. Human Vaccines. [Commentary]. 
2006;2(2):84-5. 
21. Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) DoHaA. Statement on rotavirus vaccines. 
[Internet] Canberra 2010 [updated 201 1; cited 2013 May 7]; Availabl e from: 
http://www. tga. gov .au/ safety/ a I e rts-m ed i ci n e-rotavi ru s-1003 24. htm. 
22 . World Health Organization . Age of admin istrat ion of rotavirus vaccines. Geneva: 
294 
World Health Organization; 2009 [cited 2014 January 30]; Avai lab le from: 
http://www. w ho. int/vaccine safety/com mittee/topics/rotavirus/rotarix and rotateq/ 
7Aug 2009 age administration/en/index .html. 
23. Lloyd-Joh nsen C, Bines J, Zurynski Y, Elliott E, Booy R, Richmond P, et al. Pre lim inary 
national data on acute intu ssusception in ch il dren aged '.::24 months from the 
Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit (APSU). 11th National Immunisation 
Conference, Pu blic Heal th Assoc iat ion of Australia; 16-18 September 2008; Gold Coast, 
Australia 2008. 
24. Horvath J. Review of the management of adverse events associated with Panvax 
and Fluvax. Canberra: Commonwealth of Austra lia 2011. 
25 . Department of Health TGA. About the TGA: commi ttees. [Intern et] 2012 [cited 
2013 October 22]; Available from: http: //www. tga.gov.au/about/committees-
expert.htm. 
26. Department of Health IAP. Immunisation advisory bodies: Austra lian Technical 
Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI). [Internet] 2013 [cited 2013 October 22]; 
Available 
http://www. h ea Ith .gov. au /intern et/immunise/pub I ish i ng. nsf /Content/ advisory-
bodies . 
from: 
27 . World Hea lth Organizat ion. Causality assessment of an adverse event fo ll owing 
immunisation (AEFI): user manual for the revised WHO classification. Geneva : WHO 
2013. 
28. Brighton Collaboration. Available definit ions. [Internet] [cited 2013 October 23]; 
Ava il able fro m: https://br ightoncol laborat ion .org/pu blic/what-we-do/setti ng-
sta n d a rd s/ ca se-d efi n it i on s/ ava i I ab I e-d efi n itio ns. htm I. 
29. Brighton Col laborat ion. Who we are. [Internet] [c ited 2013 October 22]; Available 
from: https://brightoncol la boration .org/pu blic/who-we-a re. htm I. 
30. Mahajan D, Cook J, McIntyre P, Macartney K, Menzies R. Annual report: 
survei llance of adverse events fol lowing immunisation in Aust ralia, 2010. Commun Dis 
lntel l. 2011;35(4):263-80. 
31. Th e Austra lian Paediatric Surveillance Unit. About the APSU. [Internet] 2013 [cited 
2013 October 22] ; Ava ilable from: http://www.apsu.org.au/about. 
295 
32. The Australian Pa ed iatric Survei llance Unit. Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Surveillance. [intern et] 2013 [cited 2013 October 22]; Avail able from: 
http://www.a ps u. org.a u/ s u rvei 11 an ce-systems/paed s/. 
33 . Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) . About AIHW. [Intern et] 2013 
[cited 2013 October 22]; Avai lab le from: http://aihw.gov.au/about/. 
34. Chiu C, Dey A, Wang H, Menzies R, Deeks S, Mahajan D, et al. Vaccine Preventable 
Diseases in Australia, 2005 to 2007. Commun Dis Intel!. 2010;34(Supplement). 
35. Australian Institute of Hea lth and Welfare (AIHW). Au stralian Institute of Health 
and Welfare: Austra lian hospital statistics 2006-2007. Canberra2008. 
36. O'Ma lley KJ, Cook KF, Wildes KR, Hurdle JF, Ashton CM. Measuring diagnoses: ICD 
codes accuracy. Hea lth Serv Res. 2005;40(5 Pt 2):1620-39. 
37. Quan H, Li B, Saunders LD, Parsons GA, Nil sson Cl, Alibhaj A, et al. Assess ing validity 
of ICD-9-CM and ICD-10 administrative data in recording clinical conditions in a unique 
dually coded database. Hea lth Serv Res. 2008;43(4):1424-41. 
38. He S, Zurynski Y, Elliott E. Evaluation of a national resou rce to identify and study 
rare diseases : The Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit. J Paediatr Child Hea lth. 
2009 ;45 :498-504. 
39. Th e Australian Paediatric Survei llance Unit. Past studies. [Internet] 2013 [cited 
2013 October 22]; Avai lab le from: http://www.apsu.org.a u/studies/past/. 
40. The Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit. Pa st PAEDS conditions under 
surveillance. [Internet] 2013 [cited 2013 October 22]; Availabl e from: 
http://www.a psu. o rg. au/ su rvei 11 an ce-syste ms/paeds/past -pa eds-condit ions-under-
su rvei I lance/. 
41. Th erapeut ic Goods Administration. Dat abase of Adverse Event Notifi cations 
(DAEN). [Internet] 2013 [c ited 2013 October 22]; Available from: 
http://www. tga. gov. au/safety/ da en . htm. 
42. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Surveil lance for safety after 
immu nization: Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) -- United States, 
1991-2001. MMWR. 2003;51(ss01):l-24. 
43. Quinn H, Wood N, Cannings K, Dey A, Wang H, Menzies R, et al. lntussusception in 
Aust ralia: popu lation-based risk fo ll owing monovalent human rotavirus vacc ine. 
296 
Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal. 2013; IN PRESS. 
44. Cortese MM, Staat MA, Weinberg GA, Edwards K, Rice MA, Szilagyi PG, et al. 
Underestimates of intussusception rates among US infants based on inpatient 
discharge data: implicat ions for monitoring the safety of rotavirus vaccines. J Infect Dis. 
[19817607]. 2009;200 Supp l 1:5264-570. 
45. Zurynski Y, McIntyre P, Booy R, Elliott E. Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease 
Survei llance (PAEDS): a new surveillance system for Australia. J Paediatr Child Health. 
2013;49(7):588-94. 
46. Buttery J, Danchin M, Lee K, Carlin J, McIntyre P, Elliott E, et al., editors. 
lntussusception following rotavirus vaccine administration: post-marketing 
surveillance of Rotateq and Rotarix in the National Immunisation Program in Australia 
[poster presentation]. 28th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Paediatric 
Infectious Diseases (ESPID); 2010/05/04/. 
47. Carlin J, Lee K. Rotavirus vaccination and risk of intussusception: a case-series and a 
case-control analysis of confirmed cases from six states and territories of Australia, July 
2007 - June 2010. Confident ial report to the Therapeutic Goods Administration . Final 
report. 24 April 2012. 
48. Centers for Disease C, Prevention. Withdrawal of rotavirus vaccine 
recommendation . MMWR - Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report: 1999;48(43):1007. 
49. Carlin JB, Macartney K, Lee KJ, Quinn H, Buttery J, Lopert R, et al. lntussusception 
risk and disease prevention associa t ed with rotavirus vaccines in Australia's National 
Immunization Program. Clin Infect Dis. 2013;57(10):1427-34. 
50. GlaxoSmithKline. Rotarix © Product Information. 2013 . 
51. Merck, Co I. Rotateq © Product Information. 2013. 
52. Macartney K, Wood N, Cannings K, Quinn H, Wang H, Dey A, et al . NCIRS report to 
NSW Health on intussusception among NSW infants given Rotarix vaccine 2011. 
53. Quinn H. lntussusception among New South Wales infants given Rotarix vaccine. 
Communicable Disease Control Conference; 4-6 April; Canberra 2011. 
54. Cann ings K. lntussusception and rotavirus vaccination in NSW: clinical review. 
Communicable Disease Control Conference; 4-6 April; Canberra 2011. 
55. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
297 
Prevention (CDC). Summary Report. Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the 
Immunization Practices (ACIP}, Jun 19-20; Atlanta 2013. 
56. Therapeutic Goods Administration. Rotavirus vaccinat ion and ri sk of 
intussusception: A report of TGA's investigation of a possible sa fety signal. 2011; 
Available from: www.tga.gov.au/safety/alerts-med icine-rotavirus-110225. htm. 
57. Australian Technica l Advisory Group on IA. The Australian Immunisation Handbook. 
10th ed. Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing; 2013. 
58. Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI). 44th Meeting. 
February 24-25; Canberra 2011. 
59. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Rotaviru s. [Internet] 2013 [cited 2013 
October 22]; Available from: 
http://www. cd c.gov /va cci n esafety/vacci n es/rotavs b. ht m I. 
60. World Health Organization. Global vaccine safety blueprint: the landscape analysis. 
Geneva2012. 
61. World Health Organization. Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety, 12-13 
June 2007. Weekly Epidemiological Record. 2007;82(28/29):245-60. 
298 
V
, 
w
 
u
 
C
 
z w 
a
. 
a
. 
<( 
en 
en 
N
 
0 0 M 
Appendix 6.A. Overview of how a case of IS is detected and 
reported by ADRS surveillance 
AEFI (including IS) 
Is detected by one of the 
following: 
/ 1 
-
-.. 
State/ Health Vaccine 
territory health professionals manufacturers 
departments 
1 I I 
i i 
I SAFEVIC in 1-- TGA Victoria 
i 
Assessed and entered into ADRS 
Serious reports 
reviewed by ACSOM 
and ACSOV 
ACIR data 
provide number 
of administered 
doses of each of 
. the 10 childhood 
vaccines 
database 
I l 
De-identified data 
analysed by NCIRS 
/":, ---------------
ABS population 
estimates used 
for repo rting 
rates 
AEFI 
detected 
and 
reported to 
the TGA 
l 
A records AEFI, 
uding details 
out symptoms; 
ns/diagnoses 
ded by staff in to 
ndardised terms 
ng MedDRA 
j 
Data routinely 
analysed by 
NCIRS to 
monitor AEFI 
surveillance 
effectiveness 
and to detect 
signals 
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Appendix 6.B. Overview of how a case of IS is detected and 
reported by APSU surveillance 
~ 
Paediatrician or 
surgeon detects r- -----> 
I ~---~---__J 
I 
Questionnaire used 
to confirm diagnosis 
and receive further 
de-identified clinical 
and demographic 
information 
Reports case via monthly 
reporting card received 
from APSU 
APSU 
r L ______ > 
APSU Investigator 
~1,2so registered 
paediatricians and 
surgeons across 
Australia participate 
in APSU and receive a 
monthly report ca rd 
by reply post or email 
asking them to report 
on any newly 
diagnosed (in the 
preceding month) 
conditions under 
surveillance 
![APSU updates its I I investigators about reported cases ~-------~ 
r------~----------, 
APSU Investigator 
:-1 conducts analysis 
' 
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For assessment of IS cases, information 
about whether the case had received 
rotavirus vaccination prior to IS 
obtained from the patient file or if 
missing sought from the parent's 
records or ACIR by the treating doctor 
Appendix 6.C. Overview of how an IS case is detected and 
reported by PAEDS surveillance 
IS case as defined by the PAEDS case 
definition (in accordance with the Brighton 
Collaboration criteria) detected by PAEDS 
surveillance nurse in hospital admissions/ED 
databases, admissions records, lab results or 
infection control logs 
,J, 
Parents/guardians of eligible children 
-provide consent for the inclusion of data in 
the PAEDS database 
Supplementary data 1 
extracted from child's Surveillance nurse 
medical, lab and facilitates biological 
vaccination history records specimen co ll ection 
and also obtained from 
wl}en appropriate 
interviewing 
parents/guardians 
PAEDS database accessed by PAEDS 
I, 
Invest igators for analysis 
" 
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Appendix 6.D. Overview of how hospitalisation inpatient data 
are used for IS surveillance 
304 
State and territory health departments 
compile hospitalisation records (coded 
according to the ICD-10-AM) for the 
AIHW 
✓ 
' 
AIHW National 
Hospital Morbidity 
Database 
~ 
Reports are generated 
by AIHW 
Researchers and research 
institutions access Al HW data 
or state/territory inpatient 
databases for analyses 
For the purpose of IS 
surveillance, 
supplementary data 
from ACIR accessed 
For the purpose of IS 
surveillance, cases assessed 
according to Brighton 
Collaboration criteria 
Appendix 6.E. Stakeholder questionnaire used for evaluation 
• nc1 se 
NATIONAL CENTRE FOR IMMUNISATION 
RESEARCH & SURVEILLANCE 
Stakeholder feedback regarding intussusceptions 
surveillance following Australia's introduction of 
Rotarix and RotaTeq vaccines 
Please respond to the following questions and return as an attachment to Alexis 
Pillsbury at alex is.p illsbury@health.nsw.gov.au by Friday, 6 September 
2013. Alternative ly, you can fax th e questionnaire to 02 9845 1418 or mail to 
Alexis at NCIRS, Cnr Hawkesbury Road and Hainsworth St, Westmead, Locked Bag 
4001, Westmead NSW 2145. 
1. At the time the Rotarix and RotaTeq vaccines were licensed in Australia, was 
a surveillance system for monitoring intussusception (IS) associated with 
receipt of the vaccines put in place? 
0No 
Oves 
D Unsure 
► If yes, what were the objectives of the surveillance system? 
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What did the surveillance system consist of? 
Who was in charge of the surveillance system? 
► If there was no clear person or group in charge of the system, did this 
present challenges and if so what were they? 
2. If IS surveillance did occur, was it, in your opinion, successful? 
D Not at all successful 
D Of limited success 
D Very successful 
D Unsure 
► If you believe it was successful, what factors contributed to its 
success? What outcomes demonstrated its success? 
► If it was not successful, or if its success was limited, what do you 
think were its main limitations? 
3. What would be your recommendations for improving futu~e surveillance for 
adverse events following immunisation? 
4. Would you like to comment on any other aspect of Australia's rotavirus-15 
surveillance? Would you like to comment on any aspects of surveillance for 
adverse events following immunisation more broadly? 
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Appendix 6.F. Presentation delivered at the 7th Bi-regional 
TEPHINET Scientific Conference, Danang, Vietnam, November 
2013* 
.... Australian 
~ ' Natiol'\al 
-c::::- UM'l!fsity ncirs• _.,_,.,.~~ 
Re•thinking traditional adverse event following 
immunisation (AEFI) surveillance: 
Australia'ssuccesdul experlenceof lnlUssuscepllon (IS)sul'\leillance 
lollowinglhe 2007 in t roduc1ionof rou ,.,,;ru s vaccinu 
Alexis Pillsbury 
Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidem iology) Scholar 
Austra lian National University (ANU) 
National Centre for Immunisation Research & Surveillance 
(NCIRS) 
lntussusception 
,P,eceofsmallorlMgem1es1,ne1elescopesin 
on,11ell 
r[arlyd,agnos,s&nori-surgicillreduction 
reducedmorbid,ty&mortahty 
, Mortahtyh,ghindevelop,ngcountries 
,,. H,gheit incidence rates in As,a Pacific 
o,rte,ent,al/lJdofrtPOrh~g 
R•g,onald,H•renc•s' 
► Underlying cause in infants unknown 
~  ~:~:- ncirs 
-,,~,,. U,werso l> -:',;".;:,=':, 
Link between IS & rotavirus? 
September 1998, US 
.... 
i llohShl•i.tl 1: =.=.. .;,:. -;;. 
July 1999 
W ITHDRAWN 
~ ; ~:: - ~ft~ 
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Objectives of presentation 
To provide b■ck1round inform■tion­
intunusception (IS) & rotavirus v,1ccincs 
To explain why Australia required novel IS surveill.ince which 
used muhiplc mechanism• 
To demonstrate 1hal Austra lian IS surveillance was successful 
• To ' "mmaclse lmon, lmn,d from A"st,aUa's e<peclen:~ 
-~✓ = .. ~!t~t~ 
Rotavirus 
,,. Commonestcauseof 
gastroen1en11~ children <S year~ 
,,. ~soo.OO0deathsannually 
, Vaccme-pre~ent.able 
►No known associat ion 
between JS & rotavirus Infection 
~ ~:;;-,~ ncirs 
·-= . u, ...... ~.-1) ,._,_~_-:,::..":"'-" 
Mid-2000s: 2 new rotavirus vaccines registered 
-· =E::- "'!;"'"' 
,,,.. Ne it her Rotor ix nor RotaTeq 
demonstrated increased IS risk 
,nclinical lr ia ls 
_$ Df3~: -~ ~ft~~ 
Australia funds both vaccines in Nat ional Immunisat ion Program 
5" 4 
/ •' ' . 
--.. \ 
• - liDll!!I 
--'· -mml!II,. 
-,; 
~ what capabi llUes existed to 
detectchanges in lS inc idence? 
~ How did IS survei llance evolve? 
* D:::':: _n~ir.~ 
Australian AEFI surveillance prior to rotavirus vaccines 
► Passive reporting ofAEFI for previous vaccines 
-The,apeuucGoodsAdmmistrat,on(TGA) 
,. 
•Under•~p,:,n;ng 
.. Cannot provide a measure of risk 
*- D:,:::: - D.S.Lr.~ 
APSU & PAEDS surveillance systems 
EDIE 
Gilli 
E5TA8L ISHED:1993 
ilS20071 
S?aed+.tn<ten,ary 
hosp;i.t, 
<ISye•" 
115,<NmM<hs) 
Rare, , ~ ·o,~re1.1..t 
child!'ioodttu>d,l>O"' 
~ ~f;;;l' ncirs 
~- r U "'°'~"'!) -~~-~;:,: 
Methods of evaluation 
> wao& rnCframewock> • 
► Describesystemasawhole 
► Assess individual components 
► Eva luatesucces~of system as a whole 
~ t:,':.'.r nc1rs 
, - - U ,..._~~ I\ ... ~-':';"-'?,:::,.":"',Z 
Need for specific IS surveillance 
;...Keyvaccineexperts identifiedsurveillanceneed 
,...- Vaccine program funding did notprovide forlSsurveil lance 
;... Informal system evolved -no overarching coordination or 
management 
;... Utilised 3 additional surveillance mechanisms: 
: ;:;~,::;;,: :~::a~~~!~::~li,:::,~~:;:;t~~c~ (PAEDS} ~rY<il anu <Yrtm 
~ Hosp1tali,at1ondata } Additionalmeduini<m 
.$~ D:~r .._!JS,~~ 
APSU & PAEDS surveillance systems 
Nalionalcovarage 
i 
Appropria<, pop,1,,00 •~•"d 
App~priatesetting la.~geted 
~ dentifiescasesmal-time 
Measure of risk possible 
y 
X 
✓ 
✓ 
X 
✓ 
X 
✓ 
✓ 
✓✓ 
✓ 
✓ 
~ t;c;;;;r ncirs 
':: - U •.-:,,rSh -~:,:::;::-,;:::-
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Additional : hospitalisation data 
,- State/temlory&nai,onalaggregateddata 
, All age,.pubhc&privateadm,rnons 
,, 1CD-<odong-d,aj!no~&procedure: 
'""'"" Tr Histor,cal I~ data 1 'f Lar~e numb~rs of c, ,e1 
I'::,~~n~\~;~c~~~~s~:;ds 
"""""' Val,d,tyofcod,ng 
;~;P~::ntgntary data ::~-
"""''""'""""' rt'\ . 
~(!T1 .. 
:~ r ~r~r .. ~n~k.~ 
APSU/PAEDS 
First international pyblication lo highlight temporal association 
between receipt of both vaccines and increased IS cases 
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PAEDS/Hospitalisation data 
Informed changes to product information and safety updates from 
TGA 
□ •fl __ =:=-.... ~····~ 
IS surveillance achievements , July 2007-May 2010 , 
children aged <2 years 
IS cases contribu1e to annual reporting of national numbers of AEFI 
Meehan "m c::,,:1::~,',,~!., ~~:"7i:::~~ ::c:t ~! Oulput~ 
-
'" 
-I D 1-=-D 
@. ~ :'.·.,;~ ncirs 
• - - U •_,~.,.h ••-!";'_:,:::.-~• 
PAEDS/Hospitalisation data 
First epidemiological s!udy,ntemationallypreseotingriskfollowir,g 
receipt of both vaccines in the same country 
0.6 e~cess IS cases per 10,000 vaccinated ch~dren 
~ . - I= -----·-.. - - -
Lessons learned from Australian IS surveillance 
• Australia 1" in world to detect 15 ri sk associated with new 
Surve ill ance using tailored m echanisms more effective than 
routine pass ive surve ill ance 
Hospitalisation data & active hospital-based surveillance 
beneficia l 
Identified key issues & methods for case detection of 
;.~•:::~~~"' m[,:•Nm,,;,, safes 1 _ [ ,::;~:•,, I 
[ introduction ] __,. wrveillanceplan j ~
-~ ~:~: -- !:!ft[~ 
Importance of improving AEFI surveillance 
,, Vaccine programs more estab lished in low• & midd le• inrnme 
counwes, vacdnenfetymonl!ori n&i ncreasingly importa nt 
everywhere 
, Vaccinesafetymonitonng aidsvaccine confi dence - importantfor 
ensuring vaccinessuyavailable & affo,dable 
, ISis ba dbutro til virusis worse -
Vaume safety monitorin8 helps ensure we can persist in fishl .igamsl 
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- v , .... . 1 ...... ::-.~:.:::..- - ! 
ncirse 
NATIONAL CENTRE FOR IMMUNISATION 
RESEARCH & SURVEILLANCE 
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EXPERIENCE 
Lessons from the Field 
and peer teaching 
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PREFACE 
Background and scope of the chapter 
In the spirit of learning by doing, a core requirement of the Master of Philosophy 
Applied Epidemiology (MAE) is teaching experience. This chapter includes materials 
which I created and taught in various teaching sessions. 
Part One of this chapter contains my Lessons from the Field session ('Money matters: a 
brief introduction to health economic evaluation and cost-effectiveness assessments in 
publicly funding vaccines in Australia') which I designed and taught to four MAE 
colleagues via teleconference. Part Two consists of materials for the Epi Info™ 7 
training session I taught along with four MAE colleagues at a workshop offered to 
Communicable Disease Control (CDC) Conference (Canberra, March 2013) attendees 
on the pre-Conference workshop day. Epi lnfo•M is a public domain software program 
created by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for global public 
health practitioners. 
Role and contribution 
I planned, developed and taught my Lessons from the Field session. In choosing the 
topic, I wanted to share with colleagues an area I had exposure to that they possibly 
did not. As all members of my cohort had clinical and/or scientific backgrounds, I opted 
to share a more social science oriented topic with them. My undergraduate studies 
included economics; I also studied health economic evaluation during my Master of 
International Public Health (MIPH). While by no means an expert in the area of 
economic evaluation, I was sufficiently confident to create and conduct a teaching 
session' on the basics, w ith the aim of introducing the broad concepts to my peers. 
Constructing the session around vaccine funding was an obvious choice given my field 
placement. The session was created based on content from the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance (NCIRS) and the US CDC. The Lesson appears 
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in this chapter and the answer gu ide is included in the append ices (Appendix 7.A). 
The Epi lnfo'M training session was planned, deve loped and taught in conjunction with 
my MAE co lleagues Dr Ranil Appuhamy, Ms Rowena Boyd, Ms May Chiew and Dr Ee 
Laine Tay. We had ten students register for th e workshop. Students were public health 
practitioners from a variety of workplaces and experience leve ls who were attend ing 
the CDC Conference. 
Roles varied in the session's planning and management, and each team member was 
responsible for creating and conducting a portion of th e teaching. Because th e 
workshop was taught as a step-by-step introduction to th e Epi lnfo'M 7 software, we all 
participated as roaming tutors assisting students when we were not specifi cally 
teaching. I was responsible for monitoring wo rkshop registrations and ensu ri ng 
registrants received th e necessa ry logist ical information. I crea t ed and taught the 
introductory session of the workshop, which is included in this chapter. Th e other 
secti ons are not included due to the length of the teaching material. However, t he 
schedu le for the workshop, th e evaluation of th e workshop (drafted by Dr Appuhamy) 
and its results are included as appendices (Appendix 7.B, 7.C and 7.D). 
Th e Epi lnfo'M 7 workshop was based on simi lar workshops designed by Ors St ephanie 
Davis and Kamal ini Lokugue of the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population 
Health (NCEPH) at the Australia n National Unive rsity (ANU). It also incorporated 
elements of the Epi lnfo'M 7 Quick Start Guide. 1 The dataset used in this sess ion was 
obtained from Epi lnfo'M 7 training materials available from the US CDC. 
Finally, as part of my teaching experience requ irements, I also assisted in teaching 
sessions of NCEPH's Outbreak Investigation course to 2013 MAE students and others 
enrolled in the course. Primarily this invo lved lead ing and fac ilitating small group 
sessions and providing roaming assistance to student s during computer-based 
sessions. 
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Lessons learned 
Teaching a workshop about the Epi lnfo'M software presented particular challenges. 
Questions asked by students were not easily predictable and on-the-fly 
troubleshooting in response to questions asked was difficult. Because issues existed 
with the software program running smoothly for all students on the day, the session 
was also a good experience in keeping calm and progressing a teaching session despite 
such problems. Moreover, teaching the session with four colleagues was a solid 
exercise in collaboration. 
Finally, both teaching experiences, as well as the additional experience of assisting 
with the Outbreak Investigation course sessions, were humble reminders that teachers 
may not know everything and that admitting that to students is acceptable. These 
teaching experiences also demonstrated that sometimes it is the teachers who learn 
from the students. 
Acknowledgements 
My Lessons from the Field session proved successful because of the participants : Ms 
Rowena Boyd, Ms May Chiew, Ms Tove Fitzgerald and Dr Ee Laine Tay. All put great 
effort into understanding the content and answering questions. I appreciate the time 
they spent and the positive feedback they offered. 
The Epi lnfo'M 7 training session was a group effort and I appreciate the work my peers 
did for this workshop. Additionally, Drs Stephanie Davis and Martyn Kirk provided 
guidance and feedback. Like my Lessons from the Field session, this workshop would 
not have been successful without the efforts of the participating students. Moreover, 
it would not have been possible without the CDC Conference allowing us to conduct a 
Pre-Conference workshop, their organisers assisting us with logistics, and ANU 
providing a location for the workshop. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr Stephanie 
Davis for allowing me as part of this MAE requirement to assist in several sessions of 
her Outbreak Investigation course. 
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Finally, I would like to acknowledge that the materials used in these various teaching 
sessions incorporated elements from exist ing materia ls. Specifically, I incorporated 
elements of the US CDC's series on economic evaluation; NCIRS's Vaccines in Public 
Health workshop; the US CDC's Epi lnfo'M 7 training materials and Quick Start guide; 
Epi lnfo'M 7 traini ng materials created by Harold Collins of the US CDC which appear in 
the Epi lnfo'M Community of Users in phConnect2; and Ors Davis and Lokugue's 
(NCEPH) Epi lnfo'M 7 training workshops. 
320 
ABBREVIATIONS 
7vPCV 
ACPM 
ANU 
ATAGI 
CA 
CBA 
CDC 
CDC 
CEA 
CER 
CUA 
DALY 
DOB 
IPD 
MAE 
MCCV 
MIPH 
NCEPH 
NIP 
7-valent Pneumococcal Conjugate Vaccine 
Advisory Committee on Prescription Medicine 
The Australian National University 
Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation 
Cost Analysis 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Communicable Disease Control (Conference) 
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (US) 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Cost-Effectiveness Ratio 
Cost-Utility Analysis 
Disability Adjusted Life Year 
Date of Birth 
Invasive Pneumococcal Disease 
Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology 
Meningococcal C Vaccine 
Master of International Public Health 
National Centre for Epidemiology & Population Health 
National Immunisation Program 
321 
PBAC 
PBS 
QALY 
STEC 
TGA 
WHO 
322 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Adv isory Committee 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
Quality Ad justed Life Year 
Shiga-Toxin Producing E. Coli 
Therapeutic Goods Administration 
World Health Organization 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 7.1. Pros and cons of economic eva luation study formats ....... ......... .... ....... ... ... 337 
Table 7.2. Costs included in each type of economic eva luation .......................... .... .... 338 
Table 7.3 . Summary measures used for each type of economic eva luation ................ 339 
Table 7.4. Estimated program costs of 7vPCV ............................................................. 340 
Table 7.5. Treatment costs associated with implement ing the 7vPCV program ......... 342 
Table 7.6. Pneumococcal disease incidence and mortality rates ................................. 344 
Table 7.7. Estimated costs and outcomes associated with implementing the MCCV 
program 
323 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 7.1. Overview of how a new vaccine becomes funded in Aust ralia ................. 330 
324 
PART ONE 
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 
325 
\.D 
N
 
er, 
Lessons from the Field 
Money Matters: 
A brief introduction to health economic evaluation and 
cost-effectiveness assessments in p~blicly funding 
vaccines in Australia 
Alexis Pillsbury 
Master of Philosophy Applied Epidemiology (MAE) Scholar 
Australian National University (ANU) & 
National Centre for Immunisation Research & Surveillance (NCIRS) 
13 May 2013 
327 
Th e learning objectives for this Lesson From the Field are: 
• To introduce the various types of health economic evaluation; 
• To learn how to frame a basic hea lth economic evaluation; 
• To learn how to app roach costing inputs and outcomes for an evaluation; 
• To learn how to select and calculate an appropriate summary analysis for 
an eva luation; 
• To understand the various compon ents considered by the Australian 
Government when deciding whether to publicly fund a vaccine; 
• To give a brief overview of th e process by wh ich Australia adds a new 
vaccine to its vaccination schedule. 
Part 1: Case Study Introduction 
It is May 2002 and you have recent ly completed you r Master of Applied Epid emiology 
(MAE) studies and been employed as a research epid emiologist assisting a very 
important infectious disease professor. Th e important professo r is one of th e primary 
advisors for the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisat ion (ATAGI). ATAGI 
provides advice to the Minister of Health regarding Austra lia's National Immunisation 
Program (NIP). 3 
On your first day on the job, your boss asks you to conduct a brief economic analysis 
considering the costs of publicly funding the newly developed and licensed 7-va lent 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (7vPCV) in to the ch ildhood National Immunisation 
Program. The proposed vaccination program would consist of t hree doses given at 2, 4 
and 6 months to t he approximate 250,000 <1 year olds in Australia. Since 2001 a 
program has been funded for all Indigenous and high-risk infants. 
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Your boss apologises as he knows that this is not your area of expertise but says that 
this would be helpful to him. He then leaves you alone to figure out what to do. 
You guess that ATAGI has probably been asked to provide its official recommendation 
as to whether or not to fund this vaccine. You're not sure why you have been 
requested to conduct an economic analysis as you know that the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) will be required to conduct a formal economic 
analysis in order to provide its recommendation to the Government. In fact, you know 
that Australia was the first country to mandate that economic analysis be conducted 
for all prospective vaccines and drugs. 
This flow chart demonstrates how the various official bodies contribute to the 
determination of whether a vaccine comes to be publicly funded in Australia: 
329 
Figure 7.1. Overview of how a new vaccine becomes funded in Australia' 
1 ATAGI Scoping Phase 
I 
• HONon sca1nh; 
• tntcract.,on with Com;>an os 
· t,tcrac-tion w,th Paa 
• P1¢-PMC Sc()tl1i$$:on Advice 
(lo b0t11 PBAC and Com:>Jny) 
~ 
PBAC Phase 
• Coml)Jny svbm:so!oo lo PBAC 
• Economic Su1>-eomm,1tco (ESC) 
• Fur\hcr 'l)<!ci(,c ocMoo 1tom ATAGI 
l · PBAC rccom~ 10 Mtliswr 
'C 
Minister decision 
~
National 
Immunisation 
Program (NIP) or 
PBS applications 
for vaccines 
New Vaccine Funded 
I Post-PBAC Phoso 
' • PB?A cv3'u31ioo 
.,,,..,._,..,...,;,.. •Func: ngoo:c:mna:.cn 
' 1 • Vacono supply 
I 
TGA: Therapeutic Goods Adminis t ration; ACPM: Advi sory Committee on Prescription Medicines ; PBS: 
Pharmaceut ical Benefits Scheme 
As you cannot argue with your new boss on your first day of work, you decide you'd 
better learn about health economic evaluations and attempt to deliver him a basic 
analysis. 
First, you find a copy of Invasive pneumococcal disease in Australia, 20024 on your 
desk and read: 
"Infection with Streptococcus pneumoniae is responsible for significant morbidity and 
mortality worldwide, especially in the very young, the elderly and those with 
predisposing risk factors . It is a leading cause of otitis media, pneumonia, bacteraemia, 
meningitis and a less frequent cause of other conditions including septic arthritis and 
mastoiditis. Invasive pneumococcal disease {/PD} is defined as a clinical condition in 
which S. pneumonia e infects a normally sterile site, e.g. blood, cerebrospinal fluid or 
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pleural fluid. /PD presents most commonly as pneumonia in adults ond bacteraemia in 
children. The risk of disease is highest among people who are immunocompromised or 
have a chronic illness. In developed countries, the incidence rate of /PD is bimodal, with 
a peak in children under 2 years and another peak in adults over 65 years." 
Part 2: Economic Evaluation Basics5 
Economic evaluation is an effort to understand the costs associated with both the 
inputs (resources) required for a health program/intervention and the outputs 
(changes in health outcomes) resulting from them. Economic evaluation is a critical 
component for deciding between two or more alternative health 
p rogra ms/interventions. 
Conducting a health economic evaluation is, however, not all about adding and 
subtracting dollars. The exercise requires input from many disciplines, including 
biology and epidemiology as well as a thorough understanding of the political and 
social context within which your program/intervention is be_ing proposed and will 
function. 
There are 4 types of economic evaluation : 
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Cost Ana lysis : 
Cost analysis (CA) considers the net costs (in dolla r terms) of a program/intervention. It 
is not concerned with costing the outcomes of the program/intervention because the 
outcomes are either unavailable or they are equa lly effect ive between the 
program/i ntervention alternatives . A CA often su ppl ements other economic 
eva luations. 
Costs 
Cost-Effective Analysis: 
Cost-effective ana lys is (CEA) compares the costs of alternat ive programs/interventions 
that wi ll result in a common health effect wh ich is expressed in natural health units 
(e .g., a case of disease prevented) ra ther than in monet ary units. A CEA uses a cost per 
unit of hea lth outcome as its summary measure. 
Costs 
Health Outcomes 
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Cost-Utility Analysis: 
Cost-utility analysis {CUA) is a type of CEA that considers the utility (or a person's 
preference for a health outcome) associated with different health outcomes. 
Outcomes are measured in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted life 
years (DALYs). 6 Cost-utility analysis uses the dollar value per QALY or DALY saved as its 
summary measure . 
Quality-Adjusted 
Health Outcomes 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) standardises both costs and benefits in dollars and includes 
all costs and benefits accrued in a time period. CBA uses a single dollar value as its 
summary measure. 
I Benefits I 
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Deciding which type of economic analysis to employ typically depends on whether 
outcomes need to be assessed and what level of information the decision-makers 
desire. 
Question 1: Which type of economic evaluation do you think would be the most 
appropriate for deciding whether to fund the 7vPCV vaccine and why? (2 minutes) 
Part 3: Framing the Analysis7 
For an economic evaluation, you will, in the end, have systematically assessed the total 
costs of a program against the total health outcomes of the program and compared 
that to costs associated with existing alternative programs. To set yourself up for that 
final summary measure, however, you need to approach the evaluation like any 
academic exercise and consider it as a study which you will conduct. Framing is the 
first step in an economic analysis study and it requires you to outline what you need to 
know for your evaluation and how you are going to find that information. It should 
include: 
• Study problem 
• Problem importance 
• Characteristics of the intervention(s) 
• Audience 
• Study perspective 
• Study timeframe 
• Study analytic horizon 
• Study format 
• Costs 
• Outcome measures 
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Question 2: What is the study problem? (I.e., what is the question you are trying to 
answer?) (2 minutes) 
Question 3: Why is this problem important? What aspects of the problem do you 
need to understand in order to grasp its importance in light of the Government's 
decision on whether or not to fund the vaccine program? (5 minutes) 
All relevant intervent ions should be included for comparison in an economic 
evaluation. The baseline comparator is typically the existing program and should be 
included as an option. The baseline may also be 'no program'. Having the baseline 
included may help decision-makers understand th e incremental costs of implementing 
a new program. 
Question 4: What is/are the alternative intervention(s)? What characteristics of the 
alternatives would be useful for you to understand in order make a comparison with 
the proposed program? (5 minutes) 
Question 5: Who is the audience for this study? (I.e., who is interested in or will use 
the results?) (2 minutes) 
The perspective from which you are considering and conducting your evaluation will 
help determine wh ich costs to consider. A study's perspective may be the provider 
perspe<:tive, the patient perspective, the societal perspective, etc. 
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Question 6: What is the study perspective? (I.e., from whose viewpoint is the study 
being conducted?) (2 minutes) 
Question 7: What would be a realistic timeframe for the study? (I.e., what is the 
period of time during which the program/intervention will be implemented?) (2 
minutes) 
Question 8: What is the study's analytic horizon? (I.e., what is the entire period 
during which costs and benefits related to the impact of the program/intervention 
will be measured?) (2 minutes) 
Study formats outline the ways you will collect your data and conduct analyses for the 
economic evaluation. Options include: 
• Prospective study 
• Retrospective study 
• Model 
A prospective study collects outcome and cost data after the study begins. A 
retrospective study reviews costs and outcomes that have already been incurred. 
Modelling can be used to create a representation of what you think will happen when 
you implement the program/intervention . 
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Table 7.1. Pros and cons of economic evaluation study formats• 
Pros Cons 
Prospective study More control over data Time- and resource-
qua lity intensive; possibility for 
observer bias 
Retrospective study Time-saving Less control over quantity 
and quality of data 
Modelling Less reliance on direct Validity of underlying 
data; more flexible assumptions questionable 
Question 9: What do you think would be the most appropriate/realistic study format 
to use for this evaluation? {I.e., how will you assess the program/intervention?) (2 
minutes) 
The costs in an economic eva luation can be both tangible and intangible. Tangib le 
costs include direct medical costs (hospitalisation costs, pharmaceutical costs, medical 
supplies, etc), direct nonmedical costs (program administration, patient travel costs, 
etc) and productivity losses (time used by patient or caregiver accessing healthcare, 
wages lost because of accessing healthcare, etc) . Intangible costs are emotional ones 
and are typically not included in an economic eva luat ion because th ey are difficult to 
quantify. 
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Table 7.2. Costs included in each type of economic evaluation• 
Direct medical Direct nonmedical Productivity Intangible 
costs costs losses costs 
CBA X X X X 
CUA X X 
CEA X X X 
Question 10: What costs do you think should be included in the analysis? Include 
both the type of cost and some specific examples. (5 minutes) 
An outcome measure is a unit used to assess th e output of the program/interven tion. 
Outcomes can be measured in monetary units (CBA), quality-adjusted health outcomes 
(CUA), or natural units (CEA). Choosing w hich outcome measure depends on w hat is 
most approp riate for th e study and what data are available. 
An outcome measure may be an intermed iate outcome or a final outcome. An 
intermediate outcome is the short/ nea r-term effect of the program/intervention and a 
final outcome measure is the ultimate or long-term health outcome of interest. Often 
int ermed iate outcom es are more reali sti c to measure because th e final outcome data 
are not available. 
Question 11: What would be the intermediate and final outcome measures in your 
evaluation? (3 minutes) 
The fin al summ ary measure of your eva luation depends on th e type of eva luation 
conducted and the specific outcome you are report ing on. 
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Table 7.3. Summary measures used for each type of economic evaluation6 
Economic evaluation Summary measure 
CBA Net benefits 
(benefits - costs) 
CUA Cost-utility ratio 
(net costs/QALY) 
CEA Cost-effectiveness ratio 
(net costs/cases prevented) 
Question 12: What will be the final summary measure in this evaluation? (2 minutes) 
Part 4: Assessing Costs and Outcomes8' 9 
Once you have the framing structure for your analysis, the next step is assessing costs 
and outcomes. For a CEA, all tangible costs are included. The net cost is the cost of the 
program/intervention minus the cost of disease averted and the cost of productivity 
losses averted. 
Net cost= 
Program cost - Cost of disease averted - Cost of productivity losses averted 
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Essentially, you are subtracti ng the overa ll savings from the tota l cost of the program. 
The cost of disease averted and cost of productivity losses averted are su btracted 
because they are savings. If you excluded them from the equation, you'd be 
overestimating th e costs. 
If you are considering th e eva luation from a societal perspective, then you will 
incorporate productivity losses averted. If, however, you are em ploying a hea lth ca re 
syst em or provider perspective, you might not include productivity losses. 
Your boss has left you this information provided by consultants who were hired to 
estimate th e costs relevant for this vaccine: 
Table 7.4. Estimated program costs of 7vPCV9·' 0 
Vaccine cost per dose 
Administration fee per dose 
Number of doses required 
Population of children <1 year of age 
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$90.00 
$5.00 
3 
250,000 
Question 13: What are the anticipated program costs based on the estimations in the 
table above? (2 minutes) 
Cost of vaccination: 
Total vaccination cost (for each child x 3 doses)= 
Total administration cost (for each child x 3 doses)= 
You have now estimated the total program costs. In Question 10 you listed medical 
and nonmedical costs associated with the vaccinat ion program as well as productivity 
losses. You now need to measure and value these costs. 
If you were actually conducting a thorough cost-effectiveness analysis, you would 
systematically identify each cost one-by-one and then provide a measurement of each 
cost and a va luation of each cost. 
For example, if you were evaluating a program which aimed to conduct neighbourhood 
fogging/anti-mosquito spraying in Vietnam, you would identify as a cost th e yearly 
wage for the program duration for the X number of local ·staff. You wou ld then 
measure that cost by consulting with appropriate experts to determine the number of 
staff needed (prospective study) or ultimately by the number of contracts signed 
(retrospective study). To value this cost, you could consult local experts as to the 
standard salary for th is type of program worker, or you could consult the World Health 
Organization (WHO) wh ich provides data outlining the average yearly wage (and other 
key statistics) for skilled workers and goods per region .1° For a retrospect ive study, you 
could consult the project accounting records and tim esheets. 
You should note that all costs are typically discounted 3% annually. 
Lucky for you, the consultants have also done a summary of the treatment costs 
associated with all pneumococcal disease states and sequelae. 
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Table 7.5. Treatment costs associated with implementing the 7vPCV program 9 
Total treatment costs - $144.2 million 
with no vaccination program 
Total treatment costs - $127.3 million 
with vaccination program 
You decide for simp licity sake to ignore non-medical costs and productivity losses for 
the time being because the consultants did not include that information. More 
importantly, because you are primarily concerned with conducting the eva luation from 
the Government's (or funder's) perspective you can skip including th e costs of 
produ ctivity losses. 
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Question 14: What is the net cost of implementing this program? (3 minutes) 
Total program costs (from Question 13) = 
Total treatment costs - no vaccination program= 
Total treatment costs - with vaccination program= 
Difference in treatment costs between no vaccination and implementing the 
vaccination program= 
Total costs of implementing this vaccination program= 
Net cost= Program costs - disease costs averted*= 
(*Averted costs are those which are not incurred as a result of the program being 
implemented.) 
In order to determine your final summary measure, you need a measure of natural 
health units in order to derive the cost-effectiveness ratio (net costs/cases averted). 
Lucky once more, you also have information on the baseline rate of disease with no 
vaccination program and the anticipated reduction in disease associated with program 
implementation: 
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Table 7.6. Pneumococcal disease incidence and mortality rates10 
Baseline disease with no vaccination 
program 
Anticipated number of cases with 
vaccination program implemented 
Difference 
Baseline deaths with no vaccination 
program 
Anticipated number of deaths with 
vaccination program implemented 
Difference 
588 cases pneumococcal disease (not 
including pneumonia and otitis media) 
36 cases 
552 cases 
36.6 deaths 
24.2 deaths 
12.4 deaths 
So you know that the vaccination program wou ld reduce the burden of disease to 36 
cases and 24.2 deaths annually. 
Question 15: How many health outcomes would be prevented by the vaccination 
program? (2 minutes) 
You now need to ca lculate the cost-effectiveness ratio (CER) to summarise your results 
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as a cost per unit of health outcome. 
Cost-effectiveness ratio= net cost/ total health outcomes prevented 
Question 16: Calculate the CER in terms of cost per case of disease prevented and 
cost per death averted. Interpret these results - what do they mean? (5 minutes) 
Question 17: Is this an expensive vaccine program? What is your instinctive opinion 
(and basic recommendation to your boss) on whether it is cost-effective or not? (5 
minutes) 
You summarise your evaluation framework and include your rough calculations from 
Question 16 for your boss. 
You decide that you ought to mention that there are limitations to your results. 
Specifically, you are aware that while a cost-effectiveness eva(uation gives you some 
figures to work with, a Decision Analysis would take into account the uncertainty in 
events and outcomes and provide a more detailed consideration of alternatives and 
probabilities. 
Though you don't have time to conduct a proper Decision Analysis, you decide that it 
would be useful to highlight some sensitivity analyses which could be employed to test 
a range of probabilities and outcomes. 7 You are very aware that, for example, the cost 
of vaccine administration may vary so you list what you believe cou ld be the high and 
low range of possible values for this cost and re-calculate the program costs 
accordingly. 
Question 18: What other parameters should be subjected to sensitivity analyses? (3 
minutes) 
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Your boss thanks you for your effort and tells you this is a great help to him to have a 
better fee l for the cost component of the 7vPCV program. 
He then tells you that ATAGI is also considering fund ing the meningococcal C vaccine 
(MCCV) for infants <12 months of age (1 dose) but that there is only enough money to 
fund one of the vaccines . He provides you with the following information regarding the 
MCCV vaccine: 
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Table 7.7. Estimated costs and outcomes associated with implementing the MCCV program'" 
Net cost of MCCV program $9.6 million 
(Net cost= $10 million program cost -
$400,000 treatment costs) 
Anticipated decrease in meningococcal 130 
cases annually under vaccination 
program 
Anticipated decrease in meningococcal 13 
deaths annually under vaccination 
program 
Cost per case of disease averted under 
MCCV vaccination program annually 
Cost per death averted under MCCV 
vaccination program annually 
$73,846 
$738,462 
Question 19: Roughly, how does this compare with what you worked out for the 
cost-effectiveness of the 7vPCV program? What would your recommendations to 
your boss be in terms of which vaccine to fund? What types of information would 
help you to better make your recommendation? (8 minutes) 
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Not long after you provide your recommendation to your boss, you notice several 
items in the media rega rding pneumococca l and men ingococca l diseases: 
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FOUR more people have 
died from suspected me-
ningococcal disease, iaking 
the NSW toll Lo 12. 
In this special investigation, 
The Ds.ily Telegraph bas un• 
covered hoy,.• this is shaping as 
one of the deadliest. years on 
record. with the virus striking 
young and old alike. 
Last week, mother-of-th:ree 
Jodi Lord was rushed to hospital 
complaining of severe head-
aches - hours later she W.:LS 
dead. \Vhile the coroner is still 
investigating the otficial C-3.Use 
,, - '~>-· 
of Mrs Lord's death, traces of 
meningococcal disease were 
found in her system. 
And yesterday it was also re-
vealed a 33-year-old female city 
gym employee died on Monday in 
St Vineent's Hospital. 
Australian Medical Assoc-
iation NSW president, Dr 
Choon.g-Sicw Yong, said the 
scariest thing about the illness 
'o\'as not knowing what to do 
a.bout it. 
"Scientists don't. fully under-
stand why sometimes you get 
these outbreaks and other times 
people don 't seem t.o be affected 
by it," he said. 
"When you get an infection, 
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things 
happen.Jrery 
i 
quickly and you 
can get severe com-
plications that result 
in sudden deat.h." 
Other connrmed 
victims are 10-year-
old John Pio, of 
Dharruk in Syd-
ney's west, and 
55-year•old Colin Shearer, of J es-
mond, in Newcastle, One in 
eight people who have contrac• 
ted meningococcal this year 
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The very words "meningococcal disease" prompt fear. 
The first sign of a symptom causes panic. It's a 
terrifying disease that can maim and kill in hours, 
Babies and young adu lts are most at risk and right 
now is th e peak danger· period. To make matters 
worse, there is no cure and no one vaccine that covers 
all the various strains of meningococcal bacteria. Now, 
survivors and the relatives of victims are demanding 
immediate Federal Government action. 
In this emotion-charged .-eport, Tara Brown goes to 
New Zealand, whe.-e the Government has bitten the 
bullet and committed $ZOO million to the fight agains t 
meningococcal disease. 
Back home, she confronts the Federal Health Minister 
Kay Patterson, who says the Government is studying 
the problem but can't commit any funds just yet. That 
prompts the questio n - what price a life? 
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Five-month-old Brandan Rudnick whose brother, Nathan died from 
pneumococcal disease in 1999 poses with dolls representing the [more than] 
2000 children affected annually by the disease Photo: Andrew Taylor Source: 
The Age 
Question 20: From a decision-maker/policy perspective, how do these media 
portrayals influence the debate over which vaccination program to fund? After 
seeing these articles, what other factors would you include in your list of criteria 
which influence whether or not a vaccine is publicly funded? Would you change 
your basic recommendation to your boss based on any of this information you 
have just considered? (5 minutes) 
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Conclusion: 
While implementing a vaccination or similar program may involve more than just 
health and epidemiological considerations, it also goes beyond the 'money matters' 
which were the focus of this Lessons from the Field. At the end of the day, that 
political and social contexts within which a program is being considered are crucia l 
to the final decision especially when Governments have ample health budgets with 
which to work. 
Consequently, both vaccination programs were funded: 
• In 2003, the MCCV was funded for all children at 12 months plus a catch up 
program for all who were born after 1984 (i.e., 119 year olds) . 
• In 2005, the 7vPCV was funded for all infants (2, 4, 6 months). 
Other resources: 
• World Health Organization (WHO). Making choices in health: WHO guide to 
cost-effectiveness analysis 2003 [cited 2013 April 20]: Available from: 
http://www.wh o.i nt / choice/publications / p 2003 general ised cea.pdf. 
• Owens D. Interpretation of cost-effectiveness analysis. J Gen Intern Med. 
1998;13(10):716-7. 
• Scuffham P, Lowin A, Burgess M. The cost-effectiveness of varicella vacc ine 
programs for Australia . Vaccine. 1999;18(5-6):407-15. 
• Ray G. Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine: review of cost-effectiveness studies 
in Australia, North America and Europe. Expert Rev Pharmacoeconomics 
Outcomes Res. 2008. 2013 April 20;8(4):373-93. 
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PART TWO 
EPI INFO™ 7 TRAINING SESSION 
WORKSHOP 
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Introduction to Epi Info™ 7 Training Session 
Instructor Guide 
This session was created based on a workshop designed by Stephanie Davis in May 
2012. It is adapted from the Epi lnfo'M 7 Quick Start Guide and based on a session 
originally designed by Dr Kamalini Lokugue. 
The dataset used in this session has been obtained from Epi lnfo'M 7 training 
material available from the US CDC. 
Learning objectives: 
• Describe the major uses of Epi lnfo'M 7 
• Use Epi lnfo'M 7 to: 
o Develop questionnaires, enter data and create cluster maps 
o Transfer data into and out from Epi lnfo•M 7 
o Perform basic analysis using the Visual Dashboard Tool for 
descriptive statistics, recoding of variables, creating graphs and 
2x2 tables to calculate measures of association 
o List the advantages and disadvantages of analysing data in the 
Epi lnfo'M 7 Classic Analysis Tool versus the Visual Dashboard 
Tool 
o Understand the range of statistical tests offered by StatCalc 
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TOPIC 1: Welcome to the Introduction to Epi Info™ 7 Training Session 
(10 minutes) 
Welcom e students to the session. Introduce the instructors and get students to 
briefly introduce themselves, including their background, why they are attending 
this session and what they hope to get out of it. Any logistical information required 
by students to be included in this Topic. 
TOPIC 2: Introduction to the Training Session and Epi Info™ 7 (1015 
minutes) 
The instructor will give a Powerpoint presentation providing: 
• An overview of the learning and course objectives for this session; 
• The format for the session; 
• An overview of Epi lnfo'M 7 and its uses and capabilities. 
After Powerpoint presentation, instructor to launch Epi Info and ensure all students 
have successfully done so. 
To launch Epi lnfo'M 7: 
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• Double click the Epi Info icon on your desktop. 
• Click on the Launch Epi Info button. This should bring up the main menu 
screen for Epi Info. 
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TOPIC 3: Questionnaire development and mapping 
Instructor to introduce case study for the questionnaire and mapping section. 
Case study 
You are a newly employed epidemiologist at the Bavarian state health department 
in Munich, Germany. You are contacted by a local hospital on Wednesday, July 18 
and informed that there have been multiple reported cases of Shiga-toxin 
producing f. coli (STEC). After preliminary interviews with several known cases, you 
discover that all cases are members of Germany's David Hasselhoff Fan Club who 
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had attended a special concert and barbeque event on the evening of Saturday, July 
14. 
It quickly becomes apparent that this outbreak has been extensive, with 359 
reported cases from states all over Germany, all of whom had attended the specia l 
concert and barbeque event. 
Because you work in Munich where the concert and barbeque event was held, you 
are put in charge of the outbreak investigation. To identify the source of infection, 
you decide to start your investigation by creating a Food Questionnaire to use to 
interview al l known cases. You will create you r questionnaire in Epi lnfom 7 with the 
following information: 
• Case ID 
• Demographic details 
o First name 
o Last name 
o Date of birth 
o Age 
o Sex 
o Address 
• Clinical details: 
o Date of onset of symptoms 
o Headache (yes/no) 
o Fever (yes/no) 
o Bloody diarrhoea (yes/no) 
• Food history 210 days before onset of symptoms: 
o Sour cream 
o Beansprouts 
o Beef jerky 
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INTRODUCTION TO EPI INFO™ 7 PRESENTATION 
~-=" 
Introduction to Epi Info"' 7 
Topics 1 & 2: Welcome and Introduction 
-~--®,~ 
19Mard12013 
CDC CO!'lfere.rice 
Learning objectives of this course 
• To provide an introduction to Epi Info™ 7 and its 
capabilities in the management, manipulation, 
display & ana lysis of data 
To provide an overview of and expe rience with 
Epi Info™ 7's most commonly used functions: 
• Elecuoruc fotm creat,Ot\ & data ~ntl)' 
• Mapping andvisuai,s,mon 
• 6as,c 51a!1$\1cal analysis & dala management 
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Course agenda 
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overv1ew 
Questionnaire & mapping 
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Data analysis usmg Visual Dashboard 
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StatCalc 
Surrmary & condusmn 
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Topic 2 Outline 
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Course agenda 
Explanation of course materials & instruction 
methods 
• Quick overview of Epi Info™ 7 
• Downloading & insta lling Epi In fo TM 7 
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Quick overview of Epi Info'" 7 
Public domain suite of software tools designed 
fo r globa l community of public health 
practitioners by the US CDC 
Free to download, use & distribute 
Fea tures include: 
- Rap1delectromcformcrea1ion & data entry 
- S1a11s11calanalysis 
- Mapp,ng&~isual1sal1on 
~E 
Create Forms 
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... ...,,,., 
Maps 
~ · 
$55; 
StatCalc 
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Epi lnfon,• 7 main menu 
Create Forms 
Enter Data 
• Analyse Data 
Create Maps 
• StatCalc 
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Visual Dashboard 
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Downloading and installing Ep1 Info rn 7 
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Appendix 7.A. Answer guide for Lessons from the Field 
Question 1 
Which type of economic evaluation do you think would be the most appropriate 
for deciding whether to fund the 7vPCV vaccine and why? 
Good student answer 
❖ Cost effectiveness analysis 
• The analysis needs to incorporate the measure of health outcomes, which 
can be a single dimensional measure such as incidence, death, 
hospitalisations etc. 
• CA therefore is not appropriate. So is CBA as measuring health outcomes 
in monetary terms in this context will be problematic. 
• CUA can be considered to take into account of QALY/DALY but this 
usually done when QOL is the important outcome, for e.g. chronic 
diseases 
❖ In public health we try to do the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. The purpose of a vaccine is to prevent or modify disease. The Cost-
Effective evaluation is the most appropriate as it compares the cost of the 
intervention to the potential health gains, usually in cases prevented. 
Other points to consider 
► You could argue for more than one choice (though not for a basic cost 
analysis). 
► Think about w hat kind of information we want and who wants it - what is 
the decision level? E.g, a high ranking government official is only going to 
care about the bottom line in dollars and not about quality of life 
interpretations for individuals affected by funding a program/intervention. 
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► A cost-effectiveness analysis would allow you to calculate a cost in $ value 
per health outcome ach ieved which is a useful measure for a body like 
ATAGI to consider. It is easier to absorb than a summary measure from a 
cost-ut ility ana lysis but provides more detail than the single dollar va lue 
determined from the summary measure in a cost-benefit ana lysis. 
Question 2 
What is the study problem? (I.e., what question are you trying to answer?) 
Good student answer 
❖ Should 7vPCV be universally funded for infants< 12 months of age? 
Other points to consider 
► A more thorough economic evaluation question would be: what are the 
incremental costs as measured in t erms of IPD disease and deaths averted of 
implementing a new universal infa nt pneumococcal vacc inat ion program? 
Question 3 
Why is this problem important? What aspects of the problem do you need to 
understand in order to grasp its importance in light of the Government's decision 
on whether or not to fund the vaccine program? 
Good student answer 
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❖ ... consideration needs to made as to where this money con be used most 
effectively to improve population health as well as take into account other 
considerations such as public interest and if there are other 
in terventions/programs that will achieve similar outcomes. 
❖ The problem is important as it can cause severe disability and even death 
and affects the most vulnerable individuals ... We need understand the burden 
of disease and consider the economic impact of the disease on society ... 
❖ -Level of preventability 
-The costs of disease to society as a whole and also the cost of inaction. 
Other important aspects that need to be considered include access to the 
vaccine, the cost of the vaccine, the cost of administering the vaccine and the 
efficacy of the vaccine. It's also important to understand that the lvPCV has 
been demonstrated to have a population effect, so by vaccinating the <2yrs, 
thereby doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
Othe r poin t s t o consider 
► How much will t his program cost and where is tha t money coming from? 
► Wi ll any programs be cut t o f und thi s program and if so what? 
► Will we require any catch up campaigns or wi ll any other age groups require 
vaccina t ion? How much would these programs cost? . 
► Are t here any adverse events associated with t he vaccine? 
► How many doses does this vaccine require? What would be t he t iming 
associa t ed with the doses? 
► What is the est imated herd immunity associated with this vaccina tion and 
cou ld that impact its costs over time? 
Question 4 
What is/are the alternative intervention(s}? What characteristics of the 
alternatives would be useful for you to understand in order make a comparison 
with the proposed program? 
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Good student answer 
❖ The alternatives are to maintain status quo and continue ta fund only for 
Indigenous and high-risk infants, consider other primary prevention 
strategies addressing the risk factors for /PD, or focus efforts of secondary or 
tertiary level prevention. We need to compare the effectiveness of these 
alternatives, their scope of effect (i.e. individual or population), and 
feasibility . 
❖ The alternative intervention is treating cases as they occur. To compare this 
to a vaccination, it's useful to know hospital admission costs associated with 
the disease as well as the costs of medication, administration costs 
associated with hospital admission and productivity losses associated with 
carers lost wages. It's also important to understand that death is not 
reversible and the illness can result in disability that is life-long. It would be 
useful to know what the cost associated with disability is over the life-span of 
a person. 
Other points to consider 
► Basically, we are comparing implementing this new vaccine program against 
no program because there hasn't been a universal program. We therefore 
need to understand the costs associated with doing nothing as compared 
with implementing this program. 
► Considering programs targeting subgroups (like the one targeting Indigenous 
and high-risk infants) or other non-vaccination based programs could also be 
appropriate. {These haven't been factored into this session, however.) 
Question 5 
Who is the audience for this study? {I.e., who is interested in or will use the 
results?) 
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Good student answer 
❖ -Policy makers & those financing the system - government 
-Drug companies supplying vaccine (cha ching!) 
❖ -Key decision makers at both federal and state departments . This includes 
A TAG/, PBAC, NC/RS 
Other points to consider 
► Your audience is really only those who will use the results of your study to 
make decisions. Therefore, your primary audience will be the Government 
who need to decide whether or not to fund this vaccination program. ATAGI 
may also be interested (and maybe PBAC though they would do their own 
proper analysis) . 
► You could argue that healthcare providers and the public would have an 
interest in the results but they wouldn't be your main audience. 
Question 6 
What is the study perspective? (I.e., from whose viewpoint is the study being 
conducted?) 
Good student answer 
❖ The provider perspective as we are looking at the costs of the program which 
will be funded by the government if it is approved. 
Other points to consider 
► The perspective is the viewpoint from which the study is being conducted . It 
takes into account those who pay for the program costs and are affected by 
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the outcomes. Determining this helps determine which costs and outcomes 
are relevant and need to be included in your study. The perspective for your 
study would be the provider perspective - i.e., the Australian Government. 
You cou ld also conduct the study from th e societal perspective which would 
consider all costs and outcomes. 
Question 7 
What would be a realistic timeframe for the study? (I.e., what is the period of 
time during which the program/intervention will be implemented?) 
Good student answer 
❖ It would have to be> 6 months (the time it would take for a 3-dose schedule 
to be complete). At least 1-2 years would need to be required to at least 
have one full cohort and also account for initial 'teething' where uptake of 
the vaccine may be low. 
Other points to consider 
► The timeframe is the period during which the intervent ion is delivered. 
► One year would give you enough time to see an annua l cohort of infants 
receive the complete dose regimen. 
Question 8 
What is the study's analytic horizon? (I.e., what is the entire period during which 
costs and benefits related to the impact of the program/intervention will be 
measured?) 
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Good student answer 
❖ The analytic horizon will be the length of fol/aw up required after the 
implementation of program to observe measurable changes in health 
outcomes. (A great vague, diplomatic answer!) 
Other points to consider 
► This is a difficult question to answer and all students included good 
components to consider, like whether the vaccine confers long-term cross-
protection of other strains of 5. pneumoniae, whether we know how long 
the vaccine is effective for, whether we know anything about herd immunity 
effects. 
► You cou ld assume that the vaccine would prevent pneumococcal disease 
until a child was five years old and therefore that the analytic horizon should 
be five years. This may be conservative. 
Question 9 
What do you think would be the most appropriate/realistic study format to use 
for this evaluation? {I.e., how will you assess the program/intervention?) 
Good student answer 
❖ Modelling is the most realistic and time/labour effective option ... but will 
also require some assumptions, thus validity may be an issue. 
❖ if funding is available, the most appropriate study would be a prospective 
study as data collected would be more reliable than retrospective and 
modelling which uses a number of assumptions. 
❖ A combined study design incorporating retrospective study for baseline data 
and prospective study for follow up of health outcomes, using a series of 
administrative datasets. 
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Other points to consider 
► A prospective study considering a representative samp le of an annual birth 
cohort wou ld be the best option but it would be tim e and resource 
intensive. Modelling cou ld be considered using decis ion-ana lysis software if 
the resources do not exist for a prospective study. We would need 
appropriate software and expertise for this. Both study types could be 
considered . 
Question 10 
What costs do you think should be included in the analysis? 
Good stud ent answer 
❖ -Direct medical: hospital costs (in-patient, out-patient, ED), general practice 
costs, medications and diagnostic costs. 
-Direct non-medical cost: loss of productivity of parents/patien t, 
administration (healthcare facilities and Medicare) 
-Cost of vaccine and cost to roll-out the program (media campaigns, 
administration, staff, logistics etc.) 
Other points to consider 
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► We need to include program costs, direct costs (m ed ica l and nonmed ica l) 
and productivity losses. We should do th is for both no vaccination program 
and for the program in order to compare. 
► Program costs= cost of vaccine and administrative costs per dose 
► Medical costs could include hospitalisation costs, emergency room costs, 
diagnostic test costs, surgery costs, prescription drug costs, outpatient costs, 
etc. We could break these down further. 
► Nonmedical costs could include administrative costs and parent/caregiver 
lost time from work. 
► Productivity losses would be those of the child. This is difficult to assess and 
wou ld involve questionnaires aimed at understanding quality of life based 
on parent or caregiver answers. If we are conducting the evaluat ion from 
the provider/payer perspective, we do not need to include productivity 
losses. 
Question 11 
What would be the intermediate and final outcome measures in your evaluation? 
Good student answer 
❖ -Intermediate outcomes: 
Number of vaccines given 
Vaccine uptake 
-Final outcome: 
Incidence of disease (based on notifications, hospitalisations) and 
complications 
Deaths from disease 
Other points to consider 
► Outcome measures are units used to assess the output of the program or 
intervention. 
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► Though using final outcomes may be preferred, intermed iate outcomes are 
often used because they are available and the fin al outcome data are 
insufficient. Moreover, intermed iate outcomes may be used if a strong 
causal link exists between the intermediate and final outcomes. 
► For this study, th e intermediate outcome could include the number of 
children vaccinated. Th e final outcomes would be a better indicator of the 
effecti veness of the program and could include the numbers of men ingitis or 
bacteraemia, pneumococcal pn eumon ia, otitis media, infection, disability or 
death. 
Question 12 
What will be the final summary measure in this evaluation? 
Good student answer 
❖ Cost-effectiveness ratio 
Other points to consider 
► Cost-effectiveness ratio= net costs/cases prevented (or another natural 
hea lth unit like deaths prevented) 
Question 13 
What are the anticipated program costs based on the estimations in the table 
above? 
Good student answer 
❖ Cost of vaccination: 
Total vaccination cost (for each child x 3 doses)= $270.00x250,000= $67.Sm 
378 
Total administration cost (for each child x 3 doses) 
$3.75m 
$15.00x250,000= 
=$71.25m 
Question 14 
What is the net cost of implementing this program? 
Good student answer 
❖ Total program costs (from above): $71.25 million 
Total program costs= 
Total treatment costs - no vaccination program= $144.2 million 
Total treatment costs - with vaccination program= $127.3 million 
Difference in treatment costs between no vaccination and implementing the 
vaccination program= $16.9 million 
Total costs of implementing this vaccination program = 
Net cost= Program costs - disease costs averted= 
$71.25 million -16.9 million= $54.35 million 
Question 15 
How many health outcomes would be prevented by the vaccination program? 
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Good student answer 
❖ 552 cases of disease and 12.4 deaths would be averted by implementing the 
vaccination program 
Question 16 
Calculate the CER in terms of cost per case of disease prevented and cost per 
death averted. Interpret these results - what do they mean? 
Good student answer 
❖ All were correct 
54.35 m I 552 cases prevented= $98,460 
54.35 m I 12.4 deaths prevented= $4,383,064 
Other points to consider 
► This program costs $54.34 mi llion and results in 552 cases prevented and 
12.4 death s averted. With the program, each additiona l case avert ed costs 
$98,460 and each add itional death averted costs $4.83 million. 
► This ratio would all ow us to compare the program with other vaccinat ion 
programs. 
Question 17 
Is this an expensive vaccine program? What is your instinctive opinion (and basic 
recommendation to your boss) on whether it is cost-effective or not? 
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Good student answer 
❖ It seems like a very expensive program and my instinctive opinion would be 
not to support the program. Having said that however I'd like to do more 
research comparing this against a cost effective analysis of vaccinating 'at 
risk' children and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people only. I'd also 
like to compare it against the CEA's of other vaccination programs that have 
been included and excluded from the immunisation schedule. 
❖ I don't know if this is expensive, I'd need to refer to other programs to gauge 
the expense. But what value do you put on a life? My instinct indicates this is 
not expensive, especially when productivity losses and intangible losses are 
not included in the analysis. 
Other points to consider 
► It would appear that this is an expensive program but we'd need to have 
other programs' CERs calculated in order to make a comparison . For 
example, a study on the cost-effectiveness of varicella vaccination 
determined that the vaccine cost $64 to prevent one case of chickenpox. 
Clearly, comparing the two, the pneumococcal program is dramatically more 
expensive. 
► Answering this question requires us to ask whether or not this is good value 
for money - and this is a value judgement. What is the threshold which we 
apply that determines this depends on who the decision-maker is, how the 
decision-maker values health outcomes and money, how willing the 
decision-maker is to substitute one for the other, and the decision-maker's 
attitude towards risk. If the decision-maker is the Government, then general 
societal consensus will also influence the decision. The resources available 
will also contribute to this decision. 
► A cost-effectiveness evaluation is subjective and is meant to provide a 
general guideline as to whether a program is reasonably efficient, 
questionably efficient or inefficient. 
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Question 18 
What other parameters should be subjected to sensitivity analyses? 
Good student answer 
❖ -Vaccine efficacy 
-Discount rate 
-Positive effects of herd immunity 
❖ -Cost of vaccine 
-Cost of health services 
Other points to consider 
► Other factors which cou ld impact on the study results shou ld be subjected 
to sensitivity analyses. These cou ld include vaccine efficacy, incidence of 
pneumococcal disease, treatment costs (which cou ld be broken down more 
thoroughly), vaccine adm inistration cost, cost of th e vaccine, discount rates . 
► A range of possible values should then be employed and resu lts recalculated 
accordingly. If the study results change significantly and have therefore 
reacted very sensitively to a particular set of parameters, then results shou ld 
be interpret ed carefully. 
Question 19 
Roughly, how does this compare with what you worked out for the cost-
effectiveness of the 7vPCV program? What would your recommendations to your 
boss be in terms of which vaccine to fund? What types of information would help 
you to better make your recommendation? 
382 
Good student answer 
❖ I'd recommend funding the MCCV program over the /PD program as the 
MCCV program is o lot more cost effective than the 7vPCV program 
particularly cost per death. 
Types of information to help make recommendations: 
-CEA of the 'high risk' vaccination program for /PD 
-Efficacy, duration of efficacy and adverse events of both meningococcal C 
and 7vPCV vaccines, 
-Public interest 
-CEA comparison with other vaccines on the immunisation schedule and 
vaccines that did not make it onto the schedule 
❖ The 7vPCV is a bit more expensive than the meningococcol C vaccine. I see 
where you're going in terms of cheaper cost vs. more of the population 
covered but I couldn't choose, it's not ethical as you're talking about the lives 
of children. I'd tell him to fund both. In terms of outcomes, they can both be 
just as devastating. Maybe I'm just not meant to be one of those people that 
have to make these decisions. 
Other points to consider 
Pneumococcal: 
54.35 m / 552 cases prevented = $98,460 
54 .35 m / 12.4 deaths prevented = $4,383,064 
Meningococcal: 
9.6m / 130 cases prevented= $73,846 
9.6 m / 13 deaths prevented= $738,462 
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► The pneumococcal program is significantly more expensive to fund at 54.35 
million compared with the meningococca l program. It is cheaper to prevent 
a case of meningococcal or a death from meningococcal than it is 
pneumococcal . Th e meningococca l program is also expensive however. 
► Notifi cation rates and mortality rates are both higher for invasive 
pneumococca l as is the impact from non-in vasive pn eumococca l disease 
states. 
► Based on this rough data, and understanding that both are expensive, you 
cou ld consider recommending funding the pneumococcal program because 
it is has the potentia l to avert more disease burden. It is not always better to 
fund the cheaper program. This is abso lutely subjective and there is no right 
answer for this question. 
► We wou ld wan t to know how these costs compare with other vaccine 
programs, whether a ca tch up campaign would be necessa ry, and if so how 
extensive wou ld that be and how costly? How long do th e vaccines last fo r? 
Where would the fun ding come for either program? Are both vaccines 
equa lly effective and equa lly effective for invasive disease, non-invasive 
disease and long term sequelae? Are they both effective for all serotypes of 
the disease? Do we have enough to fund each? Do we have enough money 
to fund both? 
► Also, knowing that th ere is already a PCV program in place for Ind igenous 
and high-risk infants, we'd want t o know what proport ion of the age co hort 
is covered by this program. 
Question 20 
From a decision-maker/policy perspective, how do these media portrayals 
influence the debate over which vaccination program to fund? After seeing these 
articles, what other factors would you include on your list of criteria which 
influence whether or not a vaccine is publicly funded? Would you change your 
basic recommendation to your boss based on any of this information you have 
just considered? 
Good student answer 
❖ The media portrayed both diseases as sudden and deadly diseases that 
affects mostly children and are incurable. They framed the diseases in a 
highly emotive manner (far e.g. 'what price is life?') and alleged that the 
government is doing nothing about this. This will influence the debate 
significantly because we are dealing with a group of vulnerable populations 
and the government would always want to give the image that they are 
doing something and are responding to the public's concerns. 
Other factors to consider are the societal perspective and the potential public 
backlash of not funding a potentially preventable disease. 
I would incorporate this issue into my recommendation and have a measured 
approach that considers not only the epidemiological and economics aspects 
of the disease but also the political and social dimensions of this. 
Other points to consider 
► Beyond just burden of disease, vaccine characteristics, immunisation 
strategy and cost-effectiveness, other factors come into play with funding a 
vaccine, including the program's acceptability and equity, as well as ethical, 
legal and political considerations. 
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► While implementing a vaccination or sim ilar program may invo lve more than 
just health and epidemiological considerations, it goes beyond the 'money 
matters' which were the focus of this Lessons from the Fie ld . At the end of 
the day, the politi ca l and social context w ithin which a program is being 
considered is crucial to the final decision, especially when countries have 
substantial health budgets to work with. 
► Consequently, both of these vaccination programs were in fact funded. 
Appendix 7.B. Schedule for Epi Info™ 7 training session 
Topic 1: Welcome and introduction 
Introduction - staff and participants 
Logistics 
Topic 2: Introduction to Epi Info and the 
training session 
• Learning objectives 
• Epi Info Overview 
• Capabilities and uses 
• Format of session 
Introduction to case study 
Topic 3: Questionnaire and maps 
• Learning objectives 
• Introduction to questionnaires and 
maps 
• Create form 
• Enter data 
• Create a cluster map 
Round table 
Power point 
presentation 
Powe r point 
presentation 
Power point 
presentation 
Instruction 
demonstration 
Participant 
activities 
Break for 15 minutes 
Topic 4: Overview of data analysis 
Classic and visual dashboard 
Topic 5: Data analysis using visual dashboard 
• Learning objectives 
• Data import/ export, open Epi Info 
dataset 
• Descriptive statistics 
• Frequency tables, summary statistics 
• Recode variables 
• Create graphs/ epi curve 
• 2x2 tables 
Power point 
presentation 
Instruction 
demonstration 
Participant 
activities 
1 uo-
1.40 
Alexis 
1.40 -
1.55 
Alexis 
1.55-
2.00 
Alexis 
2.00-
3.00 
May 
Rowena 
3.15 -
3.20 
Ra nil 
3.20-
4.15 
Ra nil 
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Topic 6: Classic analysis 
Topic 7: Stat ca lc 
• Introduce the range of statistical 
functions and when to use them 
• Use stat calc to assess if 1' cases 
occur by chance 
Instruction 
demonstration 
Power point 
presentation 
Instruction 
demonstration 
Participant 
activities 
4.15-
4.30 
Ee Laine 
4.30-
4.45 
Ee Laine 
Summing up discussions and final questions I Instructor leads I 4.45 -
discussion 5.00 
Evaluation forms Ee Laine 
Appendix 7.C. Results from the Epi Info™ 7 training session 
evaluation 
At the completion of the Epi lnfo•M 7 teaching exercise, an evaluation form 
(Appendix 7.E) was handed out to all the participants. Ten responses were received. 
The responses to the questions in the evaluation forms appear below: 
1. How well organized was the Epi lnfo•M 7 course? 
Two of the ten participants (20%) stated it was "extremely organized", eight {80%) 
stated it was "very organized" and 1 participant (10%) stated it was "moderately 
organized". 
2. Had you used Epi lnfo'M before this session (you can tick more than one 
box)? 
Three participants (30%) answered "Yes - a bit" , two participants (20%) answered 
"Yes - but a long time ago", 4 participants (40%) answered "~o" and one participant 
{10%) answered "Yes - but a long time ago" and "Yes- but an older version" 
3. How useful to your job was the information presented at the Epi lnfo•M 7 
course? 
Six participants (60%) answered that it was "very useful" and four participants 
{40%) answered that it was "moderately useful". 
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4. How much have your skills improved because of training at the course? 
One participant (10%) answered "a great deal", four participants answered "a lot" 
and four participants (40%) answered a moderate amount. One participant did not 
answer the question. 
5. How comfortable did you feel asking questions at the course? 
Two participants {20%) answered "extremely comfortable" and eight participants 
(80%) answered "very comfortable". 
6. How friendly were the presenters? 
Five participants (50%) answered "extremely friendly" and five participants {50%) 
answered "very friendly" 
7. Did the presenters allow enough time for the computer exercise? 
Eight participants {80%) answered that it was "about the right amount", 1 
participant {10%) answered that it was "slightly too little". One participant wrote: 
"varied sometimes too little, depended on program playing up" 
8. How easy was it to keep up with the exercise? 
Two participants (20%) answered that it was "extremely easy", four participants {40 
%) answered that it was "very easy", and four participants {40%) answered that it 
was "moderately easy". 
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9. What suggestions do you have for improving the Epi Jnfo'M course if it were 
to be run again? 
Comments received were: 
• "Larger screen, sometimes difficult to see what presenter was doing. If 
bringing laptop, more information on system requirements" 
• "More exercises to work through" 
"Invite participants to bring current dataset under investigation" 
• "Keep class size small" 
10. Overall, how satisfied were you with the Epi lnfo'M 7 course? 
Six participants (60%) answered that they were "extremely satisfied" and four 
participants (40%) answered that they were "moderately satisfied". 
11. If you have any comments about the Epi lnfo'M 7 course, please write them 
below: 
Comments received were: 
"Thank you ... now I'll know where to start when that outbreak hits!!" 
"Good course materials" 
"Thanks for allowing this great opportunity. Cheers" 
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Appendix 7.D. Evaluation of the Epi Info 7™ training session 
This is a short evaluat ion of the Epi lnfo 'M 7 cou rse th at was run on 18 March 2013. 
Th ank you for tak ing the t ime to complet e th is form. The information wil l be used to 
improve future sessions. 
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1. How well organized was the Epi ln fo'M 7 course? 
o Extremely organized 
o Very organized 
o Moderately organized 
o Slight ly organized 
□ Not at all organized 
2. How useful to you r job was th e information presented at the Epi lnfo•M 7 
course? 
□ Extremely usefu l 
o Very useful 
o Modera te ly useful 
D Slightly useful 
o Not at all useful 
o Other (p lease specify) _____________ ___ _ 
3. How much have your skills improved because of training at th e course? 
o A great deal 
o A lot 
o A moderate amount 
D A little 
o None at all 
4. How comfortable did you feel asking questions at the course? 
□ Extremely comfortable 
□ Very comfortable 
□ Moderately comfortable 
o Slightly comfortable 
□ Not at all comfortable 
5. How friendly were the presenters? 
□ Extreme ly fr iendly 
□ Very friendly 
□ Moderately friendly 
o Slightly friendly 
□ Not at all friendly 
6. Did the presenters allow enough time for the computer exercises? 
□ Much too much 
□ Somewhat too much 
□ Slightly too much 
□ About the right amount 
□ Slightly too litt le 
□ Somewhat too li ttle 
□ Much too little 
7. How easy was it to keep up with the exercises? 
□ Extremely easy 
□ Very easy 
□ Moderately easy 
D Slightly easy 
□ Not at all easy 
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8. What suggestions do you have for improving this Epi Info™ course if it were 
to be run again? 
9. Overall, how sa tisfied were you with the Epi Info'" 7 course7 
o Extremely satisfied 
o Moderately satisfied 
D Slightly satisfi ed 
o Neither satisfied or dissat isfied 
D Sligh tly dissatisfied 
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o Moderately dissatisfied 
o Extremely dissatisfied 
10. If you have any comments about the Epi Info'" 7 course, please write them 
below: 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS EVALUATION!! 
